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FOREWORD
The negative impact of plant closings and relocations on 
individuals and communities is of growing public concern as 
the frequency of these phenomena increases. Joblessness 
associated with plant closings now appears to contribute to 
national unemployment statistics.
In this comprehensive review of the plant-closing research 
undertaken over the past two decades, the authors attempt to 
identify conceptual and methodological limitations of past 
research, areas where policy needs to be developed, and 
directions in which programming efforts should move. It is 
intended as a compendium of information which could pro 
mote the formulation of a new research agenda and assist 
policymakers and planners who might wish to review past ef 
forts in order to find directions for the present and future.
Facts and observations as presented in this monograph are 
the sole responsibility of the authors. Their viewpoints do 
not necessarily represent positions of the W. E. Upjohn In 
stitute for Employment Research.
E. Earl Wright 
Director
Kalamazoo, Michigan 
November 1981
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PREFACE
The purpose of this study is to summarize and synthesize 
the results of the most significant plant-closing studies 
published during the past two decades. This review was 
undertaken with two major objectives in mind. First, a sim 
ple summary of the literature and a convenient compilation 
of research findings would be, it was hoped, helpful to those 
who wish to pursue research in this area as well as to those 
who are concerned about the policy and program implica 
tions of industrial relocation. Second, and perhaps more im 
portant, we have attempted to review the literature in terms 
of several critical questions, such as reemployment ex 
periences of displaced workers, community responses to 
plant closings, and mental health outcomes of unemploy 
ment, so as to identify what advances in our understanding 
have been made over the past two decades. The natural 
results of that approach have been the identification of areas 
where research is either nonexistent or inadequate, sugges 
tions about the causes of these lacunae, and recommenda 
tions about the conceptual and methodological approaches 
which would be most productive.
This review focuses upon the standard plant-closing study, 
which is typically a case study or a collection of case studies. 
The organization of this research summary follows the plant- 
closing event in a chronological fashion. We proceed from a 
first section, which considers the state of plant-closing 
research and the concerns and options of the groups involved 
in a shutdown, to a second chapter, which views the manage-
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ment decision in a series of economic contexts: international, 
national and local. Next, the immediate and intermediate 
responses of management, the union or unions, and the com 
munity are considered, together with some related material 
about recent state and federal legislative initiatives and a 
brief outline of how European countries respond to 
economic dislocation. The second half of this volume is con 
cerned with the experiences of the displaced workers, their 
job search behaviors and subsequent labor market ex 
periences, their participation in programs designed to 
facilitate reemployment and the outcomes of those pro 
grams, and the effects of job loss on mental health. A con 
cluding section reflects upon the aims and objectives set out 
earlier and proposes concrete research projects as well as a 
general research agenda. It also summarizes the research 
findings and outlines the implications for policy and prac 
tice.
The studies we have selected for intensive review do not 
represent, as noted earlier, the entire plant-closing literature 
of the past two decades, although the vast majority of 
studies are included. Also, some research reports which are 
not standard plant-closing studies and therefore do not ap 
pear in our list of studies reviewed are cited extensively. This 
research from more general areas, such as unemployment 
and mental health, community and political action, and the 
impacts of shifts in investment patterns, is interwoven with 
the results of plant-closing studies to further validate, con 
firm, and illuminate those findings as well as to raise ques 
tions about them. Our analysis is heavily reliant on 27 plant 
closings reported in 20 studies. These studies appear early, as 
in Dorsey's study of the Mack closing in 1963. Others are 
very recent, such as the Aronson and McKersie comparative 
analyses from upstate New York completed in 1980. Some of 
the studies are accounts of industrial dislocation in New 
England, for example, the five studies of Devino,
vin
Raphaelson and Storer as well as the Lipsky analysis of in- 
terplant transfer, while New York state is represented by 
Foltman's study of the difference between blue-collar and 
white-collar workers in response to job loss. All but one of 
the studies are American. (We have included Portis and 
Suy's study of the impact of early notification of the closing 
at the Kelvinator plant in London, Ontario.) Several studies 
of the midwestern experience, notably Aiken, Ferman and 
Sheppard and Palen and Fahey, as well as Root, are included 
and the South is represented by McCrea's study of Roanoke, 
the Shultz analysis of the Fort Worth program, and Walter 
Strange's study of Saltville, Virginia. Geographic diversity is 
paralleled by industrial diversity: Aiken, Ferman and Shep 
pard as well as Palen and Fahey studied automobile 
manufacturing; McCrea studied the fabric industry; and 
Stern and others studied the transformation of the meat 
packing industry. More recent studies, such as Aronson and 
McKersie, feature newer industries television tubes and 
photographic equipment.
It is important to note that there is little unity among these 
studies. This diversity is real. It does not simply reflect a dif 
ferent industry in a different area studied at a different time. 
Methodology and conceptualization of the several studies 
differ substantially. The approach and focus of each study is 
different. Several, such as Stern and Lipsky, are actually 
program evaluations, while others, such as Root and 
Strange, stress the noneconomic consequences of closures 
but in very different ways. While the unity is often more ap 
parent, because of similar subject matter, than real, the con 
sistent results or concerns that emerge are emphasized.
This review is, in several important respects, a continua 
tion and update of work begun by William A. Haber, Louis 
A. Ferman, and James Hudson in the early 1960s and 
published by the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research as The Impact of Technological Change: The
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American Experience in 1963. Like that volume, the present 
study concentrates upon the standard plant-closing situation 
captured at the time of the closure. It emphasizes the after 
math of the management decision, the labor market ex 
periences of the displaced workers and the effectiveness of 
programs mounted to assist with the transition. However, 
the concerns of researchers in this area have changed, and 
the focus of the present review reflects that change. We see, 
for example, a new preoccupation with community response, 
with the unemployed family rather than the unemployed in 
dividual alone, and with programs which attempt to vary at 
an early point. Still, since the general approach of plant- 
closing studies has remained the same, and since plant clos 
ings have always been difficult experiences for individuals 
and communities, it is reassuring that the more recent studies 
continue to confirm earlier findings. On the other hand, that 
some similarities continue to exist between this review and its 
1963 ancestor is a matter for concern, especially since in 
dustrial relocation is no longer viewed as a sporadic set of 
events characteristic of a growing and expanding economy, 
but rather as uncomfortably frequent symptoms of an 
economy undergoing an uncertain period of transition. 
Some of the same recommendations for research, policy 
development, and program implementation found in the 
earlier study are repeated in this volume. It is our hope that 
this volume will be generally useful and that the research, 
policy and program recommendations which have become 
even more important after more than 18 years will, at long 
last, be implemented.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
The State of Plant-Closing Research
Until recently, plant closings have been a relatively 
neglected area of research. While several case studies date 
back to the Great Depression and even before, and the threat 
of automation aroused considerable interest in the field in 
the 1960s, the fact that the national economy has been ex 
panding has made the problem of industrial relocation ap 
pear to be a temporary phenomenon. While industrial 
relocation has meant disruption for individuals and com 
munities, ultimate benefit was seen in the industrial growth 
that plant closings and relocations heralded. Considering the 
quantity of research on other employment problems, the 
literature on plant closings remains modest. Nevertheless 
analysis of the findings we do have can pinpoint areas where 
research is most urgently needed, areas where policy needs to 
be developed, and directions in which programming efforts 
should move.
There is now enormous public concern about the problems 
of plant closings, and this concern is reflected in the growing 
need of workers for reassurance as to the security of their 
jobs. Communities also are worried, especially those cities in 
the Northeast and Midwest that are losing old industries 
while failing to attract new facilities. Indeed there is ap 
prehension on a national scale as an increasing fraction of 
the world's manufacturing capacity is being located abroad 
because of the cheaper labor markets available there. In-
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terest has been keen in efforts by employees and/or com 
munity members to purchase plants slated for closing and to 
continue operations. At every level of government, serious 
problems arise as workers displaced by plant closings move 
to enroll in government programs that will compensate them 
for their losses or prepare them for effective labor market 
reentry.
Two additional factors contribute to the need for research 
on plant closings. The United States lags behind the other in 
dustrialized nations of the world in the development of a na 
tional employment policy, particularly of a policy directed 
toward the orderly management of the investment and 
disinvestment process. Various proposals have been brought 
before Congress and legislative initiatives on the local level 
are moving rapidly in some areas. Many states are consider 
ing bills requiring plants to give advance notice of closings. 
This legislative action is, however, taking place without ade 
quate knowledge of the scope of the plant-closing problem 
and its long term effects, still less the appropriate strategies 
for reducing the costs incurred by industrial and economic 
dislocation.
Furthermore, we are still without information that is 
critical, not just to formation of national policy, but to ef 
fective development, implementation, and administration of 
ad hoc programs designed to confront economic emergen 
cies. We do not have data on the prevalence of plant clos 
ings, on how many facilities shut down during any given year 
or for what reasons. We do not know the number of workers 
affected or the scope of the effects on communities. We do 
not know to what extent companies that move benefit from 
this investment strategy, and we have no clear idea of the 
available interventions or of their cost-effectiveness.
While the negative impact of plant closings upon in 
dividuals and communities has seldom been dismissed light-
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ly, it has been possible to develop an argument that 
unemployment associated with plant closings is a relatively 
insignificant portion of the total national unemployment pic 
ture. Cross-sectional data to document the reasons why in 
dividuals are unemployed at a particular time are not 
available. Case study data, the staple of plant-closing 
research, reveal a great deal about unemployment in par 
ticular instances but have no wider applicability. There have 
been assertions that research, policies, and programs need 
not be developed especially for plant closings since the exten- 
siveness of the problem does not justify widespread concern, 
but arguments as to the permanence of the termination 
associated with plant closings have been stressed to justify 
concern. Data are still not available to indicate clearly what 
percentage of those unemployed at any specific time are 
jobless because of plant shutdowns, but recently collated in 
direct evidence shows joblessness associated with plant clos 
ings now contributes significantly to the statistics on national 
unemployment. Business Week1 estimates that two million 
jobs have been lost as a result of plant closings over the past 
five years. Bluestone and Harrison2 examine the National 
Longitudinal Sample (NLS) and cite the findings of Parnes 
and King over the 7-year period 1966-73 for 4,000 males over 
the age of 45. Men were selected who had served at least five 
years with their employers and their employment histories 
were followed. About 4.6 percent of the sample, represent 
ing men over 45, experienced permanent involuntary separa 
tion from employment during the study period. These data, 
while far from comprehensive, confirm that plant closings 
provide a substantial part of the total unemployment figures. 
Research in plant closings has been confined to the case
1. Business Week, March 12, 1979, p. 41.
2. Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, Capital and Communities: The Causes and Con 
sequences of Private Disinvestment (Washington, DC: Progressive Alliance, 1980), 
p. 19 ff.
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study and evaluation tradition and that as a consequence 
there is no comprehensive listing of plant closings and no 
statistics concerning the extent of unemployment directly or 
indirectly attributable to plant shutdowns.
While we have come to understand some of the conse 
quences of plant closings for individuals and communities 
better than we did some two decades ago, we are coping with 
these consequences in much the same ways that were com 
mon then. The earlier solutions were designed as stop gap 
measures for victims of short-run problems created by an ex 
panding economic system ultimately expected to benefit all. 
Even these limited goals were not met with a high degree of 
success; but this was not considered a serious deficiency, for 
this was a period when economic growth and job oppor 
tunities were expected to be in an upward spiral that would 
go on indefinitely.
Research on plant closings has always been undertaken 
with a strong orientation toward policy and program 
development. In fact, the literature is primarily concerned 
with the evaluation of programs. It is therefore particularly 
striking that in the years between 1963, when the first series 
of plant-closing studies were analyzed, and 1980, no really 
new approach has been tried. Benefits paid are higher, more 
attention is given to various provisions of collective bargain 
ing agreements designed either to assist with plant-closing 
problems or to be adapted to meet that situation, and early 
retirement options have increased, but all these responses 
were available in one form or another in the early 1960s. 
Thus the past two decades have seen program amplification 
rather than program change. Despite the fact that these 
measures were never designed to attack a problem at its root, 
but simply to ease the difficulties in a transition period, they 
were not particularly effective in achieving even their stated 
and limited goals. Over the past two decades, they have been 
elaborated, extended, and evaluated. During the same period
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the plant closing, often a healthy sign of growth and change, 
has become a symptom of a stagnant economy; measures 
designed to ameliorate the negative impact of plant closures 
have become less and less well adapted to that end.
Plant closings have a widespread rippling effect, and par 
ties concerned have a repertoire of responses available to 
them. Once the decision to close has been made, manage 
ment, unions, individuals, communities, local agencies, and 
elements of the government all have their own particular in 
terests and priorities. If these parties view their problems as 
similar and agree on strategies for coping with them, a clos 
ing can take place with minimal difficulty. Yet, even in the 
best circumstances, it is clear that each of these groups will 
perceive a different part of the problem or often a different 
problem altogether, and that no single framework for 
understanding the full implications of plant closings current 
ly exists. It is scarcely surprising then that no coherent 
policies or programs have been developed.
The design and implementation of policies and programs 
to deal with problems associated with plant closings in 
evitably promote suggestions about the development of a na 
tional policy in fundamental opposition to the basic 
assumption that a capital market operates perfectly and that 
to intervene in this process risks serious disturbance of the 
market. This conflict, which is seldom made explicit in the 
plant-closing literature, is at the root of most of the observed 
inadequacies of research, policy development and program 
design, implementation and evaluation.
Although the national economic climate, the general in 
dustrial environment, and local realities and constraints are 
all significant both to the plant-closing decision and to its 
aftermath, plant-closing studies tend to be focused on the 
aftereffects of the decision. The decision in its general and 
specific context will be considered below at some length, but
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the emphasis in this review will be placed upon the actors in 
the plant-closing situation, the repertoire of responses 
available to meet their concerns, whether and in what ways 
these concerns and responses are conjoined, and how this 
conjunction or lack of its affects final outcomes. The actors 
in a plant-closing situation are usually (1) management, 
(2) the union or unions, (3) the individual workers, and 
(4) the community. Within the idea of community, it is ap 
propriate to group the local population in the most general 
sense: merchants whose sales will drop off; teachers whose 
jobs may be eliminated as the tax base is reduced; persons 
who provide services to affected workers, as well as those 
who join in a community effort to take action that may be 
deemed appropriate to the crisis. Local government, in 
cluding both the service sector and industrial development, 
can also be assigned community membership, despite fre 
quent strong links between local, state, and federal agencies. 
The fifth actor, often intimately involved with some or all of 
the others, includes state or federal agencies. Each actor has 
a specific set of concerns and a number of possible responses 
from which to draw actions that may be considered ap 
propriate to the particular situation. It must once again be 
stressed that plant-closing research continues in the case 
study tradition and that the time dimension of these studies 
seldom extends beyond a year or two at most. Such studies 
never assess the problems beyond the narrow scope of one 
closed plant, because there are theoretically numerous ways 
in which the closing of a plant can proceed. Thus we can 
draw only upon limited evidence for a limited number of 
closings, but that evidence does suggest that certain 
responses by the several actors involved can minimize the 
costs associated with economic dislocation, while other 
responses can exacerbate the initial disturbance.
Introduction
Management Post-Decision Concerns
Whatever reasons are advanced for plant closings, 
management will have much the same concerns during the 
shutdown period, whether the action is a closing or a reloca 
tion.
One major concern is to keep productivity as high as possi 
ble from the time the decision is announced until the time of 
actual closing. During the phase-out period, another 
management concern is to avoid public opprobrium. While 
this concern is directed chiefly toward workers, it includes 
the community at large, and to both groups management 
wishes to validate its competence in decisionmaking. It is im 
portant for management to avoid court suits that may be in 
itiated by workers or the community. This priority is close to 
another management concern: that is, keeping industrial and 
local peace involves both avoiding local disapproval and 
restricting costs. Maintaining the physical integrity of the 
facility is crucial; a building must be in good repair if 
management plans to sell it. Maintenance of equipment is 
also important, whether that equipment is to be moved to 
another location or for the use of an eventual purchaser. 
Good relations must be maintained between management 
and the community to avoid possible tax penalties and to 
enlist the cooperation of local leaders in the sale of the facili 
ty. If the plant is moving to a new location, management 
must regard a smooth transition as one of its priorities, for 
such a transition will be obviously less costly. It is at this 
point that encouragement is given to certain key personnel to 
transfer with the plant, while inducements are offered to less 
valued workers to remain behind.
Union Post-Decision Concerns
A major priority of labor unions is to maintain the viabili 
ty of the organization in the face of loss of membership. To
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some degree this priority is consonant with labor's other 
aims during the phase-out, most if not all of which concern 
the affected workers. First, the unions attempt whenever 
possible to delay closings or to avoid them completely. Since 
either attempt is usually futile, the unions then move to 
maintain job security for members through transfer. 
Whether or not such transfers can be arranged, labor tries to 
maintain the income level of members as far as possible. 
Labor also is concerned about the trauma inflicted on 
unemployed and employed members of the union alike, step 
ping in to assist with problems associated with unemploy 
ment. Labor is concerned, as a first priority, with obtaining 
for members all the benefits to which they are entitled and 
additional benefits if possible.
Community Post-Decision Concerns
Local communities faced with the prospect of a closing 
plant look first to maintaining the population and industrial 
base of the area. In one sense, this concern is closely tied to 
that of maintaining the tax base at its preclosing level. Often 
communities, like management, wish to delay the closing to 
insure a smooth change and avoid the flare-up of conflict 
and hostility that might endanger life and property. Local 
communities also hope that the physical plant and its equip 
ment will remain intact and so they also wish to maintain a 
high level of services in the community for, even though the 
tax base may be jeopardized by the announced closing, com 
munities are keenly aware of the important role that good 
services, roads, public safety, and schools can play in at 
tracting and retaining industry.
Individual Post-Decision Concerns
Individuals wish above all to maintain economic and 
social security during the phase-out period. They need infor 
mation about a range of issues bearing on job security and
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income maintenance, as well as a sense of certainty about 
what plans are and are not feasible under the circumstances.
Governmental Post-Decision Concerns
Concerns of local, state, and federal government and the 
various agencies specifically mandated to respond to 
employment-related crises are roughly similar, although dif 
ferent levels of government and government agencies un 
doubtedly have different priorities depending upon the situa 
tion at hand. However, most levels of government would 
agree that, if possible, the ideal solution would be to prevent, 
delay or at least minimize the effects of closings. Failing 
that, concern shifts to recompensing workers for lost in 
come, and to efforts toward their reemployment, such as 
training or retraining. However, local, state, and federal 
agencies have recently become aware that the problem of 
unemployment encompasses more than income maintenance 
and reemployment; the entire area of physical, emotional, 
and social consequences of unemployment and a changing 
industrial environment has become a matter for serious 
discussion. Finally, a continuing concern is to rebuild the 
economic base of the community after the shutdown.
Each group affected by a plant closing has at hand a reper 
toire of responses. Which responses are selected by any one 
group depends in part upon the choices of the other groups. 
The responses settled upon by the different groups and their 
interaction determine the nature of the plant-closing ex 
perience.
Management Repertoire of 
Post-Decision Responses
Management may elect to provide the workers and the 
community with advance notice. Early notice is required by 
law in some areas, and many states have legislation now 
pending that would require a substantial payment to be made
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if insufficient notice is given. Often management refuses to 
provide much if any advance warning, lest property damage 
be done to the facility and its equipment. Management may 
delay closing to permit certain community actions to take 
place, or it can stagger layoffs so that the labor market is not 
flooded with job seekers at any one time. Union collective 
bargaining agreements often insist that management provide 
transfer rights, and in some cases management is willing to 
give active help with transfer. For workers who do not 
transfer, management can offer placement assistance. 
Severance pay, which may or may not be required by con 
tract, may have various conditions attached to it. Post- 
closing negotiations with labor and the community will be 
smoother if management elects to participate in the transi 
tion from full production to closing. Management can also 
inform the community about plans for the facility and can 
solicit help with the sale of the plant.
Labor Post-Decision Responses
The unions affected by a closing can respond in a variety 
of ways, depending often upon management's post-decision 
actions. Responses to management can range from strike ac 
tivity at one end of the spectrum to a position where virtually 
no contact with management is maintained. Often at a mid 
point in this spectrum, ad hoc bargaining is tried. Going over 
management's head by invoking political power is a response 
occasionally found, but recourse to political initiatives is 
usually considered a strategy by a union rather than a tactic 
by a local. In addition to seeking all possible benefits for 
members, unions respond externally with strenuous efforts 
to build coalitions.
Community Post-Decision Responses
A community faced with an imminent plant closing has 
available to it a wide range of activities that can minimize the
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impact of the closing upon the economic and social well- 
being of community members. While one group or 
another the mayor's office or local social service agencies, 
for example can accomplish limited objectives, com 
prehensive actions can be taken effectively only by a well- 
organized, carefully coordinated effort involving represen 
tatives from many sectors of the community.
Fundamentally, there are only five areas in which 
responses can be made by a community. The first priority is 
commonly an attempt to prevent the closing or, in the event 
that the shutdown is inevitable, to vary the conditions and 
timing of the closing in order to minimize its impact. Com 
munity assistance here is peripheral, although cities and 
counties are occasionally eligible for certain kinds of federal 
assistance that may be of help to the workers. The second 
important community response is directed to reemployment 
of laid-off workers. Community leaders and agencies can 
often cooperate with other local groups to provide job refer 
ral services or can work with local employers to this end. 
Third, training and training-related assistance are areas in 
which communities often take an active role and inventories 
may be made of local training institutions. Fourth, informa 
tion about present and future labor needs may be gathered 
and matched with the abilities of the displaced workforce. 
Funds for such efforts can be acquired from several federal 
sources. Finally, the assembling of such labor market infor 
mation often becomes the basis for a continuing effort to 
monitor the local economy in order to maintain the stability 
of local employers and to rebuild and develop the economic 
base of the community.
Individual Post-Decision Responses
In theory, a whole range of responses is available to those 
individuals who are thrown out of work by a plant shut 
down. Depending upon personal characteristics, the actions
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of other workers, and the state of the labor market, 
however, the unemployed worker may in fact have a limited 
range of options. At one extreme, the worker may im 
mediately become reemployed at a similar job or, at the 
other extreme, may enter upon a period of prolonged and/or 
recurrent unemployment. Intermediate responses include 
retraining, relocation, temporary employment, or the 
development of a new strategy to maintain family income. In 
some cases responses include retirement or early retirement. 
Economic deprivation is associated with prolonged and 
recurrent joblessness, and a wide range of physical and men 
tal health problems may be the outcome of the plant shut 
down.
For those workers more seriously affected, response to the 
closing can be seen as a process, beginning perhaps with 
denial of the fact of the closing and continuing with vain 
hopes of a reopening of the facility and a recall to the old 
job. There is some evidence to suggest that many workers 
react passively after this initial phase and begin seriously to 
look for a job only after benefits have been exhausted, a time 
when the labor market is apt to be at its least receptive. Con 
tinued unemployment or, perhaps even worse, intermittent 
employment marked by the acceptance of jobs at lower pay 
and lower status may ultimately leave these workers at risk 
for mental and physical illness.
Government Post-Decision Responses
The plant shutdown is a classic situation in which income 
security, a major goal in American society, is no longer pro 
vided by private enterprise; the government response is a 
patchwork of income supports. When plant shutdowns are 
particularly threatening to localities already suffering high 
rates of unemployment, the federal government accepts 
residual responsibility on an ad hoc basis for assisting com 
munities with special grants and for dispersing certain sorts
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of income assistance accompanied by retraining and reloca 
tion assistance. Attempts to pass legislation on the federal 
level to prevent or delay plant shutdowns or to levy fines for 
late notification have not been successful. To some degree, 
federal funds provide income for families with no means of 
support after unemployment benefits have been exhausted. 
Both state and federal agencies support a certain amount of 
intervention as well as research directed toward determining 
the most advantageous deployment of intervention funds. 
There has been no continuity of effort in this area, mostly 
because the negative effects of economic dislocation were, 
until recently, considered minor in comparison to the 
benefits associated with economic change.
This inventory of concerns and post-decision responses to 
plant shutdown sets out the limits within which intervention 
may be designed to minimize the impact of plant closings 
upon individuals and communities. That these concerns, 
responses, and potential interventions exist should not imply 
that informed and active programs are commonly initiated 
or that even those that are undertaken are documented and 
analyzed. Still less should there be any implication that the 
literature suggests the costs of economic dislocation should 
be borne by any parties other than the affected individuals 
and the local communities, supported in part by some 
federal assistance. But it is now generally recognized in the 
policies, programs, and literature since 1963 that con 
siderable costs are associated with plant closings, and accor 
dingly attempts will be made to spread these costs across 
society.
Most responses of the groups concerned in a plant closing 
are rational ones when considered in the light of each 
group's special concerns. Some responses, like the call of a 
strike by a union, are only marginally helpful, while others 
(the rapid and early formation of a community coordinating 
council, for instance) serve the purposes of several groups
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well. It is important to note, however, that the concerns and 
the responses of any one group may conflict with those of 
another group or may simply not seem worthwhile. What 
this indicates, in addition to the usual adversary process at 
work between management and labor, is a fundamental 
disagreement about the relations between these groups and 
their place in the larger economy.
Inevitable conflicts accompany industrial relocation, and 
nearly every plant-closing study will resound with one or 
another of them. For example, while arrangements are 
necessary to provide an acceptable level of subsistence dur 
ing the adjustment period, it is equally necessary to motivate 
workers to seek employment and return to work as rapidly as 
possible. These goals are sometimes contradictory. 
Moreover, it is equally difficult to balance the competing 
claims of management to the rights to which it is entitled and 
of social responsibilities toward workers and communities 
which management is sometimes expected to assume. The 
problem lies in the belief that intervention in other than a 
superficial ameliorative fashion would inhibit the operation 
of a free capital market.
These conflicts surface frequently in debates about 
specific policy suggestions. For example, requiring advance 
notice of plant closings may be supported by individuals and 
community groups on the grounds that their joint interests, 
such as rapid reemployment, retraining, relocation, or 
employee-community attempts to purchase the plant, can 
thus be dealt with more expeditiously. Management, on the 
other hand, may object to providing any substantial period 
of advance notice on the grounds that productivity might 
drop before closing or damage be done to the physical plant 
and equipment. Yet a more profound disagreement may 
underlie this dispute. Advance notice may be perceived by 
community, unions and individuals as indicating that the 
closing decision could yet be reversed, while management
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may feel that both the decision and the timing of its an 
nouncements are rights inherent in ownership. On another 
level, those favoring advance notice may argue that it acts as 
a brake on industrial movement and support this as a 
favorable outcome, while those who oppose it may also see it 
as a brake on industrial mobility but as therefore destructive 
to the functioning of the capital market.
This study will follow the plant-closing experience 
chronologically. First it will explore the international, na 
tional, and individual environments in which the plant- 
closing decision is made. Then the post-decision experience 
will be analyzed in terms of the responses discussed above. 
Specific issues will receive attention. Severance pay, for ex 
ample, is part of the industrial context in which the decision 
is made; it is also both a management and a union response 
to the plant-closing decision, and it has an impact upon the 
individual and the community alike. Throughout, the con 
cerns and responses of the major actors management, 
labor, individuals, communities and government will be 
shown as interacting, sometimes in conflict and sometimes in 
cooperation, to result in that complicated phenomenon, a 
plant closing.

Chapter 2
Economic Contexts and
Management Decisions in
Industrial Relocation
and Plant Closing
Reasons for Industrial Relocation
The relocation of industrial facilities and the permanent 
closing of plants are characteristic features of the American 
industrial scene. There have been many reasons for reloca 
tion. For example, the movement of the textile industry from 
New England to the South before and during World War II 
is usually thought to have been impelled by the search for 
nonunion labor. Historically, management has sought to 
reduce costs in order to maximize profits, and numerous fac 
tors other than cheaper labor can contribute to that end. 
Transportation costs, incurred in the acquisition of raw 
materials and the marketing of finished products, have 
become an increasingly important determinant of plant loca 
tion in the face of energy shortages and increased energy 
costs. Shifts in demand or changes in production patterns 
may bring about the closing of a facility or its reduction in 
size. Changes in consumer preference are rapidly translated 
into shifts in the labor market. Technological change, rang 
ing from the limited introduction of new machinery or new
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systems of management to the transformation of an entire 
production process, often means industrial dislocation.
Very seldom are all the factors involved in a specific deci 
sion to close a plant or move an industrial facility known 
outside the managerial cadre in which the decision is made. 
The objective of management is to improve the company's 
competitive position and, since some factors clearly are con 
ducive to that improvement while others are not, it can be in 
ferred which factors are involved in a given decision. But it is 
often impossible to know how much weight was assigned to 
each element. Plant-closing research has tended to focus on 
events that occurred after the closing decision, so that the 
literature on dislocation neither emphasizes the decision- 
making process not analyzes the reasons for it.
The 27 plant-closing cases covered by the 20 studies 
analyzed in this report reveal a wide range of reasons given 
for closings; in a number of cases, no reasons whatsoever 
were given. For two major automobile company clos 
ings Studebaker and Packard the cause was clearly the 
failure of the firm. At least three closings were related to 
shifts in product demand or demand reduced by competi 
tion. Technological change was implicated in six studies that 
dealt with the meat-packing industry in the period of the 
Automation Fund's work. 1 In two of those cases, consolida 
tion combined with technological change to cause the clos 
ings. In the Mack case, technological change was also a fac 
tor, as was the recognition that an outmoded wage structure 
could be replaced by one more advantageous to management 
in another location. Reasons cited in other closings included
1. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, fears that automation would cause large-scale 
unemployment in areas ill-prepared to deal with the consequences of joblessness were 
widespread. A tripartite committee was developed including management, labor and 
government representatives to assess the problems, to devise solutions and to monitor the 
resulting programs. While the apprehension was premature and the results were mixed, the 
Automation Fund remains a model mechanism for creating a climate in which programs 
can be developed.
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proximity to markets, union discipline, inability to meet 
mandated pollution standards, and the takeover of the facili 
ty by another enterprise. While this spectrum of causes was 
given for 17 closings, ten of the closings studied cited no 
reasons at all. Considering that studies associated with the 
Automation Fund form the core of plant-closing research 
during the 1960s, it is probably fair to say that a random 
sample of plant closings might show that few managements 
ever make public their reasons for closing. Even in this array 
of studies, enriched as they are by Automation Fund pro 
gram evaluations, 37 percent of the plants studied gave the 
researchers no reasons for closing. The absence of informa 
tion tends to mask the differences among closings. A failure 
is a very different matter from a situation where consolida 
tion of three facilities into two, for example, is perceived to 
be the optimal management strategy.
Some of the elements in plant-closing decisions can be 
identified only by going beyond the standard plant-closing 
literature, such as the case studies below. Other literature, 
while scarce, can still be divided into three categories: inter 
national economics; the individual location decisions; and 
the prevailing labor-management climate. These categories 
are only general guides to the primary emphases of the 
studies. The fact that investment flows away from the older 
industrial areas of the United States into less industrialized 
centers in this country or abroad is closely related to the local 
labor-management climate and to the developmental stage of 
the establishment concerned.
International Economic Context: Capital, 
Production and Technology Transfer
Various approaches can be discerned in the "flow of in 
vestment" literature: the transfer of capital; the transfer of 
production; the transfer of technology; and the displacement
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cost of foreign competition. The recent Bluestone and Har- 
rison study, Capital and Communities, 2 views the shift of 
capital from the older industrial areas of the United States as 
less striking than the shift of investment by American con 
glomerates to enterprises abroad. From this perspective, the 
highly visible plant closing is the final phase of the 
disintegration of a facility from which capital has been 
withheld by a conglomerate, or as Bluestone and Harrison 
phrase it, "a corporation exhibiting conglomerate 
behavior." The capital no longer invested in obsolete 
facilities is being invested in American branches of foreign 
companies or in foreign enterprises. Such large-scale enter 
prises may also display a pattern of facility coexistence, 
where a newer plant or operation outside the older industrial 
areas continues operation while another facility in the older 
area declines gradually. In contrast, smaller companies 
display what Bluestone and Harrison call a "sequential pat 
tern," as an old facility is shut down and a new one opened. 
In addition to linking American investment abroad to plant 
closings in the Northeast and Midwest, Bluestone and Har 
rison also point to the findings of David Birch, who main 
tained that "the rate at which large established manufactur 
ing establishments have shut down was actually higher in the 
South than in any other part of the country." 3 A case in 
point is the textile industry. While the initial shift in textile 
manufacturing from New England to the South was spread 
over several decades, the later shift, mostly from the South 
to overseas, has taken place much more rapidly.
While some objections can be raised about the interpreta 
tion of data presented by Bluestone and Harrison, the invest 
ment shifts that they identify undoubtedly have had enor-
2. Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, Capital and Communities: The Causes and Con 
sequences of Private Disinvestment (Washington, DC: Progressive Alliance, 1980), pp. 
19-61.
3. David Birch, The Job Generation Process (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Program on 
Neighborhood and Regional Change, 1979), pp. 7-9.
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mous impact on plant closings. Their work also draws atten 
tion to a critical point in the decision-making process; the ac 
tual ownership of the business in question. Small indepen 
dent businesses are more vulnerable to the business cycle and 
may fail more frequently than large corporations. The clos 
ing of a branch plant is often part of a corporate strategy to 
improve profits or to eliminate subprofitable plants.
Other research that addresses the problems encountered 
by American business in international economic change is 
found in The Impact of International Trade and Investment 
on Employment, proceedings of a 1976 conference published 
in 1978. 4 A major article by Robert H. Frank and Richard T. 
Freeman, in which a 1970 input-output table was used, 
estimates the indirect manufacturing job loss due to multina 
tional overseas investment as some 105,000 jobs. 5 Indeed this 
micro- and macroeconomic analysis was used extensively by 
Bluestone and Harrison. Frank and Freeman note:
In all cases, direct foreign investment produces a 
decline in both the real wage and the share of na 
tional income going to labor. . . . Even by relative 
conservative estimates, however, the wage income 
is reduced by more than 3 percent. 6
Frank and Freeman assume that the original motive for 
direct foreign investment was to procure a higher return on 
capital, and in fact their analysis demonstrates that the in 
come accruing to capital is significantly increased by foreign 
investment. Frank and Freeman present their findings 
cautiously, since they and their discussants note that a
4. William G. Dewald, ed., The Impact of International Trade and Investment on Employ 
ment (Washington, DC: Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Department of 
Labor, 1978).
5. Robert H. Frank and Richard T. Freeman, "The Distributional Consequences of Direct 
Foreign Investment," in William G. Dewald, op. cit., pp. 153-170.
6. Ibid., p. 164.
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satisfactory model for the distributional consequences of 
direct foreign investment has not yet been developed. 
Moreover their calculations show that in 1970 indirect 
unemployment associated with overseas transfer of produc 
tion activities lasted between four and eight weeks. It is clear 
that the acceleration of overseas investment when added to 
other factors make 1970 and 1980 years in which widely dif 
ferent situations obtained.
Technology is another factor only recently receiving atten 
tion for its role in the impact of international trade and in 
vestment on domestic employment and plant closings. What 
is meant here, however, is not robotization or other 
automated equipment to replace human labor, but the 
transfer of technology. Jack Baranson reported at the same 
conference that several levels of concern have been expressed 
about the release of proprietary technology. 7 While refusal 
to release technology may safeguard American industry, 
multinational corporations can minimize losses in income, 
trade, and employment at home by judicious licensing and 
investment in foreign facilities. To ignore this opportunity 
may close those markets completely to American suppliers. 
Giving foreign enterprises access to American technological 
advances assumes that the United States holds a significant 
lead in these areas, that investments will continue to be made 
in research and development to maintain and lengthen the 
lead, and that there is little anticipation of competitive 
threats from newly industrializing countries. On the other 
hand, arguments have been made that American firms have 
contributed to the deterioration of the trade balance of 
America and to the loss of its technical leadership by the 
licensing of technology to foreign manufacturers. Baranson 
analyzes technology transfer in relation to 25 case studies in 
five industries aircraft, automotive, computers, consumer
7. Jack Baranson, "Technology Transfer: Effects on U.S. Competitiveness and Employ 
ment," in William G. Dewald, op. cit., pp. 177-203.
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electronics, and chemical engineering and stresses that 
American industry owes some of the difficulties under which 
it is now laboring to a lack of available domestic investment 
capital.
While Baranson acknowledges that his case studies may 
not adequately emphasize the short-run benefits to the U.S. 
economy of technology transfer, he concludes that such 
transfer to noncontrolled foreign enterprises may:
(1) cause erosion of job opportunities in key American 
industries; and
(2) weaken the competitive position of United States sup 
pliers of technology over the long term. Such effects 
are particularly significant:
(a) under adverse domestic economic conditions (low 
growth rate, high unemployment, inflation, declining 
productivity, balance of payment difficulties); (b) in 
the absence of substantial improvement in labor 
market adjustment mechanisms (to relocate and 
retrain displaced production workers); and (c) in an 
economy where technologically dynamic industries 
(or services) are not expanding at a rate sufficient to 
absorb labor displacement from declining industrial 
sectors. 8
While realizing that prohibition of technology transfer 
would be counterproductive, Baranson finds it essential to 
view such transfers in terms of their domestic economic im 
pact and argues for an early warning system of adverse 
economic impact so that a smooth adjustment can be made.
Still another major element of the international economic 
context is the effect upon employment and earnings caused 
by .increased sales in the United States of foreign goods. 
While it has been generally agreed that the American
8. Ibid., p. 206.
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economy benefits from relatively unrestricted trade, quotas 
and tariffs have become a particularly delicate political issue 
as more and more American industries encounter stiff com 
petition from foreign makers and resulting job displacement 
occurs.
Louis S. Jacobson's article in the conference proceedings 
deals with earning losses of workers who have been displaced 
from manufacturing industries, drawing in part upon data 
specific to the 1960s, for example the steel industry in Penn 
sylvania from 1962 to 1965 (report completed 1976). 9 Using 
the Social Security system's Longitudinal Employee- 
Employer Data (LEED) file to examine both earning loss 
and number and characteristics of displaced workers, Jacob- 
son studied 11 industries: petroleum refining, aerospace, 
electronic components, television receivers, steel, autos, 
meat packing, toys, women's clothing, shoes, and cotton 
weaving. Some of these industries display high average earn 
ings as well as a relatively stable work force. Fundamentally, 
the study measured the earnings of workers permanently let 
go during an employment reduction and compared them 
with the earnings of those not so displaced during the cut 
back. Since the sample was chosen to provide national 
representation, the study provides a comparison of workers 
unemployed after a plant shutdown with workers sharing 
similar demographics in the same industry who were not in 
volved in a shutdown. Similar comparisons were made for 
those caught in a large contraction resulting in permanent 
layoff and those not laid off. The differences were substan 
tial. In the case of steel workers, the difference amounted to 
about $17,000 (in 1964 dollars) over the affected workers' 
lifetimes.
While transfers of capital, production and technology 
abroad, currently contributing to permanent workforce
9. Louis S. Jacobson, "Earning Losses of Workers Displaced from Manufacturing In 
dustries," in William G. Dewald, op. tit., pp. 87-98.
Economic Contexts 25
reductions and plant closings, are relatively recent, the harm 
ful effects of foreign competition upon domestic manufac 
turers have been felt for at least two decades. Foreign com 
petition was not cited as a reason for closing in any of the 
studies reviewed here, yet it could clearly play a major role, 
directly or indirectly, in decisions to relocate domestically. 
Baranson argues that technology transfer often occurs 
because venture capital is more readily available abroad than 
at home, while Bluestone and Harrison and Frank and 
Freeman would point to increased levels of American invest 
ment abroad productive of high return on capital. The incen 
tive provided by cheaper labor in areas outside the Northeast 
or Midwest, as well as increased competition, would pro 
mote a larger capital investment in the form of new 
technologies and new plants to house them. Expanding pro 
duction and production facilities that take advantage of 
economies of scale become more important during periods 
of heightened competition. Consequently, international 
economic conditions influence relocation decisions made 
within the United States.
National Economic Context: The 
Location Decisions of Finns
The plant-closing decision, as Roger Schmenner points 
out, 10 often rests on the search for the least expensive site, 
and an ill-advised decision can be as disastrous for the com 
pany in the long term as it is in the short term for displaced 
workers and the community. Commonly the search for a 
new site, plans for relocation, and the final closing of the old 
plant are undertaken because of the needs of the company 
for, or because a change in production techniques requires, a 
new facility. Therefore, a closing because of relocation is 
most apt to occur when the company is thriving or when new
10. Roger W. Schmenner, "Look Beyond the Obvious in Plant Location," Harvard 
Business Review, January 1979, pp. 126-132.
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technology adopted in a timely and orderly fashion promises 
continued and increased profits. Schmenner's study involved 
interviews with 30 companies and surveys of over 1,000 
facilities; more than 200 had recently relocated and about 
150 were new plants. The evidence indicates that, despite the 
common perception that plants are moving and closing con 
stantly, only about one-third of the moves contemplated are 
finally undertaken. Actual relocation occurs (or did occur 
through 1978) at a rate of only 3 percent per year in 
manufacturing establishments of all sizes, and less than 1 
percent per year in plants employing more than 100 
employees.
Schmenner's data also indicate that larger companies tend 
to establish new branch plants; undoubtedly some of them 
are the "parallel facilities" identified by Bluestone and Har- 
rison. 11 Each year between 3 and 6 percent of the existing 
stock of plants is added as branch plants.
There are five identifiable strategies for plant locations. In 
a product plant strategy, a facility concentrates on a product 
or a narrow range of products. This offers a simplicity and 
an economy of scale not obtainable in a multiproduct facili 
ty, but such facilities often find themselves in difficulty if 
they continue to expand. A market area plant strategy 
responds to consumer needs and minimizes transportation 
costs. Some corporations are so large that they can utilize 
both strategies, developing product and market area-specific 
manufacturing facilities, generally in industries that make 
products that are consumed everywhere. Some large cor 
porations use either market area or product strategies, 
depending upon the subsidiary involved. Yet a fourth 
strategy, one commonly associated with complex industries, 
is the process strategy, used where individual facilities make 
one or another component of a finished product and are
11. Bluestone and Harrison, op. tit., p. 27.
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therefore a kind of supplier or feeder plant. Finally, the 
general purposes strategy, usually associated with defense 
contractors, demands a high degree of flexibility in the 
change of product demands, plant configuration and 
employee assignment.
The availability of cheaper land, lower tax rates, better or 
cheaper materials, and lower wages often provides incentive 
for the corporate decision to move South, to Mexico or Latin 
America, or to the Far East, but the contribution of these 
new benefits to the corporate balance sheet must be com 
pared with the possible costs associated with diverging, if 
that is required by the move, from the current plant location 
strategy. Moving a process plant too far from other plants 
within the same production system, despite savings from low 
wages in the new site, may prove costly in transporting the 
products of that process to the final completion site.
Finally, Schmenner points out that plant relocations are 
difficult for management and, according to his data, will be 
avoided if at all possible. In respect to plant closings or 
relocations, he has found that:
Overwhelmingly, it is the small, growing plants, 
often independent of particular suppliers, markets 
or labor sources, and pressed for more production 
space, that move to larger, more modern quarters, 
and in the process alter their production 
technology, sometimes in fundamental ways. The 
vast majority of relocations are over short distances 
(less than 20 miles) which helps ensure continuity of 
labor force and retention of customer and supplier 
contacts. To a lesser degree, relocations also occur 
to consolidate two or more plants into a new single 
facility and to escape from high site costs (wages, 
land values, taxes).
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It is the plants whose profits are hurting the most 
that see relocation chiefly as a means of lowering 
costs. These plants are also the ones most likely to 
move distances of greater than 20 miles in search of 
these lower costs. 12
It is important to note the decision to close a plant in order 
to move to a new facility or to consolidate production is 
seldom made lightly or in haste. It is the last in a stream of 
decisions.
Plant-Closing Decisions and the 
Labor-Management Climate
The labor-management climate is a major factor in the 
decision to close or move a plant. One codification of this 
employment relationship may be found in the collective 
bargaining agreement in force at the time of the decision. At 
this point, two kinds of provisions become important both to 
the decision-making process and to the affected workers: 
those designed specifically for the shutdown situation and 
those designed for other eventualities which can be adapted 
to the problems associated with a closing.
As Stephen Mick notes:
Analysis of data compiled by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics on 1,823 contracts applying to collective 
bargaining units with at least 100 employees shows 
that most contracts contain very few provisions 
related to plant shutdowns and movement. In 
descending order of percentage of specific contract 
provisions related to plant shutdowns are interplant 
transfer to another plant or company (32.1 
percent), severance or layoff pay (29.6 percent), 
relocation allowances (11.1 percent), transfer of all
12. Schmenner, op. tit., p. 129.
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or partial seniority (9.9 percent), income 
maintenance (5.1 percent), advanced notice of 
move (3.7 percent), union notification or participa 
tion in management decisions to move plants (3.3 
percent). 13
Mick also points out that less than one-fourth of organized 
labor seems to be covered by such provisions. Since less than 
one-fourth of the American labor force is organized, it is 
likely that the provisions apply to only about 6 or 7 percent 
of the workforce. Because all the studies analyzed in this 
report are concerned with plants having union representa 
tion, many of them in major unions, such provisions are im 
portant here.
Other provisions, not originally designed for post- 
shutdown adjustment, can be applied: supplemental 
unemployment benefits (SUB), individual account security 
plans, and regular or early retirement. SUB, now a major 
feature of many collective bargaining agreements, were 
designed to help smooth out income in industries where 
seasonal and short term layoffs were common. Today SUB 
no longer retain their purity of purpose and have come to be 
used for a variety of purposes including severance pay, 
health insurance during layoffs, relocation allowances, and 
even supplementary pay for workers transferred to lower- 
rated jobs. Both SUB and individual account security plans 
often are transformed into severance payments if the 
necessary funds do in fact exist at the time of closing.
Provisions designed for the shutdown situation are un 
doubtedly considered in the decision-making process. 
Management can influence how union members participate 
in job security provisions by the timing and style of the
13. Stephen S. Mick, "Social and Personal Costs of Plant Shutdowns," Industrial Rela 
tions, Vol. 14, No. 2, May 1975, p. 205.
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plant-closing announcement. The Mack case 14 is an example 
in which interplant transfer was an option available to 
workers whom the company did not wish to retain. Manage 
ment made a series of announcements regarding the im 
plementation of the transfer provision in a manner which 
deterred those workers from taking the transfer option. In 
contrast, workers in Lipsky's study15 were encouraged to ac 
cept the interplant transfer option by the timing and style of 
management's announcements. However, the fact that the 
way the decision is made and announced can have a substan 
tial effect upon the participation rate in interplant transfer 
programs is not direct evidence that the presence and condi 
tions of such transfer rights have a direct effect upon the 
shutdown decision itself.
Severance payments, a form of compensation for perma 
nent job loss after protracted employment, is a collective 
bargaining provision particularly sought by unions whose 
workers are threatened by continuing technological change. 
Audrey Freedman quotes a letter from Joseph A. Beirne, 
President of the Communications Workers of America, in 
1956:
However, because of intensive and extensive 
mechanization constantly taking place and 
resulting layoffs, we have carefully negotiated, 
over the years, a well-defined system of termination 
benefits. . . , 16
Mick's analysis of over 1,800 collective bargaining 
agreements indicates that about 30 percent included some 
form of severance payment. The studies we reviewed in this
14. J.W. Dorsey, "The Mack Case: A Study in Unemployment," in Studies in the 
Economics of Income Maintenance (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967).
15. David B. Lipsky, "Interplant Transfer and Terminated Workers: A Case Study," In 
dustrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 23, No. 2, January 1970, pp. 191-206.
16. Audrey Freedman, Security Bargains Reconsidered: SUB, Severance Pay, and 
Guaranteed Work, Report 736, The Conference Board, 1978.
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report do not always emphasize all points of interest in plant 
closings. Only four studies mention collectively bargained 
severance payments, while twelve studies show that such 
benefits were available, whether specifically noted as 
bargained or not, although it is more than likely that all such 
provisions were bargained. Eight studies record that workers 
participated in this benefit, most of them receiving payments 
between $1,500 and $2,000.
Severance payments have usually been designed for 
precisely those situations to which the Communications 
Workers were responding: permanent layoffs of individuals 
rather than plant closings. So, despite the rather low levels of 
payments, the presence of a severance payment clause can 
help to postpone or even prevent a plant shutdown. If a plant 
is closed as a result of serious financial difficulties and it is a 
single facility, severance payments may simply not be forth 
coming or may be much reduced because of the financial 
condition of the company. As Freedman shows, a company 
that closes a facility of 500 employees, averaging $5.60 an 
hour with an average seniority of nine years, and that has a 
relatively standard format for distributing modest severance 
payments may actually have a liability for about $1 million 
for those payments. More commonly, the wage rate is 
higher, the seniority is longer, the severance payment more 
generous and the liability larger. Clearly the liability involv 
ed in a severance payment, a type of plan that is almost 
always unfunded, can have a major effect on the decision to 
close a plant. An attractive option for management would be 
the immediate sale of the facility to a buyer who would rehire 
the workforce. Indeed the attractiveness of employee 
buyouts may be related to the liability represented by 
severance payments. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of the 
precise role that a severance payment provision plays in the 
decision to close a plant.
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Other types of provisions described by Mick include 
relocation allowances and transfer of all or partial seniority. 
These are associated with interplant transfer rights and rein 
force the attractiveness of that option for workers. Once 
again, as the contrast mentioned above between the Mack 
case discussed by Dorsey and the General Foods case analyz 
ed by Lipsky shows, such considerations must bear on the 
decision-making process and may alter the manner of the 
decision. Still other provisions, such as some form of income 
maintenance and union notification or participation in 
management decisions, would undoubtedly influence the 
decision, although no studies (with the possible exception of 
Stern) have addressed that point except tangentially. 17 Ad 
vance notification of closing, if required by union contract, 
is normally accompanied by other provisions such as the 
right to interplant transfer.
Influencing the Decision to Relocate
At least two major groups involved in a plant-closing have 
a substantial interest in influencing the decision the 
workers and the local community for both have a great 
deal at stake. The struggle over advance notification re 
sounds less with concerns about timing and its impact on ad 
justment costs than with the possibility of reversing the deci 
sion. Obviously those groups who hope to influence the deci 
sion must know that such a decision is under consideration. 
While there is no exhaustive list of management actions to 
enlighten a concerned group about impending closure, Julius 
Majoros 18 provides valuable insights into some of the steps
17. James L. Stern, "The Consequences of Plant Closure," Journal of Human Resources, 
Winter 1972, pp. 25-31.
18. Julius Majoros, "Early Warning Signs of a Plant Closing: One Worker's Views," in 
Industrial Exodus, Edward Kelly, ed. (Washington: The Ohio Public Interest Campaign, 
1978).
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taken by management prior to closure that may furnish a 
clue.
1) Company may make changes in key personnel in the 
higher echelons of the plant. Younger workers may be 
moved to company headquarters and replaced with 
men near retirement.
2) Discipline is relaxed.
3) Maintenance policy can become of the patchwork 
variety.
4) Maintenance personnel may not be replaced.
5) Rumors of an impending shutdown may increase.
6) Company may be slow in announcing a negotiating 
team for normal contract talks.
7) Non-hurry-up policy during negotiations may be 
adopted.
It is not clear what actions by workers or the local com 
munity might conceivably alter the decision. Theoretically, 
labor subsidy or capital subsidy could reduce the costs of re 
maining at the original site and expanding it to the point at 
which other options become less attractive. Although labor 
subsidies have not yet been documented in the literature, the 
wage concessions made by Chrysler workers are a form of 
labor subsidy, applied here to a situation far more serious 
than a threatened plant closing or relocation. Recent 
research at a Michigan manufacturing facility includes con 
sideration of the entire closing negotiation process. In the 
end, the local union bargaining team offered to accept a con 
siderably reduced wage level as an incentive for the plant to 
remain. 19 But, the management decision was to consolidate 
operations in another state, despite the fact that the wage bill 
proposed by the Michigan facility was much lower than the 
wage bill at the relocation facility. In general, labor subsidies 
are not a common form of incentive.
19. Transcript of February 18, 1981, interview with Bargaining Committee, AP Parts, 
Grand Haven, Michigan, by Sean P. McAlinden.
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Capital subsidies, on the other hand, which have been 
available through a series of federal programs mounted in 
association with urban areas, primarily the Urban Develop 
ment Action Grant Program (UDAG), may have some im 
pact on location decisions. If, for example, UDAG 
assistance with land clearance and infrastructure was made 
available, capital subsidy might be an appropriate 
mechanism for the local community to use in coordination 
with the federal government in order to influence a reloca 
tion decision. 20 Further, since Schmenner has found that 
firms prefer on-site expansion, 21 capital subsidies for such 
expansion in urban areas might well have helped central 
cities by providing incentives for new construction at lower 
costs. Since the future of UDAG is uncertain, no assessment 
of its potential for altering or influencing a relocation deci 
sion can be made.
Another strategy, that of local tax subsidies, is in the 
hands of the local communities and may appear at first sight 
to be an effective method of influencing a relocation deci 
sion. However, Harrison and Kanter have found that local 
tax subsidies have little influence on the location of firms, 
except perhaps in the case of small businesses. 22 Their work 
indicates that large scale, technologically oriented firms are 
not sensitive to local tax subsidies and that tax abatements 
(given either together with or without other federal grants) 
are questionable in any case. They do not significantly affect 
a relocation decision, yet they rob the local municipality of 
badly needed funds. But it is quite possible that capital sub 
sidies could promote more rapid change to new technologies
20. Susan S. Jacobs and Elizabeth A. Roistacher, "The Urban Impact of HUD's Urban 
Development Action Grant Program or, Where's the Action in Action Grants," in N.J. 
Glickman, ed., The Urban Impacts of Federal Policies (Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1980), pp. 335-362.
21. Schmenner, op. tit..
22. Bennett Harrison and Sandra Kanter, "The Political Economy of States Job Creation 
Business Incentive," AlP Journal, October 1978, p. 23 ff.
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within firms that are, in contrast to present technologies, 
capital- rather than labor-intensive.
Summary
Business failure, the search for cheaper land taxes and 
labor, the introduction of new technology, changes in 
market, products and processes all continue to play impor 
tant roles in a management decision to close or relocate a 
manufacturing facility.
As the American economy becomes increasingly in 
tegrated into a developing world economy, the contexts in 
which relocation decisions are made are accordingly expand 
ed. Substantial transfer of capital, the production process, 
and the impact of technology upon management now loom 
larger than could have been imagined when most of the 
plant-closing research reviewed in this study was done. 
Foreign competition made for significant reductions of the 
workforce and an increase in plant closings more than 15 
years ago, and that trend has not only continued but has in 
creased markedly. But it is important that a relocation deci 
sion conform with the firm's location strategy, since even the 
most attractive wage bill cannot compensate for increased 
costs associated with an ill-designed plant location.
Early notification about moving a plant, whether required 
by law or by a collective bargaining agreement, or inferred 
from warning signs at the threatened facility, provides an op 
portunity for a possible reversal of the decision. The scant 
literature indicates that capital subsidies may be able to alter 
some decisions, but that tax subsidies are seldom successful 
and are at the same time very costly to local economies. 
Finally, while considerable attention has been paid to 
legislative initiatives requiring early notification and some 
combination of other provisions favoring a more equitable 
distribution of the costs associated with closing, no legisla-
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tion has been enacted except in Maine and Wisconsin, and 
the Wisconsin legislation has yet to be implemented. Few 
collective bargaining agreements contain an early notifica 
tion provision, and fewer still require any consultation dur 
ing the decision-making process. Finally it is instructive to 
note that, despite the complexities associated with capital 
shift and technology transfers, when plants are opened in 
new locations they are less likely to be unionized than their 
sister facilities. The decision to close or relocate a manufac 
turing facility is a private decision based on economic effi 
ciency. The responses to the decision are generally attempts 
to reduce the social and public costs of these private deci 
sions and to introduce some social equity.
Chapter 3
Responses to Plant 
Shutdowns and Relocations
While the decision to shut down a plant or to relocate is a 
unilateral one, it creates a situation to which several groups 
must respond. Management, unions, social service agencies 
and local community leaders all have available to them a 
wide range of options for dealing with shutdown problems, 
some of which can help to reduce the accompanying social 
and psychological difficulties and minimize the economic 
costs involved.
Assumptions, Perceptions, and Roles 
in Plant-Closing Responses
Each group that responds to a specific plant shutdown or 
to the prospect of one tends to respond in a generalized man 
ner, based upon assumptions concerning its rights and 
obligations and on perceptions as to the appropriate, per 
missible, or feasible point of intervention.
Management maintains that capital mobility is essential to 
the survival of certain enterprises and that efforts to restrict 
mobility and to intervene in the decision-making process are 
inappropriate. Management has the right to make its own 
decision and publicize it at its own discretion. Accordingly, it 
is difficult to predict what steps management will take, 
although the most benevolent managements will probably
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take only those steps that will both safeguard corporate in 
terests and ensure an orderly transition for workers and com 
munities.
The unions have, at least theoretically, the option of 
negotiating during each contract round for shutdown provi 
sions. They may attempt to secure access to the decision- 
making process, although these attempts have so far proved 
unsuccessful. Union officials also assume that management 
has, in most cases, the right to a closing decision, and are apt 
to concentrate upon a favorable closing process, including 
early notice, employment continuity, income maintenance, 
adjustment assistance, and pension protection. The union 
response may be seen as an ongoing response to the closure 
threat and the appropriate intervention point may be seen as 
the immediate post-decision period.
Communities have traditionally responded to plant clos 
ings well after the fact. The initial post-decision period is 
usually filled with discussion and concern with various at 
tempts to determine what can be done with the resources 
available. Generally, the appropriate, permissible, and feasi 
ble time for communities to intervene is after the decision 
has been made. Intervention focuses on worker and com 
munity adjustment assistance and occasionally on attempts 
to develop or enhance already existing forms of economic 
development. Once again, it is assumed that the decision is 
the province of management and that the communities are 
constrained to adopt reactive roles.
If the assumption of all the actors affected by a plant clos 
ing is that management has the initiative and other groups 
can respond only after the fact, post-decision intervention is 
obviously the only appropriate reaction. Since the interests 
of the reactive groups can best be served just after the deci 
sion and before the closing, pressure has often been brought 
to bear to move the time of disclosure as close as possible to
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the time of decision. This pressure from unions and from 
community agencies and groups has not usually had a 
decisive impact.
Legislative initiatives constitute yet another group of ac 
tivities that aim to facilitate community and worker adjust 
ment through early notification, provisions for continuity of 
employment, maintenance of income, and the offering of 
services that will make for a smooth transition and rapid 
reemployment. Legislative initiatives stem in part from a re 
jection of the argument for capital mobility, and so they at 
tempt to constrain unilateral investment and disinvestment 
decisions on the part of management, as well as its tradi 
tional privilege of convenient, and often late, notification. It 
is in this context that new efforts to provide subsidies and 
technical assistance for community-employee buyouts have 
surfaced. While numerous members of this broad coalition 
will continue to accord management the prerogative of 
closure decision, there is a strong movement to restrain 
management's modes of disinvestment and the timing of 
disclosure.
It will become clear below that new responses to plant 
closings have appeared only recently. Few new responses 
have been studied, thus few evaluations are available. For 
example, the traditional plant-closing literature reviewed 
here contains no information about management-sponsored 
private sector employability development programs, and lit 
tle research on the intervention efforts of public interest 
groups or on employee buyouts. Consequently, while a cen 
tral focus of this chapter is the standard plant-closing 
research literature, emphasis will also be placed on other 
analytical and descriptive, and even legislative, literature.
Management Response to Plant Closings
Once the decision has been made to close or relocate, the 
policies chosen by management can either facilitate or hinder
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the successful adaptation of employees and communities. 
Two major studies, Portis and Suys 1 and Shultz and Weber, 2 
emphasize the importance of early notice as a necessary in 
gredient of any successful attempt to reduce the negative im 
pact of the closure. In certain situations, it is argued, such 
advance notice is crucial. In plants where the educational 
level of the workforce is low, workers will be at a con 
siderable disadvantage in the labor market. Consequently, 
extensive retraining is necessary to prepare these displaced 
workers to compete. Advance notice provides time for such 
training to take place. Where jobs are not easily available or 
where openings are clustered in certain occupational areas 
that require previous training, advance notice provides time 
to assess the current labor market, to mount counseling pro 
grams (within the plant to be closed and elsewhere) so that 
workers can find the most advantageous training and enter 
these programs. Portis and Suys3 indicate that advance 
notice provides workers with an opportunity to search for a 
job while still employed, with the obvious benefits of addi 
tional time for the search. Advance notice permits unions to 
take an early and active role in advising their members on the 
options available to them, minimizing confusion and hard 
ship.
Management can also play an important role in 
cooperative efforts by unions and communities to enhance 
the effectiveness of assistance programs offered to displaced 
workers. The most significant analysis of a positive effort by 
management is the study of the Omaha plant closing by 
James L. Stern. 4 An advance notice provision had been a
1. Bernard Portis and Michael Suys, The Effect of Advanced Notice in a Plant Shutdown: 
A Case Study of the Closing of the Kelvinator Plant in London, Ontario (London, Ontario: 
School of Business Administration, The University of Western Ontario, 1970).
2. George P. Shultz and Arnold B. Weber, Strategies for the Displaced Worker (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1969).
3. Portis and Suys, op. cit., p. 27.
4. James L. Stern, "Evolution of Private Manpower Planning in Armour's Plant 
Closings," Monthly Labor Review, December 1969, pp. 21-28.
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feature of the collective bargaining agreement between Ar 
mour and the Amalgamated Meat Packers since 1961, a pro 
vision that had been extended from 90 days to 6 months in 
1967. When the plant finally closed, the 6-month period had 
been extended by 3 months at the request of community 
leaders. The role assumed by Armour during that period was 
extremely helpful, and a comprehensive private manpower 
training program was developed. Not only did Armour pro 
vide a company assistance office and permit inplant counsel 
ing, but it participated in the training and subsequent place 
ment of former employees and took the initiative in gaining 
the cooperation of other Omaha businesses who might ab 
sorb the displaced workers. Frequently, severance pay 
schedules are such that workers find them a disincentive to 
early job search. The Armour plan, in contrast to most 
management strategies, gave workers who found employ 
ment elsewhere or who wished to enroll in federal training 
programs the opportunity to start their new ventures before 
the plant closed without the loss of severance pay. But the 
Armour case is by no means typical. Moreover the generally 
good outcomes for Armour workers were undoubtedly 
related to local labor market conditions; unemployment 
stood at about 3 percent in the Omaha area at the time.
A very different management response and one disadvan 
tageous to the workers can be found in John Dorsey's study 
of the Mack case. 5 It is plant that the management at Mack 
did not wish their production workers to transfer to the new 
facility. The initial announcement was made over a year 
before the actual closing, and during that time management 
sought to design a workforce that it wanted to keep at the 
new facility. Production workers were discouraged from 
transferring, while supervisory and white-collar employees
5. John W. Dorsey, "The Mack Case: A Study in Unemployment," in Studies in the 
Economics of Income Maintenance, Otto Eckstein, ed., (Washington, DC: Brookings In 
stitution, 1967).
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were encouraged to do so. Those who did not transfer had 
considerable loss of earnings; about 23 percent of the sample 
were still unemployed 10 months after the closings, despite 
the advance notice. There is some reason to believe that the 
length of post-shutdown unemployment is positively 
associated with the size of the separation payment, although 
the age of the worker and the size of the separation payment 
are so closely tied that distinguishing between them is im 
possible in this study.
The role played by early notice in alleviating problems of 
workers was also investigated indirectly in several studies. 
Lipsky's study of General Foods emphasizes transfers and 
their outcomes, but it indicates that even a drawn-out period 
of advance notice (here more than two years) did not affect 
the duration of unemployment because the time was not used 
effectively by workers for job search. 6 Indeed few sought 
jobs seriously at all. Foltman7 noted that white-collar 
workers take much greater advantage of the advanced notice 
period for job search than do blue-collar workers; Portis and 
Suys make the same point.
Management can also elect to provide opportunities for 
workers to transfer to another plant. A fuller discussion of 
this strategy, developed through union collective bargaining, 
is included in a later section. In general, workers who 
transfer do not seem to undergo the same difficulties as their 
co-workers who do not transfer. Yet, as the Lipsky study 
shows, many workers are reluctant to move despite en 
couragement to transfer. Other studies, including Foltman, 
emphasize the reluctance of blue-collar workers in particular
6. David B. Lipsky, "Interplant Transfer and Terminated Workers: A Case Study," In 
dustrial and Labor Relations Review, January 1970, pp. 32-38.
7. Felician F. Foltman, White and Blue Collars in a Mill Shutdown (Ithaca, NY: New York 
State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1968).
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to move. Strange8 and Levinson9 both, in different ways, 
emphasize the ties to locality and community that bind 
workers to areas where job possibilities are not promising.
Returning to the Stern study, it is clear that any one 
management strategy for reducing the impact of plant clos 
ings upon workers is often ineffective. Some combination of 
early notice, inducements to transfer for those who wish it, 
company intervention in the local community on behalf of 
displaced workers, and opportunities for counseling, retrain 
ing,, and job search must be provided to achieve positive 
results. Generous severance payments and benefits also seem 
to be necessary to ease the transition, although these ar 
rangements can actually work to delay labor force reentry 
for some workers.
For industries undergoing technological change, especially 
those with relatively favorable labor relations, possibilities 
exist for creative, inexpensive, and helpful programming. 
Currently, as Business Week10 reported, efforts are being 
made by Goodyear to use the services formerly reserved for 
professional and supervisory personnel to assist permanently 
displaced rubber workers in two sites. The program has just 
become active, and data are not available for blue-collar 
workers, although such assistance has apparently helped 
white-collar and professional workers. Documentation and 
analysis of these new outplacement programs, especially in 
comparison to performance for upper-level workers, will be 
important in determining which variables are crucial in the 
reemployment of semi-skilled workers and others who have 
historically borne the brunt of plant closings.
8. Walter Strange, Job Loss: A Psychosocial Study of Worker Reactions to a Plant Closing 
in a Company Town in Southern Appalachia (Springfield, VA: National Technical Infor 
mation Service, 1977).
9. David Levinson, "Displaced Pottery Workers' Adjustment to Layoff," in Weathering 
Layoff in a Small Community, BLS Bulletin 1516, 1966.
10. Business Week, February 4, 1980, p. 86.
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A facility with a hostile labor relations climate, a seriously 
failing industry, or a small facility with virtually no resources 
might be unwilling, and in some cases unable to provide 
assistance to displaced workers. But overall, management 
policies before, during and after the closing can make a 
significant difference in the shutdown experience.
Union Response to Plant Closings
The union response to economic dislocation and plant 
closings is a direct outgrowth of the difficulties inherent in 
labor's position as a conservative force in industrial change. 
As indicated earlier, provisions of the bargaining agreement 
are an important consideration in the decision to close a 
plant. The decision, therefore, means that whatever 
payments are specified in the event of shutdown are regarded 
as acceptable costs to management, or at least as 
unavoidable losses as in bankruptcy. Management can of 
course come to the bargaining table aware of the possibility 
of a closing during the life of the contract, and can therefore 
make concessions about certain issues in exchange for pro 
tection in case of shutdowns. The unions' concern is to be 
sure that workers do indeed enjoy those benefits secured by 
bargaining. But if labor is not informed about the possibility 
of closing, it may not engage in hard bargaining concerning 
that possibility or concerning the security provisions that 
might be called for in that eventuality. On the other hand, in 
those industries where technological change is common and 
jobs often threatened, job security bargaining is a first 
priority. Such industries and agreements can be found 
throughout labor history: in the railroads, the press rooms, 
and among the communication workers. The great problem 
is that a union faced with a closing often has a contract that 
does not address the issue at all. This is apparent in the 
literature, with the exception of the Automation Fund Com 
mittee work.
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In the standard literature, the usual closing occurs in a 
unionized plant. Certain closings are chosen for study 
because access can be gained to both plants and workers. 
Unions are usually cooperative, seeing that much can be 
gained, for the membership at large if not for the affected 
workers, by such a study. Large unions are particularly at 
tracted to research projects, partly because they support 
substantial research efforts in similar areas themselves and 
see researchers as powerful advocates.
All plants in the studies reviewed were unionized (although 
not all unions are named), and major unions such as the 
United Automobile Workers, the Textile Workers, the 
Amalgamated Meat Cutters, and the United Steel Workers 
predominated. An independent union, the United 
Automobile Workers (with one exception) either did not 
have a plant-closing provision in their bargaining agreement, 
or such a provision was not mentioned, indicating that any 
provision that existed must have been weak. Five studies in 
dicated special early retirement provisions. Only in those 
cases in which the Automation Fund Committee was active 
had provisions been routinely included for early notice, in- 
terplant transfer, relocation assistance, and retraining. At 
tention will be directed in chapters 4 and 5 to the translation 
of these provisions into post-shutdown benefits. Never 
theless, it is fair to say that collective bargaining has not been 
successful in providing adjustment assistance to displaced 
workers.
While organized labor seeks in the collective bargaining 
process to provide the basis for a proactive position if and 
when the plant closes, such bargaining is not always suc 
cessful nor does it always receive high priority in negotia 
tions as compared with other issues. Although most collec 
tive bargaining agreements do not contain provisions re 
stricting plant closings, the National Labor Relations Board 
and the courts have extended to unions the right to such
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bargaining in some situations. A case in point is a recent 
study by the Illinois AFL-CIO Manpower Assistance Pro 
gram:
An employer only has to bargain over a reloca 
tion decision that does not change the basic scope 
or nature of the business. Such a decision usually 
will involve a proposal to subcontract part of a 
plant's operation, or relocate operations to other 
plants producing the same products with similar 
equipment. In some cases, unions have argued that 
although specific provisions that prohibit an 
employer from moving are not contained in the 
contract, an implied prohibition exists based on the 
substance of other related clauses in the contract.
[The National Labor Relations Act] requires the 
employer to bargain over the effects of a planned 
move or shutdown, even if no specific clause in the 
contract has anticipated this situation. The 
employer must negotiate, should the union request, 
over issues such as severance pay, pensions, and 
transfer rights. Failure by the employer to bargain 
in good faith over these issues constitutes an Unfair 
Labor Practice under Section 8(a) (5) of the Act. 
The request by the union must however be timely, 
and should the union fail to make a request, it gives 
up the right to bargain over these issues. An 
employer is further required to provide the union 
with details about the relocation of bargaining unit 
work, including 1) where the work is to be transfer 
red. 2) the job classifications at the new site, 3) the 
number of jobs at the new site, and 4) the com 
parative costs of the operations. Should the 
employer refuse to bargain, or only bargain in 
superficial fashion over these areas, the union can 
file a charge with the NLRB, who will then conduct
Responses 47
a thorough investigation of the matter. However, 
should an employer be found in violation of the 
Act, remedies are seldom stringent enough to pre 
vent an employer from shutting down, and indeed 
the decision may well support the union and 
workers, but come long after the plant in question 
has locked its gates. Even where an employer's ac 
tions are found by the Courts to be unlawful, vin 
dication rarely comes without years of litigation. 
Most often however, negotiation over the closing is 
common and occurs fairly routinely.''
Recently it has become clear that the existence of a provi 
sion requiring ad hoc bargaining in the closing situation can 
help to bring about a favorable closing bargain. Indeed, a 
new militant attitude, including threatened and actual resort 
to the courts, has pervaded plant-closing bargaining, and 
some benefits have accrued to workers as a result. There is a 
dearth of evidence about ad hoc bargaining at the time of 
closing, which may reflect the lack of bargaining or of 
results. Research priority should be given to the investigation 
of agreements concluded at the time of closing, to a close 
analysis of their relationship to the contract in force at the 
time, and to the process involved, since this type of bargain 
ing, will surely become more common and more militant.
Within the literature reviewed there is also a lack of 
evidence (indicating lack of activity) in respect to union sup 
port services. In two cases, placement programs were begun. 
In some other cases, notably the Automation Fund studies, 
the unions were represented, if not heavily involved, in the 
program. However, recent discussions with union represen 
tatives indicate that the union representative can serve as a 
facilitator, counselor, and a support system to laid-off 
workers. Once again, this matter requires further study.
11. Preliminary Report on Plant Closings, Illinois State AFL-CIO Manpower Assistance 
Program, 1980, p. 26.
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What the literature does indicate is significant for 
American experience with plant closings in the past. 
However, the future, with the new attitude toward closing 
bargaining, may be different. But the changes which are oc 
curring in the area of community response, and which are 
sometimes effective, highlight the fact that one new role of 
the union is that of partner to community members and to 
local groups and agencies. In two cases below the union pro 
vided facilities for one community program and cooperated 
with another. Labor has also undertaken continued and 
heightened involvement in legislative and other political in 
itiatives.
Only a little evidence of this heightened activity on the part 
of organized labor has surfaced in print. One example of 
where labor took the leading role in the coordination of 
available resources can be found in the Illinois State AFL- 
CIO Manpower Assistance Program associated with the 
closing of the Rochelle, Illinois, Swift Meatpacking Plant. 12
In summary, when confronted by a plant closing, unions 
react by referring to the bargaining agreement in force, by 
engaging in ad hoc bargaining, by forming coalitions within 
and outside the community, and by pushing toward 
legislative enactment of those provisions that have not been 
achieved through collective bargaining. These reactions cor 
respond closely to the range of activities that organized labor 
normally undertakes. The new role taken by some groups in 
organized labor, and the degree to which that role reflects 
organized labor's interest in and talent for building coali 
tions, is the most positive element in the union's reponse to 
plant closings.
12. Ibid., pp. 31-37.
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Community Response to Plant Closings
In contrast to the roles of management and labor, which 
have remained relatively unchanged over the past several 
decades, communities beset by plant closings have taken 
some new steps in recent years. Two decades ago, com 
munities were mentioned in the plant-closing literature only 
in reference to such variables as community size, local labor 
market conditions, and the community's history of job loss. 
In other words, communities were affected by plant closings 
but remained relatively passive.
The recent active measures taken by communities in 
response to economic dislocation are reflected in a certain 
amount of the research, although this does not always ap 
pear in the literature. Most of the material upon which the 
following section depends comes from research reports, 
lengthy memoranda, and other unpublished materials. There 
are three general areas of community-centered studies. The 
first focuses on community costs and the associated question 
of what should properly be considered within the community 
cost-accounting system. There is, therefore, some continuity 
between studies of actual dollar amounts lost by com 
munities through a closing and increased costs generated by 
sponsoring services for a growing number of unemployed. A 
second type of study reports on what happens after a closing 
and can include discussion of worker-ownership and other 
less developmental interventions. What distinguishes such 
studies from standard plant-closing program evaluations is 
the emphasis on the community as adjustment agent, rather 
than the displaced workers, and on the programs designed to 
assist them. Finally, a major study on the coordination of 
community services after a shutdown is reviewed. While the 
emphasis of this study is on interorganizational linkages and 
the barriers to effective resource utilization, the underlying 
problem is, of course, financial. Effective coordination of
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services is vital when resources for all services are increasing 
ly constricted.
Policies and programs developed to assist the temporarily 
unemployed and to aid disadvantaged groups in general have 
not, for the most part, relied on local monies. However, the 
increased demands on local services of all kinds during times 
of high unemployment and economic dislocation places 
communities and agencies within communities in a vise; just 
as demand for services increases, funds to provide such ser 
vices are cut. Kopolow and Ochberg spell out the conse 
quences of this situation with respect to mental health ser 
vices. 13 But the problem encompasses several other losses to 
the communities as well. Jobs from the plant are lost and, 
depending on the type of facility, a greater or lesser number 
of other jobs in supplier plants may quickly follow. Should 
the crisis last long enough, and the displaced workers' 
residences be concentrated within the community, a 
downturn in local commercial and business establishments 
will also follow. A final ripple can occur in public sector 
employment as lowered tax revenues force the layoff of 
public employees.
Assessing community costs of plant shutdown is a research 
area only now opening up. Although the complexity of the 
research and the lack of precision to be expected in early 
pilot studies are discouraging to deal with, two valuable 
preliminary studies have been completed. In one, Carlisle 
and Redmond 14 outline the indicators by which they measure 
community costs of plant closings; and in a companion piece 
they present methodology, sources of data, and preliminary
13. L.C. Kopolow and Frank M. Ochberg, "Spinoff From a Downward Swing," Mental 
Health, National Institute of Mental Health, 1976.
14. Carlisle and Redmond Associates and C & R Associates, Measuring the Community 
Costs of Plant Closings: Overview of Methods and Data Sources, Federal Trade Commis 
sion Report, May 1979; and Indicators for Measuring Community Costs on Plant Closings, 
FTC Report, 1978.
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findings about the effect of plant closings on the cities of 
Bridgeport, Connecticut and Durham, North Carolina. 
While they do not attempt to estimate all the costs, they have 
developed methods and indicators for this purpose. Current 
ly, three research efforts are underway to assess total 
costs in New England, in Youngstown, Ohio, and in 
several Michigan communities. 15 None of these studies has 
progressed beyond the data collection and analysis phase, 
but it is expected that they will be developmental in nature 
and that their publication will stimulate further work on the 
costs to communities of plant shutdowns.
From the community perspective, services to assist in 
worker reemployment and to smooth the transition period 
are important in the short term, but community economic 
development is obviously a long-term strategy to be prefer 
red to adjustment to community reduction. Worker- 
community purchases of industrial facilities threatened with 
closing have, during the 1970s, given many communities 
hope, for keeping a plant open obviates the need for dif 
ficult, painful, and costly adjustment.
There is substantial literature on worker ownership; Stern, 
Wood and Hammer, 16 and Whyte 17 concentrate upon this 
process, while Conte and Tannenbaum 18 continue to 
monitor the fiscal health of employee-owned enterprises. 
Three brief case studies suggest that the new trend toward
15. Elliot Sclar at Columbia is completing one study while Jemadari Kamara is conducting 
a cost study as part of dissertation research in The University of Michigan's Urban and 
Regional Planing Program. Data are currently being analyzed by Scan McAlinden on the 
costs of human services provided after a closing in Grand Haven, Michigan.
16. Robert N. Stern, K. Haydn Wood, and Tove Helland Hammer, Employee Ownership 
in Plant Shutdowns: Prospects for Employment Stability (Kalamazoo, MI: The W.E. Up 
john Institute for Employment Research, 1979).
17. William Foote Whyte, "In Support of Voluntary Employee Ownership," Society, 
September/October 1978, pp. 73-82.
18. Michael Conte and Arnold Tannenbaum, "Employee Owned Companies: Is the Dif 
ference Measurable," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 101, No. 7, July 1978, pp. 23-27.
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employee ownership depends upon the local community and 
upon the formation of a coalition of community members, 
workers, local banks, federal agencies and scholars involved 
in research in the area. An employee buyout of South Bend 
Lathe (South Bend, Indiana) survived the first stage after 
buyout, that is, the demonstration of sufficient continued 
profitability. But, as William Foote Whyte has remarked, 
there are two stages to such development, and all too fre 
quently managers, in their effort to establish and maintain 
profits, neglect labor-management relations just when such 
relations should surpass ordinary corporate efforts at 
cooperation. 19 At South Bend Lathe, problems mounted 
over several years and have resulted in a well-publicized 
strike, seen by many as one in which workers were striking 
against themselves. With the settlement of the strike, steps 
are being taken to reduce labor-management problems. A 
similar disillusionment has occurred at Saratoga Knitting 
Mills and the Mohawk Valley Community Corporation's 
venture at the Library Bureau at Herkmer, New York, both 
of which are reviewed by Zwerdling. 20 In neither case were 
labor-management tensions eased by the buyout. After an 
initial period of euphoria, management continued to func 
tion as before while workers, sometimes in conflict with their 
union and sometimes in concert with it, expressed discontent 
with a system fundamentally unchanged. These situations 
have convinced some observers that worker-ownership 
should be accompanied by greater worker participation in 
decision-making, if not by worker-management. Conte and 
Tannenbaum have given support to those who see worker- 
ownership as a response that saves communities from the 
losses incurred when a major manufacturing facility closes 
by noting that profitability, at least on a modest scale if not 
on the scale of a multinational corporation, is maintained by
19. Whyte, op. cit., pp. 78-80.
20. Daniel Zwerdling, Workplace Democracy (New York: Harper Colophon Edition, 
1980), pp. 65-80.
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employee-owned businesses. 21 It is not clear what impact bad 
labor-management relations characteristic of the second 
stage of employee buyouts will have on profitability. Fur 
ther, there is little as yet on the few situations in which 
employee buyouts are combined with increased levels of 
worker participation. Finally, as the section on legislative in 
itiatives explains, employee buyouts, formerly funded in part 
by federal agencies, will probably have to depend in the 
future on state government or the private sector or both for 
financial and technical assistance.
While it can be assumed that all communities are concern 
ed about a shutdown and its consequences, not all com 
munities respond in the same way. In the economic disloca 
tion impact inventory, the U.S. Department of Labor's Of 
fice of Trade Adjustment Assistance studied three cities after 
shutdown: Talladega, Alabama; Horseheads, New York; 
and Mansfield, Ohio. 22 Although the differences are strik 
ing, certain similarities dictated the choice of study sites. The 
plant closings were all removed from large labor markets and 
were in cities of 100,000 population or less, where the 
workers lived nearby. The closings resulted in unemploy 
ment higher than the national average, for each location was 
an established manufacturing area currently experiencing 
long-term decline and stagnation. In each case, a significant 
portion of the local population was heavily dependent upon 
the affected industry. Further criteria for selection involved 
eligibility for Trade Adjustment Assistance and the presence 
of collective bargaining agreements with major national 
unions, including contracts with seniority provisions inap 
plicable elsewhere. All had health and pension plans and the 
plants in Horseheads and Mansfield had both SUB and ter- 
mination benefit plans. The displaced workers were mostly
21. Conte and Tannenbaum, op. cit., pp. 27-28.
22. Economic Dislocation Impact Inventory Study: A Pre-Test in Three Cities 
(Washington, DC: Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance, Bureau of International Labor 
Affairs, U.S. Department of Labor, November 1979).
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unskilled and had a limited education, and the manual skills 
they did possess could not readily be transferred.
The studies sought to identify individual needs not met by 
traditional forms of assistance, to obtain assessments of the 
problems specific to the locale of the displaced workers, and 
to identify local resources and explore whether these could 
be mobilized to assist workers and the community. Despite 
some difficulty in collecting data, the studies did present a 
clear picture of economic dislocation in three cities, one par 
ticularly important here in relation to the community's 
responses.
The study team's interviews in Talladega revealed that in 
dividuals and groups within the community expressed con 
cern, but that practical results were limited. Local economic 
development effort was stepped up, but the results of that in 
creased activity, if indeed there were results, could not be 
observed by the team in a short term investigation. Either the 
nature of this increased activity was not explained to the 
team, or the efforts had not taken shape by the end of the 
study. There appears to have been no important community 
agency, group or institution that did not express verbal sup 
port, but there were limits to community action, and no 
fruitful community response was observed.
In Horseheads, New York the impact on the community 
was not especially severe, except for the loss of employment 
and earnings. The secondary impact was limited, partly 
because many workers commuted fifty or sixty miles to work 
and the economic dislocation was spread outside the im 
mediate area of Horseheads. While there were reports of the 
usual social problems divorce, depression, and substance 
abuse consequent upon unemployment, free counseling 
was a help in alleviating them. The negative impact was also 
minimized because some families had savings and some 
workers were married women and thus secondary wage
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earners. The workers were reemployed eventually. Skilled 
workers relocated, others retrained, and during the period of 
adjustment the community expressed a sense of support. The 
study team felt that the experience of recovery from the 1972 
floods in the area may have helped the community to 
organize for economic dislocation. Operation Help, organiz 
ed by a joint effort of the union and the local community ser 
vice groups, provided information on available assistance 
programs and arranged for family and financial counseling. 
The Chemung County Chamber of Commerce took an active 
role in assisting workers with their creditors and helped to 
identify possible jobs. The local community college organiz 
ed a program to prepare workers to enter appropriate ad 
vanced training programs even before trade adjustment 
assistance certification was issued, with the understanding 
that if certification was not issued, the program would pro 
ceed without charge to the unemployed workers. Unfor 
tunately a dispute arose, primarily jurisdictional in nature, 
with the New York Department of Labor. General com 
munity response in this situation was properly directed, and 
difficulties arose only because of limited coordination ef 
forts among groups who were involved in the plant closing 
but outside the immediate community.
Mansfield, Ohio exhibits certain features of a classic plant 
closing. The community is contracting by some 3.6 percent 
each year. While younger workers in the area, which had an 
unemployment rate of 7.9 percent when the closing was an 
nounced, decided to leave Mansfield, many older workers 
did not. A significant portion of the workers were in their 
forties or fifties, and their adjustment became a matter of 
concern for the community. Even before Trade Adjustment 
Assistance became available, the community responded with 
counseling, training, and job placement services, while other 
agencies were mobilized and coordinated to offer special ser 
vices.
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The Mansfield experience has received attention because 
of its emphasis on retraining. The proposal that a program 
be developed was made by Henry Fallerius, President of 
North Central Technical College, and from that proposal 
came Project Care, directed to the rubber workers affected 
by the plant closing but open to all the unemployed in the 
county. Counseling, training, and job placement were all 
gathered under the Project Care umbrella. Centers were set 
up throughout the area in schools and post-secondary in 
stitutions and the union hall. Local schools contributed the 
services of their counselors and the space and facilities for 
classes. The Project appears to have been designed for the 
skill level and career aspirations of the unemployed workers 
and the needs of the local labor market. The first objective 
for the retrained workers is to acquire jobs, and it is 
understood that some may be obliged to leave the area to do 
so.
The study of these three communities suggests that a sense 
of concern is the first response of community members, 
groups, and agencies to a plant closing, but that it cannot, in 
itself, accomplish a great deal. The mobilization of groups 
and resources to provide tangible support is the next essential 
step, and communities that have had experience in previous 
disasters, such as Horseheads, fare well in this phase of 
response. Perhaps the question should be asked whether a 
community should wait until disaster strikes to develop coor 
dination and mobilization capacities. Finally, the key to suc 
cess in Mansfield was a combination of concern, coordina 
tion and mobilization, augmented by a realistic plan to solve 
problems and a determination to use the resources of several 
agencies of government. The study showed that even long 
term government support, especially if uncoordinated, is no 
answer for any community. It also showed that a community 
with its own goals and objectives can use resources available 
from local, state, and federal agencies to make the adjust-
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ment easier for workers and the community and to imple 
ment an appropriate long term development plan.
To plead for increased coordination of services in the 
aftermath of a plant closing has become a cliche. To praise 
those communities that have developed coordinated 
responses is common. What this indicates is that community 
coordination, which means improved communication and 
relaxation of territorial tensions, combined with planned 
organizational and social change is a tough task. While we 
know from organizational behavior research that a crisis 
often produces such coordinated responses, only recently has 
an action research project focused on a plant closing. In a 
study which is already a classic, a team from the University 
of Michigan's Institute for Social Research developed a 
community-based program for reducing the social impact of 
a plant closing. 23 While the authors, Taber, Walsh, and 
Cooke, recognize that the impact of the effort cannot be ful 
ly evaluated, their experiment drew together management, 
the union, and community representatives into a temporary 
inter-organizational system designed to mobilize available 
human services. After the plant shutdown, the coordinating 
effort in which the research team took a facilitating role as 
change agents increased and enhanced the competence of the 
community. However, the difficulties encountered and the 
lack of total success reported provide evidence that, even 
with the provision of skilled assistance in a major crisis, 
communities and community agencies are not equipped to 
identify and coordinate all available resources.
In summary, communities are as vulnerable to the plant- 
closing crisis as the displaced workers. The costs to com 
munities have not been adequately assessed, but those costs 
are considerable. Communities can respond passively to the
23. Thomas D.Taber, Robert A. Cook, and Jeffery T. Walsh, "Developing a Community- 
Based Program for Reducing the Social Impact of a Plant Closing," Journal of Applied 
Behavioral Science, Vol. 15(2), 1979.
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crisis, but if they take an active role in assisting those com 
munity members most affected and thus reestablish the com 
munity's vitality, they provide relief to those in need and a 
central focus for the community itself. Communities must 
perceive the problem, must mobilize and coordinate 
resources, must form a plan best adapted to that 
community's situation, and must win the support of com 
munity members in implementing that plan. Difficulty can 
be expected at every stage of the process, as the evidence in 
respect to coordination of community services shows. Yet 
communities that have experienced crises and developed cop 
ing skills are far better prepared to meet future crises.
Legislative Initiatives in 
Response to Plant Closings
Over the past decade, a great deal of political activity has 
centered on the issue of plant closings. This activity has not 
been able to promote legislation on the national level, 
although workers have been enabled to buy facilities 
threatened with closure through legislation originally 
developed for rather broader reasons. Efforts at the state 
level have been somewhat more successful, but most of these 
are too recent for studies concerning them to have appeared 
in the literature. What does surface are studies of employee- 
owned firms, displaying a strategy to combat plant closings 
favored by a significant group of scholars, political activists, 
community leaders, and growing numbers of labor leaders.
Much of the legislative activity and even more of the 
literature concerning the politics of plant closings question 
whether capital mobility should remain unrestricted. Despite 
its underpinning of a significant research effort, the 
quintessential political document embodying the perspective 
is the Bluestone and Harrison study, Capital and Com-
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muni ties. 24 It is, however, only one of the studies now being 
made by 15 or 20 individuals or groups who are concen 
trating on plant-closing problems and the development of 
political action to combat them. These researchers come 
from unions, universities, and nonprofit social action or 
research groups.
It is probably appropriate to identify the most radical 
critics of the status quo with objections to unrestricted 
capital mobility. However, the radical critics are joined in 
their intervention efforts by other groups less obviously 
critical of the disinvestment process. Despite differences in 
political orientation and economic philosophy, the beginning 
of a national coalition could be discerned in the early 1970s. 
Efforts to save jobs for the Youngstown steel workers 
enlarged and strengthened such organizations as the Ohio 
Public Interest Campaign as well as the wider network of 
persons and groups concerned about economic dislocation. 
This alliance includes individuals who have held either con 
servative or liberal positions on other matters but who have 
been drawn to the plant-closing campaigns through cir 
cumstance or, as in the case of several major academic 
figures, because of a long-standing interest in research on 
employee-ownership, employee-participation in decision- 
making, or the overall effects of plant closings. Whatever the 
political and ideological shifts and compromises that have 
been made over the past few years, it is clear that groups 
once committed to simple community organizing efforts 
have been transformed into political action groups. Further, 
because of their diligent efforts to clarify the problems and 
issues for themselves and because of their abilities to build 
networks with organizations sharing some similar concerns,
24. Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, Capital and Communities: The Causes and 
Consequences of Private Disinvestment (Washington, DC: Professional Alliance, 1980), 
pp. 16-55.
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the informal and unofficial plant-closing network is not in 
itself a major research resource.
The major product of this network, its associates, and its 
political allies has been proposed legislation that has subse 
quently appeared on both the state and federal level. 25 State 
legislation currently exists in Maine, Michigan and Wiscon 
sin. All three statutes are considered relatively weak, but for 
different reasons. Michigan Public Act 44 requires notifica 
tion so that assistance to those firms where an employee 
buyout is possible can be offered by the Michigan Depart 
ment of Labor. Maine's law simply requires that severance 
benefits be paid to displaced workers. The Wisconsin statute 
(109.07), enacted in 1975, requires 60 days' notification for 
establishments having more than 100 employees and man 
dates a fine of $50 per worker for noncompliance, but this 
statute has not yet been implemented. It is significant that 
new and stiffer legislation has been introduced in both Maine 
and Michigan.
Other states currently contemplating legislation include 
Ohio, Delaware, Oregon, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, 
California, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania. Legislation 
may also be introduced in Montana, New Hampshire, and 
Indiana within the next year or two. These legislative in 
itiatives face great opposition; some of them have been in 
troduced in different forms on several occasions, only to die 
in committee or suffer defeat. However an important 
phenomenon is increasingly associated with these proposed 
bills: the growth and development of new plant-closing 
public action groups. Patterned in part upon the Ohio Public 
Interest Campaign and adopting its strategies, new groups, 
such as the Pennsylvania Public Interest Coalition, the 
Illinois Public Action Council, and the Oregon Plant
25. William Schweke, Plant Closings: Issues, Politics and Legislation Briefing Book 
(Washington, DC: Conference of Alternative State and Local Policies, 1980), pp. 42-52.
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Closure Organizing Committee, have been formed. Public 
hearings, such as those in Rhode Island, New York, and 
California, continue to focus public attention on these 
issues.
The state-level legislation can be very simple, requiring 
only some advance notification to workers,the community 
and the state and setting a major or minor penalty for non- 
compliance. Maine, for example, mandated severance 
benefits of one week's wages for every year worked by those 
employed for more than three years. Only civil damages are 
countenanced by this bill. Ohio's proposed legislation, on 
the other hand, includes a full range of provisions. 
Employers not facing bankruptcy and falling outside certain 
other acceptable levels of business contraction and employ 
ing more than 100 persons in an establishment that has been 
more than five years in operation are subject to several re 
quirements. In one proposed version, advance notification 
of two years is required, while a bargained-down version re 
quires only one year. Severance benefits similar to those of 
Maine, one week's wages for each year of employment, are 
mandated, A community assistance payment is also part of 
the proposed Ohio legislation, requiring the payment of 10 
percent of the total wages of employees who lose their jobs 
because of closing. Willful failure to comply can result in the 
issuance of an injunction prohibiting closure. Other states, 
New York for example, propose criminal sanctions and 
punitive fines. New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, and California also include employee-buyout provi 
sions in their proposed plant-closing legislation.
As the political action side of this network gains ex 
perience with plant closings and with the legislative process, 
there is a tendency for proposed legislation to become more 
comprehensive and to include short-range remedies such as 
community action assistance as well as long-range options 
such as employee-community purchase of the plants. Occa-
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sionally, as in Michigan, an exception can be observed; 
political consideration made a simple bill providing minimal 
assistance for employee-ownership options feasible at a time 
when other measures were unlikely to be passed.
The same mix of concerns and strategies is seen in national 
legislation. Since 1974, Representative William Ford of 
Michigan has introduced successive versions of a National 
Employment Priorities Act. In the most recent version, 
unlike earlier formulations, the emphasis is on financing of 
severance pay by the employer rather than by federal funds. 
Communities would be the beneficiaries of a mandated pay 
ment to the local municipality of 85 percent of their tax loss. 
Another feature of the current bill would establish a Na 
tional Employment Priorities Administration within the 
Department of Labor to conduct investigations of planned 
closings and to offer financial and technical assistance to 
prevent them. Other bills that have been introduced and have 
died in committee have focused more narrowly on one issue 
or another. For example, the Employee Protection and 
Community Stabilization Bill of 1979 would have called for 
the continuation of employee health benefit plans but would 
have restricted federal financial and technical assistance to 
employee-buyout situations by denying them the assistance 
offered by the Ford Bill to ailing industries.
The only legislative victory the plant-closing coalition can 
claim on the national level is the Small Business and 
Employee Ownership Act of 1980, Title V of Public Law 
96-302. By this Act the Small Business Administration is 
given authority to make loan guarantees to employee trusts 
for the purchase of a business or expansion of a business. 
These trusts may be part of an employee stock ownership 
plan (ESOP) or come from another type of employee owner 
ship. At present, the Administration is entitled to guarantee 
up to $500,000 in loan authority. The possibilities involved 
in the Title I enactment, taken together with financial
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assistance available from the Economic Development Ad 
ministration of the Department of Commerce, the Urban 
Development Action Grant Program of the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, and the activities of the 
National Consumer Cooperative Bank, made the prospects 
for a continued trend toward employee buyouts seem 
favorable in late 1980. The current climate in the new ad 
ministration and Congress hardly seems conducive to con 
tinued development in this direction for the next several 
years.
The future of the plant-closing coalition is uncertain. Its 
past, brief as that has been, is an interesting example of 
coalition formation. The themes that draw individuals and 
groups together are often superficially similar but fun 
damentally different. A major concern with employee par 
ticipation in decision-making predates the association of 
plant closing with employee-ownership, yet at several points 
these concerns have coalesced, as the work of William Foote 
Whyte shows. Early notification, for which many could lob 
by, often concealed fundamental differences about what 
should be done during the time gained and even whether 
management should have the right to make the decision 
without constraint. Should the plant-closing coalition sur 
vive and thrive, it will surely move more forcefully into elec 
toral politics.
A major conclusion of this chapter, indeed of this volume, 
is that very little that is new has been recorded in the plant- 
closing literature since 1963. That is not to say that nothing 
new has happened. The newest program, and program is 
meant here in the largest sense, has been political. Although 
the goals of the supporters of the plant-closing coalition dif 
fer markedly, and indeed are in direct contradiction at times, 
a resource network has been assembled. A priority for plant- 
closing research must be the continuing study of the political
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action and community organizing groups that have mobiliz 
ed around this problem.
European Responses to Plant Closings
While this volume is concerned exclusively with the 
American experience in plant closings and industrial disloca 
tion, the new directions in the area of political initiatives 
have led the plant-closing research and action community to 
look at the European examples available. While numerous 
scholars have followed European employment and training 
programs and efforts to promote job security and occupa 
tional mobility, there has been a recent resurgence of interest 
in European policy. Two studies in particular, a report to the 
Federal Trade Commission by Carlisle and Redmond in 
197926 and the joint Report of the Labor Union Study Tour 
in the same year27 illustrate the new tendency to acquire 
useful program and policy models. Carlisle and Redmond 
made an extensive search of the literature and initiated con 
tacts with individuals and organizations active in policy 
research on plant closings and plant-closing legislation 
throughout Western Europe, including France, Sweden, 
Germany, Belgium, and the United Kingdom.
Most European countries, in contrast to the United States, 
do have some form of legislation intended to mitigate the 
hardships following a plant closing. Job training and job 
search assistance is available in all countries; France and 
Sweden have the most extensive programs, with relocation a 
focus of Swedish policy. Compensation payments are 
widespread throughout Europe, again as a matter of public 
policy enforced through legislation, in contrast to the United
26. Carlisle and Redmond Associates, Plant Closings Legislation and Regulation in the 
United States and Western Europe: A Survey, Report to the Federal Trade Commission, 
January 1979.
27. Economic Dislocation: Plant Closings, Plant Relocations and Plant Conversions, Joint 
Report of Labor Union Study Tour Participants, May 1, 1979.
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States where such payments are matters for collective 
bargaining agreements. European payments are justified 
either by the conviction that worker transition should be eas 
ed or that compensation to the worker for loss of his invest 
ment in the job should be made. Pre-pension programs, the 
early retirement option, are particularly important in the 
French scheme. There is little evidence in European legisla 
tion of penalties for companies that move, although in some 
cases there are national funds to ensure payment to workers 
in case of noncompliance or company default on severance 
payments. In Great Britain, an attempt at locational regula 
tion is made through incentives and disincentives to induce 
new industries to locate in certain affected areas.
Those who have studied European legislation tend to con 
clude that European countries generally have adopted, 
through a variety of approaches, an active and helpful 
posture toward displaced workers. The keystone of these ap 
proaches continues to be early notification, which enables 
workers to make the necessary adjustment more easily and 
enables government, which plays a major role, to provide 
compensation, services, and transition assistance effectively.
Summary
The management role in plant closings, with the exception 
of some employability development programming, remains 
one in which management attempts to minimize the costs 
associated with closing. The role of organized labor, con 
strained as always by the relative failure of collective 
bargaining to provide job security and/or substantial adjust 
ment assistance, has recently moved toward a closing- 
specific posture. New attitudes and capacities are generating 
aggressive bargaining that seeks to extract as much adjust 
ment assistance as possible. Unions have also become, in 
some cases, leaders or partners in community coordinating 
groups. Communities, once the passive element in the plant-
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closing process, are demonstrating concern and are showing 
success in coordinating services and in new capabilities for 
organizing campaigns to retrain workers and channel 
economic development.
Legislative initiatives, a new category of plant-closing 
responses, have not yet proved very successful. But in the 
process of developing such legislation, an active network of 
plant-closing research and action specialists has developed. 
Although its future is uncertain, this plant-closing communi 
ty could become increasingly visible as it provides training, 
technical assistance, and support to groups who hope to pro 
mote legislation and community initiatives. The successful 
management of plant closings in some European cases con 
tinues to be a leading source of policy and program models 
for the increasing number of labor leaders, researchers, 
political figures, officials, and activists who feel that the 
American response to plant closings has been too little and 
too late.
Chapter 4
Labor Market Re-entry 
and the Reemployment Experience
Without question, the vast majority of plant-closing 
research has centered on the displaced worker. The 
demographics, job search methods, resources, and needs of 
the displaced have all received attention. Yet research into 
the displacement experience can be separated into two broad 
concerns: while most of the literature since 1963 has focused 
on program impacts, a significant portion of plant-closing 
research has continued to examine the job search methods 
and reemployment experience of those workers who either 
chose not to participate in formal programs or for whom no 
intervention was initiated. This chapter will examine the sec 
ond group, reserving a study of program participants for the 
following chapter.
Workforce Demographics
The following examination of the demographics of 
workers considered in the literature under review is designed 
both to present a vivid picture of the worker faced with a 
plant closing and to provide a basis for comparison with the 
program participants.
Although plant-closing research has been concerned with 
different industries and geographical regions, a number of 
common characteristics of the workforce emerge. First, the
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age of the displaced worker is quite high, ranging from 53.8 
years at Packard 1 to about 40 at the Armour site, 2 due in part 
to reverse seniority layoff. When a firm fails, or when pro 
duction has been gradually cut back before an announce 
ment of closing, reverse seniority layoff may mean that the 
average age of the workforce at the time of the closing has 
risen. Since age is often associated with high seniority and 
since case study participants had an average seniority rang 
ing from 11.3 years at Omaha3 to 30 at Roanoke, 4 it seems 
likely that the younger, less senior workers were the first to 
lose their jobs. Indeed, many of them had been released long 
before the research team ever entered the plant.
Given the high age and seniority of the plant-closing 
workforce, then, low educational attainment comes as no 
surprise. Formal education was as low as 7.2 years at 
Packard, 5 while averaging as high as 10 years at a number of 
other sites. Obviously such low educational levels have a 
severe impact on retraining and development.
The tendency among plant-closing researchers to examine 
only male-dominated, heavy manufacturing industries has 
resulted in an underrepresentation both of racial minorities 
and of female workers. While racial minorities constituted 
45 percent of the Packard workforce, 6 7 of the remaining 
studies reported that minority workers comprised less than
1. Michael Aiken, Louis A. Ferman, and Harold L. Sheppard, Economic Failure, Aliena 
tion and Extremism, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1968), p. 178.
2. James L. Stern, Kenneth A. Root, and Stephen M. Hills, "The Influence of Social- 
Psychological Traits and Job Search Patterns on the Earnings of Workers Affected by a 
Plant Closure," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, October 1974, p. 112.
3. Stern, Root, and Hills, op. cit., p. 112.
4. Joan M. McCrea, The Reemployment Experiences of Workers Displaced in the Closing 
of the American Viscose Plant at Roanoke (Virginia Bureau of Population and Economic 
Research, University of Virginia, 1968), p. 7.
5. Aiken, Ferman, and Sheppard, op. cit., p. 178.
6. George P. Shultz and Arnold B. Weber, Strategies for the Displaced Worker (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1969), p. 102.
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10 percent of the workforce; 8 studies made no mention of 
race at all. The findings for females were similar. Although 
females comprised as high as 56 percent of the workers at 
West Warick, 7 most of the studies (19 out of 27) dealt with 
female participation of less than 10 percent or made no men 
tion of the sex distribution. Therefore, it is difficult to draw 
valid conclusions about the employment and job search ex 
periences of women or of minorities. Yet certain conclusions 
can be drawn from the few studies that do show significant 
levels of both groups.
Job Search
Where the labor market assistance programs are 
unavailable or have been refused by the worker, announce 
ment of closing means a return to the job market. Between 
announcement and closing the worker must plan a job search 
strategy. The basic questions are when to begin a job search, 
where to look, and how to look. Plant-closing research of 
fers substantial findings bearing on each of these decisions.
The decision to begin an early job search appears to be 
associated with the worker's occupational status and the 
availability of severance benefits. Portis and Suys, 8 in study 
ing the effects of early notice at the Kelvinator plant in Lon 
don, Ontario, note that while only 26 percent of the produc 
tion workers left Kelvinator before the closing, no more than 
one-quarter of the office, managerial, and executive staff re 
mained until the shutdown. It was found that 82 percent of 
those staying until the shutdown date listed "to get all 
severance benefits" as a cause, while 31 percent said they 
had looked for a job but could not find one, and 22 percent
7. William Devino, Arnold A. Raphaelson, and James A. Storer, A Study of Textile Mill 
Closings in Selected New England Communities (Orono, ME: University of Maine Press, 
1966), p. 111.
8. Bernard Portis and Michael Suys, The Effect of Advanced Notice in a Plant Shutdown: 
A Case Study of the Closing of the Kelvinator Plant in London, Ontario, (London, On 
tario: School of Business Administration, The University of Western Ontario, 1970), p. 8.
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said that they had been assured of a job after the termination 
date. Of those leaving early, 83 percent had a good job offer, 
while 17 percent said they did not know that severance 
benefits were being offered. Thus Portis and Suys conclude: 
"It is difficult to tell whether employment opportunities or 
severance benefits were really the more important in keeping 
workers at Kelvinator."
A more striking difference in the way the job search was 
conducted was found by Foltman9 in polling the workers at 
Wickwire. There only 41 percent of the respondents had 
tried to find another job before termination. Only 19 percent 
had made "modest or diffident probes of the labor market," 
while an additional 19 percent engaged in a serious and ex 
tensive search. However, of much greater interest was the 
apparent dichotomy between white-collar and blue-collar 
workers. While half the white-collar workers undertook 
either modest or intensive job search before termination, on 
ly 35 percent of the blue-collar workers chose to do so. Again 
issues of seniority, severance benefits, and lack of available 
jobs were given as reasons for staying, while a good job offer 
constituted the primary reason for leaving.
These two studies offer three possible reasons for the ap 
parent dichotomy. First, the much higher percentage of 
workers receiving "good job offers" appears to be directly 
related to their occupational status, a fact that implies that 
fewer blue-collar workers would leave the company before 
shutdown because they had received fewer offers. On the 
other hand, it is quite possible that white-collar workers may 
have undertaken a more rigorous search or may simply have 
developed superior techniques for finding new employment. 
The latter possibility is favored by Foltman, who points out 
that white-collar workers are usually able to take time off
9. Felician F. Foltman, White and Blue Collars in a Mill Shutdown, (Ithaca, NY: New 
York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1968), pp. 45-46.
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from work to search for employment and that they are apt to 
be in touch with better information channels than their blue- 
collar counterparts.
Leaving the job for job hunting is, of course, not 
easy for blue-collar workers in factories. To be 
sure, some employers sent representatives to 
Wickwire where some blue-collar employees were 
interviewed on company time, but otherwise, these 
workers made their employment forays on their 
own time. An employed white-collar respondent 
who found a job in another state remarked: "Due 
to my management position my feelings would 
naturally be different from others who were in the 
union rank and file; however, I feel that it would 
have helped all types of personnel to have been 
alerted to the gravity of the situation at a much 
earlier date. Even though I felt certain that a shut 
down would occur (as early as the fall of 1962) I am 
sure that the local management was not actually 
aware of the exact situation until June 1963. " 10
Finally, the high percentage of workers listing severance 
pay as their reason for remaining to the end leads one to 
believe that severance benefits may have a negative effect on 
blue-collar job search. If the employee must remain until 
layoff in order to become eligible for severance benefits, 
such benefits may actually slow down the job search of these 
workers. By reducing the sense of urgency and creating in its 
place a false sense of security, the additional income provid 
ed by severance payments may encourage the worker to act 
against his/her eventual best interests. And if the blue-collar 
worker, as Foltman suggests, has in any case a poorer 
perception of the labor market than does the white-collar
10. Ibid., p. 46.
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worker, the lure of severance pay may prevent the realization 
that early job search is necessary. 11
The decision about where to look for a job has received 
more extensive attention in the literature. Unlike research on 
when to begin looking, studies on job search mobility have 
had a wider scope than just the impact of occupational status 
and severance benefits. Unfortunately, with the exception of 
Foltman, we have only quantitative results rather than actual 
search patterns. Therefore, many of the characteristics 
outlined below are associated only with actual relocations 
and not with those workers who looked for a job that would 
require a move. As a result, we risk reporting associations 
between demographics and job search mobility when we may 
actually have been observing an association between worker 
demographics and reemployability. Yet there are theoretical 
reasons for believing that such demographics may have an 
impact on both reemployability and job search mobility. 
Thus, we present the association below, fully aware of the 
danger of establishing a spurious relationship. When a 
characteristic is associated only with job search results, the 
accompanying theoretical arguments for an association with 
job search mobility will be provided as well.
Occupational status appears to have an impact on job 
search mobility. Foltman, in studying the mobility patterns 
of white-collar and blue-collar steelworkers, notes that while 
only 22 percent of the blue-collar workers at Wickwire 
sought jobs more than 50 miles from the plant, 33 percent of 
the white-collar workers did so. 12 He asserts that occupa 
tional status, which forms one of the strongest associations 
between an individual labor market trait and job search 
mobility, affects the climate of the worker's job search. 
White-collar workers have the better informational channels
\\.Ibid., p. 62. 
12. Ibid., p. 66.
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and job search opportunities. As Foltman notes, better job 
market information makes the white-collar worker more 
aware of actual labor market conditions so that he is better 
qualified to market his skills. High occupational-status 
workers, because their acquaintances are more geographical 
ly diverse and because they enjoy search time allowance 
along with general preferential treatment, are able to "scout 
out" new localities and employers and to reduce the uncer 
tainties involved in relocation. Turning Foltman's argument 
around, it can be argued that blue-collar workers lack vital 
informational channels and thus find it more difficult to 
properly appraise the potential costs and benefits of job 
search mobility. Faced with a higher degree of uncertainty, 
the blue-collar worker may actually perceive the net benefits 
as insufficient to warrant the effort or simply choose not to 
explore the unknown.
A worker's sex has also been linked to geographic mobili 
ty. Joan McCrea13 has observed that only 15 percent of the 
displaced female workers at American Viscose, as compared 
with 24 percent of the males, relocated. While McCrea offers 
no data on the characteristics of the female relocation par 
ticipants, David Lipsky, 14 treating relocation patterns of 
workers in General Food's transfer program, describes the 
small percentage of women participants as "single career 
women" or women with husbands who were relocating. 
Secondary income status of females, it can be argued, 
reduces the opportunity for relocation and thus reduces their 
job search mobility. Risking a primary income source to en 
sure a secondary one is simply not a rational choice, and as a 
result the job search mobility of secondary income earners 
may be limited to the local labor market. Indeed, secondary 
income status may explain the actual disparity in relocation
13. McCrea, op. tit., p. 20.
14. David B. Lipsky, "Interplant Transfer and Terminated Workers: A Case Study," In 
dustrial and Labor Relations Review, January 1970, p. 194.
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rates and a potential disparity in mobility between males and 
females. But other scenarios are possible. Women may be 
more sensitive to risk factors, or they may value family or 
community ties more than men and thus wish to remain in 
the same locality. But until the data to validate any of these 
hypotheses are obtained, no conclusions are possible.
Age is another relocation barrier mentioned in the 
literature. While several plant-closing studies have noted the 
negative effects of age on the worker's propensity to relocate 
(i.e., Lipsky, Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard), McCrea gives 
an especially vivid account. 15 While 32 percent of those 
under 45 moved out of Roanoke, only 18 percent of those 
over that age did so. A primary determinant of such im 
mobility on the part of those over 45 at Viscose, and an ex 
planation common to most research on the subject, was the 
high level of community attachment of this group. About 75 
percent of the Viscose workers had been employed at the 
plant for more than 30 years and half the workforce had kept 
the same residence for more than 20 years. Such commit 
ment to the community increases the costs of relocation. The 
costs of leaving home, family, and friends after two or three 
decades is often prohibitively high. It must also be 
remembered that for the vast majority of older workers at 
any plant, the potential benefits are low. For the average 
displaced worker over 50 years of age, future working life is 
short. This decline cuts down the potential income disparity 
between moving and successful or unsuccessful local labor 
market search, thereby reducing the benefits of relocation. 
High community attachment and low income disparity be 
tween local and nonlocal employment certainly would reduce 
the job search efforts of older workers outside the communi 
ty. Activity outside the local labor market would thus be ex 
pected to be minimal, but here again theories must remain 
speculation until proper data are available.
15. McCrea, op. cit., p. 20.
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A final demographic associated with the relocation deci 
sion is education. Lipsky16 observed a slight tendency among 
the more educated to move more readily than their less 
educated co-workers. While Lipsky does not offer any 
theoretical explanation for this result, education may be 
linked to relocation in an indirect manner. Since higher 
education is often a valuable prerequisite for advanced oc 
cupational status, the association between education and 
relocation may be governed by the fact that a higher status 
position carries with it more company-assisted relocation op 
portunities and better information channels to conduct a 
wide job search. Educational attainment is also a function of 
a worker's age. Higher educational attainment may be 
associated with younger workers (up to a point) and it may 
be the worker's age and not his/her education that is the 
critical factor. Whether the correlation between education 
and relocation is indeed a spurious one has not been tested 
by plant closing research. 17
Job Search Methods
Finally research has examined actual job search methods 
of the displaced. While most methods appear to be informal, 
a small group of displaced workers has utilized placement 
agencies. In this section, we shall attempt to differentiate 
between formal and informal job search patterns by the 
demographic features of the workers and to emphasize the 
apparent superiority of informal job search methods.
Nine of the twenty plant-closing studies provided informa 
tion on the workers' propensity to utilize public or private 
placement agencies as a means of supplementing or sup-
16. Lipsky, op, cit., p. 195.
17. Two other studies, Stern, Root and Hills, op. cit. and James L. Stern, "Consequences 
of Plant Closure," Journal of Human Resources, Winter, 1972, report that the company 
transferred workers had slightly lower educational levels than those who remained behind. 
However, such differences were very small.
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planting their individual job search efforts. All but two of 
the nine studies focused on the worker's response to aid of 
fered through the local employment service or through a 
joint effort between the Armour Automation Committee 
and the appropriate state unit. The percentage of workers 
responding to such assistance ranged from a meager 1 per 
cent at Fort Worth18 to a healthy 70 percent at Plainfield. 19 
Stern, Root, and Hills20 provide some information on who 
these people are and why they chose to enlist the services of a 
placement agency. For the workers in Omaha, the average 
age of the displaced worker who used a public placement 
agency was higher than that of the worker entering the 
market on his own. The former had a mean age of 39.2, 
while the latter had a mean age of only 37. This moderate 
difference suggests that the age variable may have some ef 
fect on the worker's decision to seek institutionalized 
assistance. Constantly reminded of the difficulty that older 
workers can have in finding adequate employment, the older 
labor market entrant may perceive an advantage in enlisting 
the help of a third party in dealing with potential employers.
The placement-assisted workers at Omaha also had greater 
seniority than their unassisted counterparts, averaging 11.3 
years of company service compared to only 10.8 years for the 
latter. 21 This slight difference in mean seniority could be in 
terpreted as a tendency for long-time workers, who have not 
had to seek work over a long period of time, to seek 
assistance when necessary; long absence from the job hunt 
makes them the most likely candidates to benefit from 
assistance. Workers with recent success in finding employ-
is. George P. Shultz, "The Fort Worth Project of the Armour Automation Committee," 
Monthly Labor Review, January 1968, p. 55.
19. John W. Dorsey, "The Mack Case: A Study in Unemployment," in Studies in 
Economics of Income Maintenance, Otto Eckstein, ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings In 
stitution, 1967), p. 189.
20. Stern, Root and Hills, op. cit., p. 112.
21. Stern, Root and Hills, op. cit., p. 112.
Labor Market Re-entry 77
ment are more apt to be confident of their own job-finding 
skills and thus less likely to feel that they need formal 
assistance. Again, this theory has remained untested by the 
current research.
Finally, 61 percent of the workers who sought formal 
assistance were unskilled, 22 and it can be hypothesized that 
they also were trying to offset a negatively correlated 
reemployment characteristic by formal assistance. In fact, 
the 40 percent minority composition of the assisted group, 
the .9 year differential in their educational attainment, and 
the $151 yearly salary disparity at Armour may all be 
evidence supporting the view that workers apply to place 
ment agencies as a way of compensating for perceived disad 
vantages with respect to reemployment.
If the workers freely applying to a placement agency do in 
deed possess characteristics that put them at a disadvantage, 
this may partially justify the low success rates of placement 
programs in general. Excluding the Sioux City program 
where 450 out of 600 workers were placed, 23 placement has 
ranged from one-third of the participants at the oil firm in 
Hammerman's study24 to a meager 5 percent at Plainfield. 25 
If no other efforts had been made by the applicants, 66 to 95 
percent of the job seekers dealt with in these studies would 
have remained unemployed. While we have no employment 
data on those workers the employment service failed to 
place, it is fairly safe to assume that a substantial number of 
them found employment without formal assistance or in 
spite of the placement program. It is also worth noting that, 
in one study, those reemployed through a placement service
22. Stern, Root and Hills, op. cit., p. 112.
23. Eaton H. Conant, "Report and Appraisal: The Armour Fund's Sioux City Project," 
Monthly Labor Review, September 1965, p. 1300.
24. Herbert Hammerman, "Five Case Studies of Displaced Workers," Monthly Labor 
Review, June 1964, p. 664.
25. Dorsey, op. cit., p. 189.
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have had lower post-shutdown earnings than the unassisted 
workers. Stern, Root, and Hills26 note, in the only study 
comparing the post-shutdown earnings of these groups, that 
assisted workers averaged $7,120 per year while unassisted 
workers averaged $7,875 per year. While it is true that the 
assisted workers also had lower pre-shutdown earnings than 
the unassisted, the disparity has grown since the shutdown 
(from $251 before closing to $946 by 1971). Given the low 
participation rates among displaced workers in agency pro 
grams and the low rates of agency success generally in 
lower-paying jobs one can only conclude that public and 
private employment agencies play a relatively minor role in 
finding jobs for the displaced.
For most job hunters, informal methods have proved 
relatively successful. Portis and Suys27 note that 38 percent of 
the displaced Kelvinator workers found new employment 
through direct application, 21 percent through a lead provid 
ed by a friend or relative, 9 percent through newspaper ads, 
and 8 percent through company contacts. Only 19 percent 
found employment through a placement service. While all 
displaced workers use informal channels to some extent, 
Foltman notes a significant difference in job-seeking 
behavior between blue-collar and white-collar workers:
From the responses on job hunting before termina 
tion it appears that white-collar respondents ap 
proached their problem in a more logical and 
systematic fashion than the blue-collar 
respondents; they [white-collar workers] embarked 
on a job search, sent letters and resumes of ex 
perience to employers, and used other public and 
private services. On the contrary, many of the blue- 
collar respondents, rather than determining in ad-
26. Stern, Root and Hills, op. cit., p. 112.
27. Portis and Suys, op. cit., p. 19.
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vance what employer needs actually were, applied 
in person, knocking on doors almost at random to 
indicate their availability. 28
Foltman also notes that while white-collar workers tended to 
maximize their efforts to find the best job available, blue- 
collar workers, faced with the prospects of continued 
unemployment, tended to take the first job offered them. 
This was especially true of blue-collar groups who were 
older, less educated, and whose finances were severely 
strained.
Palen and Fahey, 29 in comparing the job search efforts of 
displaced workers under and over the age of 50, note a 
decrease in effort among older workers. While 40 percent of 
the displaced Studebaker workers had applied for 5 or more 
jobs and 25 percent had applied for from 10 to 20 jobs, 
workers over 50 generally made fewer job applications. The 
authors contend that this tendency on the part of the older 
worker is not due to a lack of interest, but rather to his ac 
ceptance of the situation; it is unclear whether or not this is 
indeed the case, for both factors could be involved here.
Job Search Summary
In summary, the white-collar worker, presumably better 
informed about the labor market and often able to look for a 
job on "company time," may concentrate search activities 
into a period shortly before or after announcement of im 
pending closure. In contrast, the blue-collar worker, less able 
to search while still employed and presumably strongly 
motivated by a desire to secure severance pay, is less likely to 
look seriously for another job before termination. In addi-
28. Foltman, op. tit., p. 68.
29. J. John Palen and Frank J. Fahey, "Unemployment and Reemployment Success: An 
Analysis of the Studebaker Shutdown," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, January 
1968, p. 239.
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tion, some displaced groups seem more likely to step outside 
the local labor market for employment. We have a little data 
on job search mobility, but there are strong theoretical 
grounds for arguing that white-collar, young and male (or 
primary income) workers are the most far-ranging in their 
search. Finally, displaced workers have the opportunity to 
use formal employment organizations, but participation has 
remained small for the most part and shows a slight tendency 
to be comprised of older, high seniority, minority, low-skill 
workers with inferior education. If the data on the Omaha 
workers can be generalized, it appears that workers with 
some disadvantage as compared with others are more likely 
to choose formal assistance as a way of compensating. While 
such assistance has provided a modest number of the ap 
plicants with jobs, a majority of workers find jobs through 
other means. While all workers make applications in person 
and/or rely on friends for leads, white-collar workers under 
take a more systematic and organized job search than do 
their blue-collar counterparts, and older workers appear to 
make the fewest contacts of all in their efforts to find a job.
Reemployment Experiences
The measure of a successful job search is employment. 
While we have noted that several worker demographics ap 
pear to have an impact on job search, it is equally important 
to remember that the characteristics of a worker also have an 
impact on the opportunity for stable employment with com 
parable income. This section outlines those environmental 
and personal characteristics that relate to the worker's 
reemployment opportunities and describe the quality of the 
worker's post-closing employment.
Other factors besides job search methods and intensity 
play a large role in the reemployability of displaced workers. 
Of primary importance is the condition of the local labor 
market. When demand for labor is high, the displaced
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worker can of course secure a new job much more easily than 
in times of scarcity. In many cases the closing of a large 
employer in a relatively small labor market, may mean that 
the number of displaced workers far exceeds the number of 
available local jobs. As a case in point, Dorsey30 reports that 
the number of workers displaced (as a percentage of the total 
nonagricultural employment in the local labor market) was a 
determinant in the duration of the unemployment of Mack 
workers. The worker, no matter how intensive or resourceful 
his job search, may fail to find a job if few are available.
The strongest association established in the literature be 
tween a worker demographic and reemployability has been 
that of age. In virtually all the studies to date that examine 
the determinants of reemployability (Dorsey; Aiken, Ferman 
and Sheppard; Hammerman; McCrea; Shultz and Weber; 
Turner and Whitaker; Stern; Portis and Suys) the conclusion 
has been the same: age is negatively related to reemployabili 
ty. Hammerman31 notes that, in four out of five case studies 
he undertook, workers over 45 years of age had significantly 
higher unemployment rates than did those below that age. In 
the fifth case, many of the laid-off older workers voluntarily 
retired, only to reenter the labor force by the time the survey 
was taken. Where narrower age breakdowns were available, 
Hammerman found the highest unemployment rates in the 
55 to 59 age group. Similar findings were noted by Lipsky: 32 
workers over 55 displaced from the Baker plant were 
unemployed for an average 23.6 weeks, while the average 
worker remained without work for 18.6 weeks.
Several explanations have been offered, one of the most 
common being discrimination. Turner and Whitaker33 could
30. Dorsey, op. tit., p. 199.
31. Hammerman, op. tit., p. 667.
32. Lipsky, op. tit., p. 199.
33. Robert G. Turner and William M. Whitaker, "The Impact of Mass Layoffs on Older 
Workers," Industrial Gerontology, Winter 1973, p. 21.
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Summary of Attempts to Quantify the Impact 
of Selected Demographics on Unemployment
Variable
Age
Sex (1 = female)
Race
Seniority
Skilled
Semiskilled
Unskilled
Number of
dependents
Other weekly
income
Wage before
termination
Education
Severance pay
White collar
Foreman
Area impact
Single female
Occupation
Married female
husband not
working
Lipsky3
.3331
(.1246)
4.2261
(2.9696)
-.2655
(.2635)
-1.0547
(.6302)
.0196
(.0227)
-.0448
(.0791)
-.5553
(.4850)
.0003
(.0018)
Dorseyb
.1514
(.0235)
-3.9408
(1.9133)
-1.8621
(1.7703)
-2.3444
(1.8338)
-1.5809
(.6402)
-1.2467
(1.8054)
-1.4032
(2.3444)
57.3002
(21.6100)
-5.1254
(1.9553)
-2.7719
(.9371)
Palen & 
Faheyc
.291
-.085
.005
-.079
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Variable
Single male
Married male
wife not working
R2
Lipsky3 Dorseyb
-2.7340
(1.3194)
-4.9338
(1.2002)
.19 .298
Palen & 
Faheyc
.132
SOURCES: David B. Lipsky, "Interplant Transfer and Terminated Workers: A Case 
Study," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, January 1970, p. 204. 
John W. Dorsey, "The Mack Case: A Study in Unemployment," in Studies in the 
Economics of Income Maintenance, Otto Eckstein, ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings In 
stitution, 1967), p. 199.
J. John Palen and Frank J. Fahey, "Unemployment and Reemployment Success: An 
Analysis of the Studebaker Shutdown," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, January 
1968, p. 242.
a. Dependent Variable is number of weeks unemployed. Standard errors are in paren 
theses.
b. Dependent Variable is number of months unemployed. Standard errors are in paren 
theses.
c. Dependent Variable is the probability of being unemployed. Regression coefficients are 
beta weights. Standard errors were not given.
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find no significant difference in the education or training 
backgrounds of displaced workers within the 55 to 70 and 
the 45 to 54 age groups that could account for the differences 
in their respective employment rates. They conclude that age 
discrimination is still a leading problem for older job 
seekers, and that it may take several forms. First, employers 
commonly see the older worker as less productive than a 
younger one. While several interest groups and a small body 
of research have come to the conclusion that this is a 
misconception on the part of the employer, many employers 
perceive increasing age as a signal of reduced productivity 
and are unwilling to hire an older worker. Even if the older 
worker escapes the unproductive label, he may still have to 
contend with the stigma of being "untrainable." While 
Whitaker and Turner34 and Conant35 point to the willingness 
of older workers to undertake retraining, many employers 
and administrators still believe that "you can't teach an old 
dog new tricks."
Furthermore, an older worker may be perceived by the 
company as a "poor investment." The older worker lacks 
the long-run potential of the younger, and may be denied a 
job on that ground alone. Financially, the older worker will 
cost the company in pension contributions and accident in 
surance coverage rates. Al Slote is concerned with this finan 
cial perspective in his book, Termination, based on personal 
interviews with workers displaced in the 1965 closing of the 
Baker paint plant. Here he speaks of Henry Burns, a healthy 
58-year-old displaced worker, who is looking for a new job:
"The first place I went to was another paint plant, 
Riis-Moran. I figured they could use a man with 
paint plant experience but they were all fill' up, 
they said. Over at Fisher Body I saw they had an
34. Ibid., pp. 14-21.
35. Conant, op. cit., pp. 1300-1301.
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opening for a jitney driver. Well, if anyone was 
qualified to drive a jitney I was the man. I drove 
jitneys at Baker for almost twenty-five years. . . . 
They read over my record and told me to come in 
and take a medical test. The M.D. gave me a test 
and said my blood sugar was too high. They 
wanted to know whether I had a history of 
diabetes. I told them no, but they said they couldn't 
take a chance on me because of my blood 
sugar. ..." One Saturday shopping with his wife, 
he ran into a guy who used to work at the Baker 
plant. The guy told Burns he ought to put in 
another application at Riis-Moran. They were hir 
ing more guys. "Call them again," he said. "It 
won't cost you anything to call them." Burns 
decided his friend was right, even though it had on 
ly been two months since he'd inquired at Riis- 
Moran and they had checked over his twenty-six 
years put in Baker and felt sorry and didn't have a 
job for him. Still he had nothing to lose, so he 
telephoned down there Monday morning and talk 
ed with the personnel man. They pulled out his old 
application and after a few minutes studying it, 
told him to come down and see them. ... To his 
amazement they hired him on the spot. . . . When 
he reported to work the next day there were more 
papers to sign. And among the things he had to sign 
he found a waiver of any claims to a pension at 
Riis-Moran. It was in their labor contract that a 
man had to have at least ten years' seniority to be 
eligible for a pension. And compulsory retirement 
was sixty-eight years of age. "I had just turned 
fifty-nine two weeks before. So I would just miss 
out on ten years if I worked to sixty-eight. I'd miss 
out by two weeks. After twenty-six years I missed 
out on a pension at Baker by one year, and now if I
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live that long, I'll miss out by two weeks on a pen 
sion at Riis-Moran." Burns, who prides himself on 
planning carefully, on thinking things through, 
does not see any connection between Riis-Moran 
turning him down two months ago when he was 
fifty-eight and signing him on now that he's fifty- 
nine.-36
While such a scenario may help to explain part of the 
discrepancy found between certain groups of older workers, 
it does not entirely account for the disparity. Yet in some 
situations, union-negotiated benefits may hurt the older job 
seeker: pension and medical benefits make the older worker 
a greater risk or increase his cost to the employer, who ac 
cordingly finds him a less attractive candidate for employ 
ment.
An increasing number of researchers, especially Lipsky37 
and Portis and Suys, 38 find that seniority may also have a 
negative effect on the workers' reemployment opportunities. 
Not only does high seniority imply that a long time has elaps 
ed since a job search, as mentioned before, it may also pre 
vent the worker from looking for a job at the most advan 
tageous time. When a plant closes, the last workers to be laid 
off are those with the highest seniority. By the time they are 
released, many lower-seniority workers have already covered 
the local job markets and taken many of the available open 
ings. While this is a plausible hypothesis, it can also be 
argued that since the younger, low-seniority workers have 
more education and other attractive labor market qualities, 
they might have secured these jobs in any case. If this is true, 
releasing high-seniority workers first may not help offset the 
problems they encountered in finding new employment.
36. A. Slote, Termination: The Closing of Baker Plant (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1969), pp. 191-194.
37. Lipsky, op. cit., p. 202.
38. Portis and Suys, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
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An association has also been established between educa 
tion and reemployability. While Aiken, Ferman and Shep- 
pard, 39 and Turner and Whitaker40 find no association be 
tween these two variables, primarily due to the unusually 
similar educational levels among the workers at these two 
plants, other researchers have found a positive association. 
In their study of the unemployment determinants of displac 
ed Studebaker workers, Palen and Fahey41 noted that the 
greatest portion of the Studebaker unemployed had only a 
grammer school education. Similar findings were reported 
by Hammerman, 42 Lipsky, 43 and Portis and Suys. 44 Ham 
merman noted that displaced workers who had completed 
high school had substantially lower unemployment rates 
than those who had not, but observed only a slight difference 
in the unemployment rates among those who had not finish 
ed high school.
While educational attainment is obviously associated with 
many other variables that affect reemployability (i.e., age 
and occupational status), Palen and Fahey45 draw some con 
clusions as to the effect of education that are consistant with 
their own findings and those of Hammerman as well. Since a 
high school diploma is often used as a screening device by 
employers to weed out workers perceived as untrainable, 
undesirable, or underqualified, many workers may be ex 
cluded without careful consideration being given to their 
abilities. Thus lack of a formal education may greatly reduce 
the reemployment opportunities of the displaced worker and 
increase his length of unemployment.
39. Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard, op. tit., pp. 31-32.
40. Turner and Whitaker, op. tit., p. 17.
41. Palen and Fahey, op. tit., p. 240.
42. Hammerman, op. cit., p. 667.
43. Lipsky, op. tit., p. 199.
44. Portis and Suys, op. tit., p. 15.
45. Palen and Fahey, op. tit., p. 240.
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A worker's race may also have a critical effect on his 
reemployment potential. Palen and Fahey46 note that at the 
Studebaker plant in South Bend, Indiana nonwhites had 
significantly higher unemployment rates than whites. While 
39.9 percent of the whites were unemployed four months 
after the shutdown, 60 percent of the nonwhites were still 
looking for employment. Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard47 
note a similar result: almost 40 percent of blacks were 
unemployed 19 months after the closing, compared with 
only a quarter of the white workers. Almost twice as many 
whites as blacks obtained jobs immediately following the 
closing of the Packard Plant.
The most common explanation here is racial discrimina 
tion. According to Shultz and Weber, 48 several well-qualified 
black welders were unable to find employment in the Fort 
Worth area, although white welders of equal training had lit 
tle difficulty in doing so. Shultz and Weber could only con 
clude that racial discrimination was still prevalent in the job 
market. While one might contend that differences in job- 
search techniques exist, both Ferman and Harvey49 and 
Shultz and Weber50 point out that minority workers are 
usually more willing to accept lower-paying or part-time jobs 
immediately following the shutdown than are whites. This 
would account for a possible disparity in post-shutdown 
earnings between whites and blacks, but not a significant 
employment disparity in favor of whites, given the abun 
dance of low-paying jobs found in the American economy.
46. Palen and Fahey, op. cit., p. 238.
47. Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard, op. cit., p. 133.
48. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., p. 168.
49. Louis A. Ferman and Scott Harvey, "Job Retraining in Michigan," in Retraining the
Unemployed, Gerald Somers, ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), pp.
213-253.
50. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., pp. 97-125.
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Racial minorities often carry with them the same stigma as 
older workers. Many minorities are thought to be less pro 
ductive than whites by misinformed employers. Also, racial 
minorities (like older workers) tend to be cast as hard to train 
or "untrainable," and employers choose white applicants 
under the assumption that they will avoide excessive training 
costs. Both these beliefs are sheer illusions, but they can be 
difficult obstacles to a minority worker seeking reemploy- 
ment.
Despite the tendency of plant-closing research to center on 
male-dominated industries, differences in the post-closing 
employment status of men and women have been observed. 
In two of the five case studies of displaced workers where 
meaningful comparisons were possible, Hammerman51 
found female unemployment rates almost three times as high 
as those of men. In one case, seven out of eight women had 
been out of work six months or more, compared with one 
out of three men. In another case, two out of three women 
were unemployed as compared to one out of four men. And 
such findings are not unique to Hammerman. Lipsky" notes 
an equally clear disparity at General Foods, where 
unemployment lasted on the average 24.8 weeks for females 
and only 16.5 weeks for males. Robert Brandewein, 53 in his 
study of displaced defense workers, reports the average 
length of unemployment as 14.3 weeks for men and 23.4 
weeks for women.
Whether females carry the same stigma with them as the 
older or minority worker has not been explored by plant- 
closing research. It is also possible that supplementary in 
come status may affect job search intensity and thus 
reemployment success. However, this seems much less likely,
51. Hammerman, op. cit,, p. 667.
52. Lipsky, op. cit., p. 199.
53. Robert Brandewein, "Employment Experience of Discharged Defense Workers," 
Monthly Labor Review, October 1965, p. 1213.
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since one would assume that the same factors that lead these 
workers into the labor market initially would remain un 
changed by the closing of the plant and may indeed inten 
sify if the woman's spouse was also employed at the plant. 
On the other hand, women may have less information about 
the local labor market and may be experiencing disadvan 
tages similar to those experienced by blue-collar workers 
relative to their white-collar counterparts. Until plant- 
closing research deals with these problems directly, we can 
only conclude that females do experience some form of sex 
discrimination in their search for post-shutdown employ 
ment.
Not only do women experience longer periods of 
unemployment than men, they appear to be discriminated 
against on the ground of age at a much earlier point in their 
lives. Hammerman54 records that the highest level of 
unemployment reached by men was between the ages of 55 
and 59, but that women experienced peak unemployment 
between 45 and 54.
Another important characteristic in the search for 
reemployment is the possession of a transferable skill or 
skills. In Foltman's study of displaced steel workers, 55 81 
percent of the professional and other white-collar 
respondents obtained jobs, against 56 percent of the blue- 
collar workers. Of the latter group, 36 percent of the skilled 
respondents found employment as opposed to only 20 per 
cent of the unskilled. Hammerman56 also found a higher 
unemployment rate among the less skilled workers in each of 
his five case studies. When hourly earnings were based on 
skill, it was found that the workers with the highest 
unemployment rates were those with the lowest earning
54. Hammerman, op. cit., p. 668.
55. Foltman, op. cit., p. 110.
56. Hammerman, op. cit., p. 668.
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levels. Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard57 found that skilled 
workers averaged seven months unemployment, as com 
pared to 11.5 months for the semi-skilled and 13.8 months 
for the unskilled worker.
While such employment differentials may be a function of 
the different occupational status groups, there is no denying 
that the possession of a transferable skill, in and of itself is a 
great asset to the displaced worker. Such qualities tend to 
reduce the on-the-job training time necessary for these 
workers to begin producing on a profitable basis for their 
employer. This obviously puts the skilled or high occupa 
tional status workers in an advantageous position relative to 
their unskilled counterparts. It should also be noted that 
skilled workers qualify for both skill-related and unskilled 
employment thus increasing the changes of their reemploy- 
ment relative to the unskilled workers.
In conclusion, it is again worth noting that these distinct 
demographic characteristics are interrelated. Older workers, 
simply because of their birth dates, are likely to have less 
education than their younger co-workers. Because they are 
also likely to have more seniority, they are apt to be among 
the last to be released from their job. Thus more than one 
deterrent to reemployment may be exhibited by a single 
worker. Such multiple characteristics may also exist for 
racial minorities, who may not only confront labor market 
discrimination but may also have received less education 
than their white co-workers. Females may face sex 
discrimination in the labor market, and have often been 
denied access to valuable manufacturing trade skills as well. 
Such multiple disadvantages undoubtedly reduce the 
reemployability for each group.
In evaluating the overall economic consequences of local 
labor market re-entry, it is worth noting that the average
57. Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard, op. cit., p. 32.
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length of unemployment for all demographic groups is 
substantial. In the closings surveyed by this review, the 
average length of unemployment ranges from 22 weeks for 
the American Viscose worker to some 16 weeks for workers 
in the Hammerman study, 58 while Aiken, Ferman and Shep- 
pard found that the average white Packard worker had 10 
months of unemployment in the two years following closing. 
These statistics are in part a reflection of the state of the local 
economy during the shutdown period. Unemployment was 
as high as 8.8 percent of the Roanoke workforce during the 
closing, while Hammerman notes a substantial unemploy 
ment rate of approximately 6 percent in all five SMSA's 
related to this study. Yet, even in times of prosperity, many 
displaced workers have had difficulty securing employment. 
Palen and Fahey write that while unemployment in South 
Bend was only 2.4 percent at the time of the first layoffs, 42 
percent had not found work four months after the closing 
and the unemployment rate had climbed to 9.1 percent." 
Clearly, unemployment is a possibility for all displaced 
workers.
If the displaced worker is fortunate enough to secure a 
job, it is often in a different industry or occupation. Stern60 
notes that only 24 percent of the Armour workers found jobs 
in the meat industry, while the rest found employment in 
other areas; McCrea61 notes that about two-thirds of the 
Viscose workers found a job in another industry. Such find 
ings are expectable since both studies deal with closings in 
contracting industries virtually disappearing in this country, 
many of the displaced workers had little choice but to change 
industries.
58. Hammerman, op. tit., p. 666.
59. Palen and Fahey, op. cit., p. 237.
60. James L. Stern, "Evolution of Private Manpower Planning in Armour's Plant Clos 
ings," Monthly Labor Review, December 1969, p. 26.
61. McCrea, op. cit., p. 19.
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Yet, even when workers were displaced from industries 
still dominant in the American labor scene, many of them 
changed occupations and industries. And, as Hammerman 
(who echoes the findings of Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard; 
and of Lipsky) points out, such changes, especially for un 
skilled and semi-skilled workers, were usually changes for 
the worse:
Many of the displaced workers experienced a 
downgrading of skills. This was more true of semi 
skilled than of skilled occupations. While the 
change in jobs for a majority of workers in the 
more skilled maintenance occupations generally 
meant no change in occupations group, in no case 
did as many as one-third of the machine operators 
obtain jobs in the same occupational group. 
Substantial proportions of the operators who were 
reemployed were working as laborers or custodial 
workers. 62
A few studies Palen and Fahey, McCrea, and Portis and 
Suys have also found that some workers became self- 
employed. The most substantial movement of this sort was 
at Studebaker, where 17 percent of the displaced workers 
were self-employed for a time. 63 The authors found that self- 
employment was no more likely among white-collar workers 
than blue-collar workers, but that middle-aged workers as 
opposed to the younger ones were the most apt to go into 
business for themselves. Unfortunately, we have no 
documentation as to their relative financial status.
Many displaced workers who secure employment not only 
experience an occupational downgrading, but a significant 
income loss as well. Stern, Root and Hills, 64 note that while
62. Hammerman, op. cit., p. 670.
63. Palen and Fahey, op. cit., p. 250.
64. Stern, Root and Hills, op. cit.
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the average pre-shutdown income for Omaha workers was 
$8,003, by 1970 their income averaged only $7,359. As one 
would suspect, the magnitude of a worker's post-closing 
financial success is directly related to the demographics of 
the worker. In attempting to quantify the relationship be 
tween worker demographics and post-closing income, James 
Stern65 undertook a multiple regression analysis of the Kan 
sas City workforce. Age, sex, seniority, and race were all 
negatively correlated with post-closing earnings while educa 
tion and skill level showed positive correlations. While each 
additional year of age cost the worker $50 a year, another 
year of seniority meant a $63 loss, while females made 
$2,123 less than males with similar characteristics and blacks 
made $204 less than whites with the same characteristics. 
Every year of education improved post-closing income by 
$122, while skilled workers averaged $1,570 more per year 
than unskilled workers with the same characteristics. Thus, 
these characteristics are not only correlated with unemploy 
ment duration, but reemployment earnings as well.
The earnings loss described above is not surprising when 
one considers that the loss of a job often requires that the 
worker begin at the bottom of the organization again. In 
beginning with a new employer, the displaced worker loses 
his/her seniority status and those wage benefits that have ac 
crued to him through his long years of company service. It is 
also important to note that many workers displaced from 
manufacturing industries, find employment in the service 
sector or take a job that requires less skill. Such changes 
bring with them an unavoidable income decline. While in 
those few cases where the displaced employee was receiving 
the highest wage in the area, as was the case at the Mack 
plant, any subsequent employment in the local labor market 
will result in an income decline.
65. Stern, "Consequences of Plant Closure," op. cit., p. 9.
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A significant number of displaced workers work at more 
than one other job before arriving at permanent employ 
ment. Aiken, Ferman, and Sheppard66 say that in the two 
years following the closing of the Packard plant, 35 percent 
of the workers had been employed twice, while 9 percent had 
had three different jobs. Other researchers see a similar out 
come. Fifty-two percent of displaced Mack workers had 
secured two successive jobs in the period under study, 67 as 
had 21 percent of the Wickwire workers. 68 Clearly, for a 
substantial number of displaced workers, employment 
security is not necessarily restored when a new job is found.
Summary
Plant-closing research has uncovered a number of rela 
tionships among demographics, job search, and reemploy- 
ment experiences of the displaced worker. While a number 
of factors appear to affect either the timing, the mobility, 
and/or the method of job search, many of the same factors 
also affect reemployment opportunities. High occupational 
status workers seem not only to engage in a more organized, 
intense and mobile job search than other groups, but they 
also have the greatest reemployment potential; other groups, 
such as older workers, who engage in late-starting, low- 
mobility and low-intensity job searches also seem to have 
low reemployment potential. Yet, despite the diversity in job 
search strategies and reemployment opportunities among 
demographic groups, the rather high age and seniority levels 
coupled with the low educational attainment and marketable 
skills characteristic of most residual workforces involved in 
plant-closing studies may be responsible for the long periods 
of unemployment and low-paying, less stable employment 
experienced by most plant-closing victims.
66. Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard, op. cit., p. 43.
67. Dorsey, op. cit., p. 196.
68. Foltman, op. cit., p. 78.

Chapter 5
Program Participation 
and Impacts
Several of the plant-closing studies covered in this 
monograph deal with the impacts of public or private at 
tempts to aid the displaced worker. Four plant-closing pro 
grams have received much attention transfer, retraining, 
retirement and early retirement, and early notice; other pro 
grams, such as blue-collar employment development or ex 
tended health insurance coverage, have been suggested or set 
in motion, but never evaluated. To evaluate properly the 
results of such efforts, plant-closing research has focused on 
more than program activities. By examining the unique 
characteristics of program participants and contrasting their 
experiences with those of the rest of the workforce, re 
searchers have hoped to assess the true impact of plant- 
closing policies on displaced workers. Although such 
assessments have been plagued both by the complexities of 
the real world and by underutilization of sophisticated 
statistical techniques, there is still a great deal that can be 
said about such programs.
Transfer
As a manpower tool, relocation assistance aims to reduce 
costs and improve benefits associated with transfer and so 
increase worker mobility. The collectively bargained or 
company-based transfer assures the displaced worker of a
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job should he decide to relocate with the same company. 
While this assurance greatly reduces the uncertainties of job 
search, it does not eliminate them, for the displaced worker 
must still evaluate his chances of finding a job on his own 
against the company's offer. The question for the displaced 
worker now is: What are the chances of my finding a better 
job than the one the company is offering in an acceptable 
time period? In other words, Is the company's offer the best 
I can do? The displaced worker may also be confronted with 
other difficult uncertainties. While assured of a job, he or 
she may have little information on what the new job would 
entail or even what the wage rate would be. Crucial privileges 
gained through seniority may be an issue under negotiation 
when the decision to relocate must be made. It is clear that a 
transfer policy may be as problematical as a job search.
Indeed, plant-closing research does offer an instance 
where the transfer policy implemented created just this sort 
of uncertainty. At the Mack plant in Plainfield, New Jersey 
the transfer arrangement that was implemented guaranteed 
nothing more than a job at Mack's new plant in Hagerstown, 
Maryland. 1 Management notified the soon-to-be displaced 
workers that the incentive pay issue would not be resolved 
for at least two years, that seniority issues would be deter 
mined after the move had been completed, and that produc 
tion standards at the new plant would "be established by the 
company at a workpace considerably higher than that now 
prevailing in Plainfield." Faced with such forbidding 
possibilities and under considerable company pressure to ac 
cept termination instead of transfer, only 10 percent of the 
workforce at Plainfield made the move to Hagerstown. The 
assurance of a job, in light of a hostile company policy, was 
not enough to promote increased workforce mobility.
1. John W. Dorsey, "The Mack Case: A Study in Unemployment," in Studies in the 
Economics of Income Maintenance, Otto Eckstein, ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings In 
stitution, 1967), pp. 178-182.
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Other transfer arrangements have often been more attrac 
tive than those offered at Mack. In his study of the Armour 
closing at Omaha, Nebraska James Stern2 credits the im 
plementation of "flowback rights" with the improved 
transfer participation rates of Omaha workers over previous 
Armour shutdowns. By giving displaced workers the option 
of changing their minds during the first few months of 
employment at the new plant and accepting separation pay, 
Armour further reduced the risks inherent in transfer by 
allowing the workers to scout out their new environment and 
so eliminate the potential cost of lost severance pay should 
the worker reject transfer. While it was hoped that this ar 
rangement would encourage more workers to accept perma 
nent relocation by offering it on a trial basis, the 17 percent 
participation rate achieved at Omaha impressive as com 
pared to previous Armour experiences cannot be taken as a 
valid measure of flowback success. As an evaluative 
measure, comparative participation rate analysis ignores the 
potential variations in demographic characteristics of the 
workforce. While it is true that the implementation of 
flowback rights coincided with an increased relocation rate, 
variations in age, sex, occupational status, or education 
might have had some bearing on the rate. Unless the Omaha 
workforce had the same mobility-relevant characteristics and 
the same mobility-relevant environmental factors as in 
previous closings, the isolated effects of flowback rights can 
not be properly evaluated. This might better be accomplish 
ed by a controlled experiment or some other design capable 
of isolating flowback rights.
Examination of worker response to seniority retention 
provisions has led to more significant results. In his examina 
tion of General Foods' interplant transfer arrangement,
2. James L. Stern, "Evolution of Private Manpower Planning in Armour's Plant 
Closings," Monthly Labor Review, December 1969, p. 23.
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David Lipsky notes the effects of seniority retention provi 
sions:
It is clear that seniority was an important correlate 
of relocation. Only by transferring to Dover could 
the General Foods worker retain the privileges at 
tendant on long service. Seniority also can be view 
ed as a measure of the worker's loyalty to the com 
pany. The plant relocation was a test of his attach 
ment to the company vis-a-vis his attachment to the 
community. There was a tendency for long years of 
service to dominate long years of residence in the 
old area, and thus for seniority to be a crucial 
variable among those found to be associated with 
relocations. 3
Thus General Foods raised the benefits associated with 
relocation by continuing the worker's accumulated rights. 
Insignificant in the early years of employment, such rights 
increase with years of company service and, if Lipsky's 
analysis is correct, may offset community attachment. As a 
result, seniority retention may improve the mobility of the 
long term employee and of the older worker with these 
characteristics. While the large disparity in community at 
tachment between transferees and terminees (29.9 years 
residence to 41.6) seems to weaken Lipsky's claim, both the 
higher mean seniority of the transferees (16.1 compared to 
13.1 years for terminees) and the relatively low age differen 
tial between those who did and did not participate, supports 
this hypothesis. 4 If Lipsky's findings are valid for most 
displaced workforces of high seniority, the mobility gains in 
duced by seniority retention provisions could be significant.
3. David B. Lipsky, "Interplant Transfer and Terminated Workers: A Case Study," In 
dustrial and Labor Relations Review, January 1970, p. 195.
4. Ibid., p. 194.
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The unusually small age disparity between terminees and 
transferees and the highest participation rate described in the 
literature (22.7 percent) experienced at General Foods, 
despite the generally immobile character of the workforce, 5 
suggests a need to tailor transfer policies to the specific 
characteristics of the displaced workers. Yet, while General 
Foods speaks of seniority retention and Armour of flowback 
rights, plant-closing research lacks documentation of a fully 
implemented transfer policy consciously designed to meet 
the needs of a specific workforce. Despite the 
characteristically high age, low educational attainment, and 
relatively low skill level of the residual workforce (the 
workers who withstood early contractions of the firm and re 
mained until the closing and phase-out period), no combina 
tion of transfer provisions designed to increase the participa 
tion rates of all characteristically immobile groups within a 
specific workforce has been documented. Despite the in 
dustrial relations problems of implementing such a com 
prehensive program and the relatively minor costs of per 
suading low occupational status workers to relocate by the 
use of flowback rights or the long term employee by means 
of seniority retention, the costs associated with attracting all 
immobile workers to relocation may be prohibitive. While 
transfer arrangements have indeed furnished relocation 
allowances ranging from $1,000 and one weeks' pay at 
General Foods to $200 at Mack, it may not be possible for 
any transfer policy to counteract all the obstacles to reloca 
tion mentioned by Hammerman:
Two cases involving interplant transfer cast some 
light on inducements and obstacles to worker 
mobility. Only the guarantee of transfer with full 
seniority rights was sufficient to induce substantial 
numbers of displaced workers to relocate. Even in
5. Ibid., p. 193.
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this case, some four out of five did not accept 
relocation. Relatively few workers were willing to 
transfer with accumulated rights to pensions, vaca 
tion, and other economic benefits, but with no 
seniority rights on layoffs. A study of the 
characteristics of the transferees indicates that 
other inducements to relocate were the need to con 
serve rights to pensions and other employee 
benefits, fear of age discrimination, and the 
economic pressures of large families. Obstacles to 
mobility included the secondary role of the wife's 
job in the family, home ownership, family and 
social ties, children in school, fear of future 
layoffs, and the high costs of transfer. Apart from 
costs of relocation, many transferred workers 
found it necessary or expedient to maintain two 
homes and to commute between areas on 
weekends, at least in the first year after transfer. 
Some complained that tax laws worked in favor of 
the companies which could write-off the cost of 
their move, while transferring workers received no 
deductions whatsoever. 6
A depressed housing market is common in areas losing a 
major employer, and a transfer policy committed to high 
worker participation may have to protect workers against 
this contingency. The costs here are so heavy that attempts to 
induce workers with strong attachment to their community 
or to a growing family to move may be financially impossible 
for the company. Unless all the costs are absorbed, the 
transfer option, despite efforts to tailor provisions to worker 
needs within budgetary constraints, is likely to continue to be 
the optimal labor market strategy of only about 20 percent 
of any given displaced workforce.
6. Herbert Hammerman, "Fire Case Studies of Displaced Workers," Monthly Labor 
Review, June 1964, p. 668.
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As Lipsky notes, one problem associated with the evalua 
tion of assisted relocation is that the workers who accept 
relocation possess the characteristics most strongly 
associated with successful reemployment, while those who 
choose termination have the opposite characteristics. 7 Stern 
attempts to resolve this difficulty by using a multivariate 
regression analysis and concludes that, for those males who 
transferred, relocation resulted in an annual income gain of 
$3,093 over those males who reentered the labor market. 8 
However, Stern admits that factors outside his regression 
analysis may reduce this disparity. If transferees have some 
skills outside the skill measure or other yet undetermined 
qualities, the disparity observed at Kansas City may be 
reduced. Handicapped by lack of conclusive research and 
lack of theory, one can only conclude that the post-closing 
incomes of transferees seem to be substantially larger than 
those of their terminated co-workers. The determinants of 
the disparity may not be completely identified.
Many workers do indeed return to their former locality 
shortly after participating in a transfer program. Stern found 
that 15 percent of the Omaha transferees exercised their 
flowback options and returned home, as did 20 percent of 
the transferees at Kansas City. 9 For these workers, the finan 
cial benefits of relocation never compensated for the loss of 
their familiar surroundings.
In conclusion, the decision to transfer prompts the worker 
to assess the personal costs and benefits associated with it. 
For those who are older, have a low occupational status, lit 
tle education, or are secondary wage earners, personal bar 
riers inhibiting job search mobility are unlikely to be over-
7. Lipsky, op. cit., p. 206.
8. James L. Stern, "Consequences of Plant Closure," Journal of Human Resources, 
Winter 1972, p. 14.
9. Stern, "Evolution of Manpower Planning," op. cit., p. 23.
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come by even the best theoretically designed and well-funded 
of transfer policies. On the other hand, for the worker who is 
characteristically mobile and would probably be the most 
successful in a job search should no assistance exist, transfer 
programs allow maintenance of income, while allowing the 
company to retain its most desirable workers. Such observa 
tions and findings lead to our present conclusion, echoed by 
David Lipsky:
If one can be permitted to generalize, the following 
appears to be true: workers most likely to benefit 
from the protection of an interplant-transfer 
system were least likely to exercise the option of 
relocation. Workers who least needed the protec 
tion were most likely to move. It follows that if the 
General Foods experience is any guide, the use of 
an interplant-transfer system can serve only as a 
limited way of avoiding the hardship of worker 
displacement after plant shutdown. It would be 
better from the viewpoint of the workers affected 
by plant shutdowns to offer them greater protec 
tion for the period following their displacement, 
rather than to devote corporate resources to the 
enhancement of relocation opportunities. In par 
ticular, in such situations, companies and unions 
should devise special policies to handle the prob 
lem of the displaced older worker [and other disad- 
vantaged groups] in the labor market. For example, 
extension of company-supported health insurance 
beyond termination would be a particularly 
valuable form of protection for the older worker. 10
Retraining
In seven of the 27 closings, terminated workers were given 
the opportunity to retrain. The decision to accept or reject
10. Lipsky, op. cit., p. 206.
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the training course may be regarded as a function of the costs 
and net discounted value of any future income stream at 
tributable to the knowledge and skills gained. As James 
Stern writes:
Training seems less attractive to an individual when 
there is a job available for him that in his opinion 
will probably be as satisfactory as the job he might 
obtain after training. 11
Therefore, in making his assessment, the terminated worker 
must weigh his present saleable job skills against the im 
provements in those skills that should be provided by retrain 
ing; if this income-producing ability will be improved in ex 
cess of costs, he then will accept the option. Notice that such 
a decision does not assume a permanent job change or a 
commitment to a new occupation following completion of 
the course. The benefits of retraining may enlarge the spec 
trum of job opportunities, since income gains may accrue 
from alternating between jobs requiring his new and old 
skills in response to market conditions. The appropriate 
evaluation is determined by maximizing the future revenue 
stream in the light of added opportunities. 12 But if the 
worker believes that the benefits associated with training will 
not offset his costs, theory suggests that he will reject retrain 
ing.
While theory also suggests that certain demographic 
groups would be more likely than others to accept retraining, 
plant-closing research has established no relationship be 
tween worker demographics and the decision to retrain that 
parallels the degree of association observed between worker 
demographics and the decision to relocate. The difference 
may be due to two factors. First, only two plant-closing
11. Stern, "Evolution of Manpower Planning," op. cit., p. 24.
12. Herbert Chesler, "The Retraining Decision in Massachusetts," in Gerald Somers, ed., 
Retraining the Unemployed (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), p. 151.
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studies (Shultz and Weber, 13 and Stern, Root and Hills 14), 
have devoted any resources to documenting this relationship. 
Second, the data used in these studies describes the 
characteristics of only those workers in training programs 
and not of those who were genuinely interested in retraining 
and would have accepted it if it had been offered. Both fac 
tors must be considered when examining the relationship be 
tween worker demographics and the decision to retrain.
The most statistically significant association between in 
dividual characteristics and the decision to retrain establish 
ed in the plant-closing literature is that of sex. While females 
at Oklahoma City, Sioux City, and Fort Worth comprised 
only about 15 percent of the total workforce, they comprised 
35 percent of the retrainees at Sioux City and 40 percent at 
Fort Worth and Okalahoma City. 15 Two possible explana 
tions exist for this relatively high percentage. First, the costs 
of retraining may be lower for females. If most of them are 
not primary income-producers in the family, economic 
pressures may be lessened and training more feasible. Sec 
ond, Ferman and Harvey16 suggest that, with the increasing 
demand for labor in the service sector of the economy, 
retraining courses have often been geared to such jobs, 
which often pay less and may be less attractive to a family 
head. In other words, the unusually high percentage of 
women in retraining programs may be a function of the type 
of course offered.
Another pertinent characteristic of the retrainee is age. 
While the displaced workers at Oklahoma City, Sioux City,
13. George P. Shultz and Arnold B. Weber, Strategies for the Displaced Worker (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1969).
14. James L. Stern, Kenneth A. Root, and Stephen M. Hills, "The Influence of Social- 
Psychological Traits and Job Search Patterns in the Earnings of Workers Affected by a 
Plant Closure," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, October 1974, pp. 103-121.
15. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., p. 8.
16. Louis A. Ferman and Scott Harvey, "Job Retraining in Michigan" in Gerald Somers, 
ed., op. cit., p. 223.
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and Fort Worth had mean ages of 47, 46, and 49 respective 
ly, Shultz and Weber found that workers enrolled in retrain 
ing programs averaged only 45, 42, and 42 years of age. 17 
This age disparity is also observed by Stern, Root and Hills; 
the averge age of the Omaha workers was 39, while that of 
the Omaha retrainess was only 36 years. 18
Explanations for this disparity come from outside the 
plant-closing context. First, older workers, with fewer work 
years left to them, have a shorter time to accumulate the 
benefits of retraining and its incremental income gain. 
Therefore, for the older worker, the income disparity at 
tributable to retraining must be great enough to offset its 
costs in a shorter time than for the younger worker. Second, 
as Herbert Chesler points out, 19 relatively older workers 
place a higher value on present income and consequently are 
more reluctant than younger workers to forego income while 
they retrain. Third, as Chesler also points out, the older 
worker may reject the opportunity to change occupations 
because of sociopsychological personality aspects. Often an 
older worker has spent an entire working life at one trade or 
occupation and is reluctant to change the job he has iden 
tified with over the years. Finally, the probability that an 
older worker will find training-related employment is much 
less than in the case of a younger worker. Lack of experience 
in a new occupation, if coupled with age, would place an 
older worker farther back in an employer's labor queue than 
a younger trainee, who may lack experience but offers the 
employer potentially a longer period of service. In summary, 
increased age not only reduces the benefits associated with 
retraining but increases the costs. With less time remaining 
and less chance of training-related employment, the older
17. Shultz and Weber, op. tit., pp. 127-132.
18. Stern, Root and Hills, op. cit., p. 112.
19. Chesler, op. cit., p. 153.
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worker cannot realize the maximum benefits of retraining, 
and attachment to a familiar occupation and to a present in 
come increases the costs to be taken into account.
Educational status may also have an impact on the deci 
sion to retrain. Retrainees at both Sioux City and at 
Oklahoma City were slightly better educated than either 
workforce as a whole, with an average ninth-grade education 
as compared to .3 years less for the total workforce. 20 Such a 
mild disparity is also reported by Stern, Root and Hills for 
Omaha, where the average retrainee had 10.2 years of educa 
tion compared to 9.9 years for the workforce as a whole. 21
While such small discrepancies may indeed be statistically 
insignificant, there are sound theoretical reasons (again 
developed outside the plant-closing context) for suspecting 
that better-educated workers are more amenable to retrain 
ing because they are more aware that education is important 
for success. Thus the better-educated workers tend to place a 
higher value on retraining, seeing it as a way to improve their 
qualifications and their chances for higher-status jobs. 
Although plant-closing research has yet to establish this con 
nection, at least for those displaced workers, however few, 
who have received a good education the perceived benefits of 
retraining may be higher, thereby increasing the likelihood 
that the worker will accept the retraining option.
On the other hand, the differences in age and education 
noted above may be due to the training program's screening 
policy. Less educated or older workers may be viewed as 
poor risks by program administrators and may be denied 
retraining in favor of better educated or younger workers 
whom administrators feel have a better chance to complete 
the program and secure stable training-related employment. 
If this is the case, the observed difference in age and educa-
20. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., pp. 102-128.
21. Stern, Root and Hills, op. cit., p. 112.
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tion between the training group and the workforce as a 
whole is not related to worker preferences, but instead to ad 
ministrative decisions.
Other demographic variables, unexplored in the plant- 
closing context, may also influence the retraining decision. 
The way in which the displaced worker perceives his own 
education is important, and such perceptions are based on 
past experience. Those workers who were refused a job in the 
past because they lacked the necessary skills for the job are 
more likely to place a higher value on retraining. The worker 
who realizes the necessity of being properly equipped to 
enter the job market has an increased appreciation for train 
ing. But the displaced worker, suddenly cast into the job 
market after several years of employment with the same 
company, may have no such awareness, since he has func 
tioned as an accomplished wage earner, whatever his educa 
tion. 22 If the worker entered his last job without a high 
school education, why should he not repeat the perfor 
mance? Under such conditions, the perceived benefits of 
retraining are likely to be very low, and if so, the chances of 
his accepting retraining are apt to be small.
It has been hypothesized that married men may be less 
willing to retrain than unmarried men, although if the latter 
have working wives the generalization does not hold true. No 
evidence yet presented supports this hypothesis. Weber23 
finds that the majority of retrainees are married, but 
Chesler24 finds no relationship between marital status and 
acceptance of training. Chesler regards the final decision to 
enter retraining as a personal one rather than one based on
22. Average seniority in the studies covered by this monograph ranges from about 30 years 
at Roanoke to 11 at Omaha.
23. Arnold B. Weber, "Experiments in Retraining: A Comparative Study," in Gerald 
Somers, ed., op. cit., p. 266.
24. Chesler, op. cit., pp. 157-159.
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status as a single unit, as economists often define the married 
state.
In conclusion, there are several groups of workers who 
may be identified as likely to accept retraining. Like job 
search mobility, these demographic characteristics affect the 
perceived costs and benefits that the worker associates with 
retraining. For the older, poorly informed, poorly educated 
or family head, the benefits of retraining are seen as relative 
ly low and the costs relatively high. Since significant 
numbers of displaced workers show at least one of the 
characteristics negatively correlated with the decision to 
retrain, retraining program administrators have introduced 
several policies designed to reduce costs or increase benefits. 
One feature common to all the retraining programs discussed 
in the literature is predisplacement counseling, which serves 
two purposes. First, counseling has been used as a screening 
device, matching "retrainable" workers' interests and 
capacities; Shultz and Weber25 found this device necessary to 
maximize program resources and worker potential. Counsel 
ing can, of course, also be used as an educational tool to in 
crease the worker's awareness as to the value of retraining, 
and may actually swell the numbers of workers entering 
retraining. This latter hypothesis has yet to be tested.
Placement is another benefit-increasing policy explored in 
retraining. Placement of a worker during the training period 
offers the additional benefit of having an agent who will 
assist in an early job search. As Shultz and Weber note 
below, such assistance can be of great value to the trainee, 
particularly in a new field.
Following an initial failure to obtain a training- 
related job, a worker was reluctant to follow-up 
any subsequent opportunities calling for his newly
25. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., pp. 150-153.
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acquired skills. Several persons who had found 
unrelated jobs failed to follow-up such leads from 
the committee and other sources, but chose instead 
to keep the jobs they had. Inertia, uncertainty, and 
the usual range of factors favoring immobility ob 
viously overbalance any anticipated gains from a 
job more closely related to training. Ideally, then, 
intensive efforts to place the retrainees on ap 
propriate jobs should begin before the worker ven 
tures out into the labor market. Otherwise, a 
cautious self-interest may cause him to retain any 
job which affords some income and security. 26
Obviously any benefits perceived by the workers are 
related to faith in the placement program and its ad 
ministrators. Without a successful placement record, the 
program might look to the potential retrainee like an empty 
promise until it has proved its value.
Policies have also been designed to reduce the costs of 
retraining. Tuition payments, subsistence stipends, travel 
allowances, and loan guarantees have all been used to reduce 
retraining costs. At Armour, the only extensive retraining 
programs documented in the literature, enough aid was 
usually distributed by the Automation Committee to offset 
the entire costs of tuition and transportation. Yet the finan 
cial benefits proved insufficient for some family breadwin 
ners even after subsistence allowances were added. As Shultz 
and Weber describe:
The most significant addition to the financial 
resources available to retrainees consisted of sub 
sistence allowances. Under the provisions of 
MDTA, workers enrolled in an approved govern 
ment course who were also heads of households
26. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., pp. 164-165.
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drew a "training allowance" equal to the average 
unemployment benefit amount paid in the state in 
the quarter preceding payment of the allowance. 
This allowance was payable for a maximum of 
fifty-two weeks and averaged approximately $32 
per week for trainees in Iowa. These allowances 
had an extremely salutary effect; among other 
things, they made it possible for trainees to pursue 
a full-time program without jeopardizing an impor 
tant source of income. Nonetheless, as originally 
constituted, the subsistence allowance was not an 
unmixed blessing. First, allowances were the same 
for each trainee regardless of the number of 
dependents. For persons with large families, $32 
was generally insufficient support over the long 
period required to complete many of the courses. 
Second, if a retrainee sought to augment his income 
by part-time employment, deductions were made 
from his allowance on the basis of the number of 
hours worked. 27
Just how effective these forms of financial assistance have 
been in improving retraining participation rates is difficult to 
evaluate. Without a control group, we can make few in 
ferences. While participation at Sioux City was slightly 
greater than at other Armour closings, any significant dif 
ferences in the workforces could invalidate the apparent im 
pact of the program. 28
Still other policies have been tried in an attempt to reduce 
the costs of retraining, the most common of which has been 
reduction of training time. The more rapid the retraining 
course, the less time a worker may have to forego full-time
27. Shultz and Weber, op. tit., p. 148.
28. Shultz and Weber, op. tit., p. 134.
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employment. Another cost-reducing measure is to offer 
evening courses, making it possible for many trainees to 
work during the day, or to collect unemployment benefits. 
Many states refuse to pay unemployment insurance to 
members enrolled in day training courses because they are 
not available for work. Since no systematic evaluation of 
either of these policies has been made, it is not known 
whether they have increased retraining participation rates.
While the actual effect of each benefit-increasing or cost- 
reducing policy is unknown, it is clear that most displaced 
workers do not turn to retraining. Participation rates range 
from 16.4 percent at Fort Worth29 to only 6 percent of the 
workforce at Kansas City. 30 Low participation rates may be 
due in part to the financial and emotional strain of retraining 
and to the inadequate financial support offered:
. . .Training is generally an arduous experience for 
the unemployed worker, and can scarcely be con 
sidered institutionalized malingering. Even with the 
financial support available to trainees in Sioux 
City, many men and their families were forced to 
make genuine sacrifices in order to capitalize on 
this opportunity for self-improvement. Moreover, 
the hard economic facts indicate that this price of 
low support in a lengthy program is a high dropout 
rate, which wastes the resources already invested 
from public or private funds and by the trainee 
himself. 31
Simply put, unless they are given substantial financial sup 
port, the number of retrainees is likely to be small and the 
number of dropouts high. Such an investment would be wise 
only if the social benefits of retraining are greater than the
29. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., p. 130.
30. Stern, "Evolution of Manpower Planning," op. cit., p. 26.
31. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., p. 150.
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social costs. Evaluating retraining programs has been dif 
ficult because information is often lacking about the specific 
goals or intended benefits of a program. However, even 
where program administrators have a sound understanding 
of potential benefits, we still have no research that presents a 
cost-benefit analysis of any retraining program for displaced 
workers.
To the terminated worker interested in reemployment, the 
only relevant criterion for the value of retraining is the in 
cremental benefits it provides over other options. Despite the 
dangers in comparing nonequivalent groups, studies do note 
that retrainees are unemployed for a shorter time than non- 
retrainees. At Fort Worth, 90 percent of those workers com 
pleting retraining were employed within a year to 18 months 
following completion of their courses, while non-retrainees 
maintained a 40 percent unemployment rate at the end of 
this period. 32 A disparity was also found at Sioux City, but a 
smaller one: only 28 percent of the non-retrainees were 
unemployed after 18 months, compared to 20 percent for 
retrainees. While such data appear to support the benefits of 
retraining, it is again unclear as to whether the unemploy 
ment differential is due to the value of retraining or to the 
favorable characteristics of the retrainee group. Shultz and 
Weber do break down the data on employment rates of 
retrainees over non-retrainees by age and race, but other 
demographic factors need to be isolated and studied.
In defense of the proposition that retraining improves 
employment opportunities, Stern33 found that 88 percent of 
the employed trainees in Omaha found work directly or in 
directly related to training. Results are almost as impressive 
at Fort Worth, where Shultz and Weber34 indicate that 77
32. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., p. 157.
33. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., p. 25.
34. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., p. 163.
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percent of the trainees found work in a training-related field, 
while Conant35 documents that in Sioux City 55 percent of 
the retrainees had the same experience. Although these 
figures illustrate substantial occupational mobility, they do 
not prove that the retrainee would not have found a job, or 
even the same job, without training. Nor does it prove that 
the training-related job was the one with the greatest poten 
tial that the worker could obtain. Given these uncertainties, 
to draw any conclusions about the effectiveness of retraining 
as an unemployment-reducing or employment opportunity- 
expanding tool would be unwise.
Only limited work has been done on the impact of retrain 
ing on worker income. While Shultz and Weber36 note a 
$2.00 per week gain in income for Sioux City retrainees over 
non-retrainees, the only multivariate analysis of such a rela 
tionship was done by Stern at Kansas City. 37 There it was 
found that the average Kansas City retrainee had an income 
of $303 a year less than those who chose the market option! 
Such a result, Stern writes,
. . .Raises the suspicion that short-term training 
may lead more of these individuals into low-paying 
occupations than would have occurred without 
retraining. 38
An alternative hypotheses also exists. When there is little 
demand for labor, retraining may simply delay entry into the 
workforce and thus prevent the worker from competing for 
the few high-paying jobs available. Therefore, it is possible
35. Eaton H. Conant, "Report and Appraisal: The Armour Fund's Sioux City Project," 
Monthly Labor Review, November 1965, p. 1301.
36. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., p. 169.
37. Stern, "Consequences of Plant Closure," op. cit., p. 12.
38. Stern, "Consequences of Plant Closure," op. cit., p. 8. It should also be noted that 
part of this result may be due to the fact that Stern's analysis uses retrainees who sought 
placement services. See p. 17.
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that Sioux City trainees may have benefited from an improv 
ing economy at the end of their training, 39 while trainees at 
Kansas City may have been released into the job market at a 
time of local contraction40 at least a plausible partial ex 
planation. Alternatively the Kansas City program may not 
have had a firm grasp of local labor market needs. In fact, 
the literature mentions attempts by other administrators to 
analyze labor needs in the local community, but such efforts 
are so often hampered by lack of time that they may finally 
consist of scanning the want ads. Without foresight into 
future needs, the retraining program is in the precarious 
situation of training workers for jobs that may not exist by 
the time the program ends, a situation that may also be 
responsible for disparities between programs.
Retraining programs have not overcome the classic income 
differentials experienced by distinct demographic groups. As 
Shultz and Weber found, men undergoing retraining earned 
more than females and whites earned more than minorities:
. . .There was also considerable variation in the ex 
perience of different elements in the retraining 
group. As indicated above, women fared con 
siderably worse than men. Moreover, for the 
minority groups at Forth Worth, decrease in earn 
ings was more precipitous than retrainees who did 
not face discriminatory barriers. Thus, the average 
hourly earnings of Negroes and Latin Americans 
were consistently below those of white trainees. 
Some of these may reflect differences in education 
and in the nature of the retraining program 
selected. 41
39. Shultz and Weber, op. tit., p. 166.
40. Stern, "Consequences of Plant Closure," op. cit., p. 17.
41. Shultz and Weber, op. cit., p. 168.
Impacts 117
Such a statement opens up the issue of whether certain 
demographic groups are steered into low-paying training- 
related courses more often than others.
In summary, retraining provides those workers who are 
younger, slightly better educated, and relatively secure finan 
cially the opportunity to learn additional skills that can be 
used to secure a new job. However, despite the attractive 
provisions included in the most worker-responsive training 
programs, the unfavorable demographics of the displaced 
workers, coupled with inadequate financial assistance for 
them, have limited participation to about 15 percent. Just 
how successful retraining programs have been in reaching, 
the goals of reduced unemployment, increased job potential 
and improved earning ability is unknown. While much 
evidence has been presented in the literature in support of 
each of these objectives, the fact is that the few available 
evaluations (with exception of Stern) are methodologically 
adequate and do not permit a decisive statement about the 
benefits of retraining the displaced worker.
Retirement and Early Retirement
Plant-closing research has, for the most part, considered 
retirement and early retirement as ways to provide the older, 
long-service worker with some form of income maintenance. 
Stern states:
. . .This benefit [special 1.5 retirement benefit] in 
stituted in 1961 to help older long service workers 
who were expected to have greater difficulty find 
ing new employment than younger short-service 
workers, has proved very helpful/2
As with relocation and retraining decisions, the decision to 
retire can be considered a cost-benefit analysis of this
42. Stern, "Evolution of Manpower Planning," op. cit., p. 23.
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specific labor market strategy. The decision to accept retire 
ment benefits does not require that the individual retire from 
the labor force completely. Since none of the pension plans 
surveyed imposed restrictions on the type or number of 
hours of work a displaced worker accepting retirement 
benefits could undertake, the worker qualifying for the 
retirement plan simply receives a guaranteed income flow 
after displacement from the plant. Therefore, within the 
plant-closing experience, the decision to accept retirement 
benefits and the decision to retire are two separate issues. 
First, the decision to accept retirement benefits, requires a 
very simple analysis if the worker is well informed about the 
benefits available. Since there is no benefit to be gained from 
rejecting the company's offer, nor any costs associated with 
accepting it, it is unlikely that any qualified individual would 
decline retirement benefits. The only demographic 
characteristics associated with the decision are those 
necessary to qualify the worker for its acceptance. At Ar 
mour, this option was open to workers between the ages of 
55 and 65 with a minimum of twenty years of service. The 
pension plan covered 101 workers at Fort Worth, 110 at 
Sioux City, 100 at Mason City and 260 at Omaha. 43
For those workers between the ages of 55 and 62, who had 
the same required seniority, the pension benefit was 50 per 
cent greater than the amount normally paid to employees in 
this age category. The income allowance, which provided 
qualified Armour workers at Omaha with $150 per month, 
was used by 46 workers at Fort Worth, 54 in Sioux City, 68 
in Kansas City, and 126 at Omaha. 44 Although this is a 
sizable sum, many Omaha workers deemed it desirable to 
supplement their retirement benefits with a wage. Thirty- 
three of the forty-two 1.5 pensioners who found employment
43. See Stern, "Evolution of Manpower Planning," op. cit., p. 23 and Shultz and Weber, 
op. cit., pp. 151-153.
44. Stern, "Evolution of Manpower Planning," op. cit., p. 23.
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with other Omaha firms reported an average post-shutdown 
wage of $2.22 per hour. For those workers who were able to 
find a supplementary job, the total monthly income from 
their two sources was only slightly less than that earned on 
the pre-shutdown Armour job. 45 For these workers then, the 
combination of pension and job put them at an income level 
appreciably higher than the average worker who accepts 
training or direct labor market entry.
Stern46 points out that the 1.5 pension benefits offered to 
workers between the ages of 55 and 62 did not seem to cause 
appreciably more people to withdraw from the labor force 
than otherwise would have been expected in a relatively tight 
labor market. The statement implies that even the 50 percent 
extra benefit was not enough to maintain the worker's ac 
customed standard of living and that labor market re-entry 
was still essential. While the benefit surely alleviated some 
financial burdens faced by the displaced worker, apparently 
a number of people felt it did not completely compensate 
them for loss of employment. Pension benefits may provide 
the worker with some income maintenance, but for many of 
them it simply was not enough.
But in the cases of 84 of the 1.5 pensioners and an un 
disclosed number of the regular retirees who either did not 
look for work or failed to find it and subsequently retired, 
plant-closing research offers no explanation for their deci 
sion. The number of retirees who fall into each of the above 
categories is unknown, but we do know something about 
their characteristics. The most interesting of these applies to 
the worker who, for some reason or another, decides not to 
look for new work after receiving pension benefits following 
displacement. Barfield and Morgan47 identify some of the
45. Stern, "Evolution of Manpower Planning," op. at., p. 23.
46. Stern, "Evolution of Manpower Planning," op. tit., p. 24.
47. Richard Barfield and James Morgan, Early Retirement the Decision and the Experience 
(Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, The university of Michigan, 1969).
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characteristics associated with the decision to retire per 
manently. While these decisions do not deal with a plant- 
closing experience, many of them may be tentatively applied 
to workers who did not look for a job after accepting retire 
ment benefits.
Of primary importance is the worker's perception of ade 
quate financial resources, including retirement benefits. 
Those workers who see their financial resources as providing 
them with a comfortable retirement are of course the ones 
most likely to retire. Perceived financial security, then, put 
into terms of a cost-benefit analysis, reduces the costs of 
retirement by relieving financial pressures. Barfield and 
Morgan note that the retirees and potential retirees surveyed 
in 1967 felt it necessary to be assured of approximately 
$4,000 a year before they could enter retirement. 48 While 
such a threshold figure is not constant, it does give some idea 
of the figure the worker feels he should have at retirement.
A closely related factor is the number of dependents the 
worker must support after retirement. While Barfield and 
Morgan considered this point less statistically significant 
than financial resources in the decision to retire, the effect 
was expectable: the more dependents the worker had, the less 
likely he was to retire. 49 This is a characteristic that demands 
a retirement income sufficient to support the customary 
standard of living of the retiree and his family.
Another correlate with post-retirement security and the 
retirement decision is the presence or absence of a home 
mortgage. Mortgage payments increase the financial costs of 
retirement and often postpone a worker's retirement until 
the debt is paid off. Here too there was a much weaker 
association with the decision to retire than in the case of ex 
pected post-retirement income.
48. Ibid., p. 14.
49. Ibid., p. 14.
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However, a worker may still choose to retire even if he 
feels his financial resources are inadequate to support a 
customary standard of living. A critical determinant in the 
decision to retire is the worker's perception of health. For 
those workers perceiving themselves to be ill, the decision 
may be forced upon them. Furthermore, a worker may reject 
retraining programs, relocation, and labor market re-entry 
on the grounds that the physical demands would be too 
great. This characteristic reduces the benefits associated with 
all other labor market strategies and leaves only retirement 
as an acceptable choice. If many mental health and health 
researchers are correct in believing that job displacement is a 
stressor that may actually cause illness to surface, 50 
theoretically the number of displaced workers falling in this 
category could be substantial. No firm evidence exists, but if 
such outcomes are significant among displaced workers, 
perhaps some sort of medical insurance should be provided 
in the hope of easing the financial burden of health care and 
facilitating the return of the worker to the workforce.
Unsuccessful job seekers constitute a second group of 
displaced workers who accept retirement benefits and then 
withdraw from the labor force. Faced with extended periods 
of unemployment after displacement, unwilling to accept the 
stigma of unemployment, and lacking other alternatives, 
these workers simply withdraw into premature retirement. 
Workers who customarily find it difficult to become 
employed, as we shall discuss in the next section, are more 
likely to fall into this category than their more advantaged 
co-workers.
In summary then, three groups of workers accept retire 
ment benefits and then choose not to return to the labor 
force. First, those workers who perceived benefits as ade-
50. M. Harvey Brenner, Mental Illness and the Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1973).
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quate to support their customary standard of living, given 
the number of dependents and financial obligations they 
have at the time the decision is made. Second, those who, 
faced with perceived disability, remain out of the workforce 
for "health reasons" and accept retirement as the only solu 
tion to their displacement. Third, those who do not find a 
new job and resign themselves to retirement through sheer 
discouragement and low self-esteem.
While we have virtually no information on the economic 
outcomes for workers who choose retirement after being 
displaced from their jobs, the findings of Barfield and 
Morgan51 allow us to speculate on the subject. Of primary 
importance to the plant-closing experience is the relationship 
between post-retirement security and pre-retirement plan 
ning. Simply put, those workers who are able to plan for 
retirement are much more likely to have an enjoyable retire 
ment than those who are forced into it either through per 
sonal illness or company action. Given the limited time per 
mitted by most plant closings for the worker to plan for the 
future, the displaced worker will be less prepared for retire 
ment than the average worker, and therefore more likely to 
have an unsatisfactory retirement. For the worker who is 
sick or unable to find employment, retirement is not a solu 
tion but another facet of the problem.
Even the worker who retires from the labor force after 
careful consideration and with adequately perceived finances 
cannot count on security. Since the retiree depends on fixed 
pension payments, unexpected inflation can greatly reduce 
buying power and put a financial strain on retirement in 
come. Many retirees have attempted to re-enter the labor 
force under these conditions only to find that their retire 
ment status has added to their undesirable labor market 
characteristics to such an extent that securing another job is
51. Barfield and Morgan, op. cit., pp. 53-59.
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almost impossible. Therefore, while retirement may seem an 
affordable luxury to some displaced workers, in the long run 
it may prove the wrong course for many of them.
In conclusion, two types of workers accept pension 
benefits. The first sees the benefits as providing some income 
maintenance but believes it necessary to continue to work in 
order to maintain financial stability. The second, either 
because benefits are perceived as adequate or for other 
reasons, decides to retire from the labor force. Although Ar 
mour workers of the first sort achieved an income level after 
displacement comparable to their former level, 52 evidence in 
the retirement literature indicates that the second type may 
fare less well. The plight of the ill, unemployed, or inflation- 
stricken worker remains one of income deficiency despite the 
aim of pension plans to provide a subsistence income. Pen 
sion plans, while they have helped to reduce the financial 
burdens of the retired, are sometimes inadequate.
Three policies are needed to relieve the financial pressures 
displacement brings to these groups. For the ill, or those who 
perceive themselves as ill, some form of medical insurance 
may reduce the costs of health care and help bring a speedy 
recovery and allow the worker to return to the workforce. 
For the inflation-stricken retiree, unable to find a sup 
plementary job, a cost of living clause in the retirement ar 
rangement would seem the optimal aid. 53 And finally, for 
those workers characterized by long periods of unemploy 
ment, there is no adequate substitute for jobs; perhaps 
employment subsidized or sponsored by the government is 
the answer. Until further research is undertaken in this area, 
programs and policies will be based on informed guesses and 
will have limited effectiveness.
52. Stern, "Evolution of Manpower Planning," op. cit., pp. 23-24.
53. The UAW has sought just such a clause in its recent bargaining round.
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Early Notice
The subject of early notification has arisen in several con 
texts throughout this volume. The fact that advance notifica 
tion, as it is also called, is a recurrent topic reflects its impor 
tance as a rhetorical rallying point, rather than its 
demonstrated effectiveness.
It is generally supposed that two kinds of benefits to 
displaced workers are associated with early notice. The first 
is directly. Early notification gives necessary lead time to 
agencies and groups that provide vital services to the displac 
ed workers. Lead time is crucial in the development of ap 
propriate needs assessments and inventories of resources for 
both workers and the community. Without it, the quality of 
the planned intervention will be diminished and the benefits 
to the displaced worker proportionately limited.
It is also argued that early notice has a direct positive ef 
fect. It can give workers a chance to find new employment 
before the permanent layoff and thereby reduce or avoid a 
period of unemployment. Of course, this hypothesis assumes 
that workers will use the early notice period to conduct job 
searches; otherwise the advantage of early notice would be 
lost.
Substantial variations can be found in the 27 closings ex 
amined in this review with respect to early notice. Only the 
Armour studies consider the effects of advance notice on 
program implementation and effectiveness. Both Stern and 
Conant speak of the importance of the ninety days' early 
notification for the development of the Automation Fund 
program, arguing that this period allowed time for a perma 
nent program staff to be assembled and for placement 
possibilities to be explored before the closing. However, just 
what impact this arrangement actually had on the success of 
the Automation Fund's program is not clear. A
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methodology is needed to isolate the effects of advance 
notice on the Automation Fund's program and one to assess 
the operation of an identical program without early notice if 
we are to evaluate the benefits claimed by Stern and Conant.
Portis and Suys provide some data about the direct effect 
of advance notice in a plant closing where no specially 
developed programs to assist displaced workers were 
mounted. At Kelvinator in London, Ontario the year-long 
early notification period was not utilized by all workers in 
the same manner. Approximately 26 percent of the produc 
tion workers found jobs during that period and left before 
closing. Some 15 percent of the workers used the period to 
line up jobs which they took directly after the closing. 54 The 
authors stress the fact that production workers over 40 find 
it difficult to find new employment under ordinary cir 
cumstances, and they attribute the relative success in job 
search here of an older group (average age 44 years) to ad 
vanced notification. 55 While it is obvious in the Portis and 
Suys study that the early notice period was useful for con 
cluding the closing agreement, it is difficult to attribute 
benefits, particularly job search success, to early notification 
in this instance. Without a comparative perspective, notably 
an assessment of the success of job search among similar 
workers without advance notification, no firm conclusions 
can be reached. Moreover, within the study itself, no men 
tion is made of the local rate of unemployment, normally a 
powerful variable in reemployment.
Therefore, while advocates of advance notification con 
tinue to press for the adoption of this strategy by manage 
ment and even argue for its being required by law, more in-
54. Bernard Portis and Michael Suys, The Effects of Advanced Notice on a Plant Shut 
down: A Case Study of the Closing of the Kelvinator Plant in London, Ontario (London, 
Ontario: School of Business Administration, The University of Western Ontario, 1970), p. 
8.
55. Portis and Suys, op. cit., pp. 14 and 21.
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formation is required. Not only do we need an effective 
evaluation methodology to assess the benefits of advance 
notification, but also a comparative evaluation with cases 
where no notice and no programming have been provided.
Chapter 6
The Effects of Job Displacement
on Mental Health
One schematic representation of the consequences to in 
dividuals of job loss, from whatever circumstance, might 
present the following progression:
A Macroeconomic Change
B Job Separation
\ 
C Economic Cons equences of Job Loss
' r 
D Noneconomic Consequences of Job Loss
E Evidence of Individual Pathology 1
This diagram is designed to show the hypothetical relation 
ship between large-scale economic change and the indicators 
of individual distress, as seen specifically in admissions to 
mental treatment facilities. 2 The diagram may be broken 
down into a number of propositions.
1. Louis A. Ferman and John Gardner, "Economic Deprivation, Social Mobility and Men 
tal Health," in Mental Health and the Economy, Louis A. Ferman and Jeanne P. Gordus, 
eds. (Kalamazoo, MI: The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1979), pp. 
193-224.
2. Ralph Catalano and David Dooley, "Does Economic Change Provoke or Uncover 
Behavioral Disorder?" in Ferman and Gordus, op. tit., pp. 321-346.
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Economic Status, Economic Change, 
and Mental Health
While this schema is applicable to the mental health out 
comes of plant closings, most research is focused on other 
types of unemployment. There are several important tradi 
tions of unemployment research to be considered. Some of 
these traditions can be identified by the connections made 
between points considered. One standard sociological ap 
proach, dating back to Durkheim's study of suicide, 3 
establishes connections between indicators of 
macroeconomic change and aggregate indicators of social 
and psychological disorder (A-E). Brenner's4 study of admis 
sions to mental hospitals as well as more recent work 
centered upon indicators of mortality, morbidity, and 
criminal behavior have stimulated another type of research 
involving data collection such as work by Catalano and 
Dooley, 5 more recently by Ferman and Gardner. 6 In one 
sense, such massive longitudinal studies and large-scale 
surveys bracket research that is focused upon job loss, on its 
noneconomic consequences, and on evidence of individual 
pathology (B-C-D). Standard studies in this field (Bakke, 7 
Komarovsky8 and Angell9) explore, in a nonquantitative 
fashion, the relationships found in unemployment resulting 
from massive layoffs (B-C-D-E). One essay, a study of the
3. Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology, J.A. Spalding and G. Simpson, 
translators (New York: The Free Press, 1951).
4. M. Harvey Brenner, Mental Illness and the Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1973).
5. Catalano and Dooley, op. cit.
6. Ferman and Gardner, op. cit.
7. E.W. Bakke, The Unemployed Man (New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, 1934).
8. Mirra Komarovsky, The Unemployed Man and His Family (New York: The Dryden 
Press, 1940).
9. R.C. Angell, The Family Encounters the Depression (New York: Charles Scribner and 
Sons, 1936).
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Baker plant by Al Slote, 10 documents those relationships in 
two particular plant closings and is actually an outgrowth of 
an epidemiological study to be considered in detail in a later 
section. A significant literature has recently developed which 
is small-scale, modestly longitudinal in nature, and depen 
dent upon a combination of surveys, case studies, and 
clinical evidence, all of which stress the relationship between 
job separation and individual pathology.
Taken together, these three traditions, archival research, 
surveys, and case studies, provide evidence that these con 
nections exist, on both aggregate and individual levels; but 
the relationships between the connections are less firmly 
established. Finally, the schema assumes that economic 
change and job loss precede the appearance of individual 
pathology, while it makes no provision for other possible 
connections between socioeconomic status, unemployment, 
and mental illness, for example.
Perhaps because research on plant closings must begin 
with a single event, that event is contrued not only as taking 
place before individual distress, but is identified as causative 
of the disorders subsequently observed. In contrast, cross- 
sectional studies often reverse the order of the schema and 
construe individual disorders as preceding and capable of 
causing negative labor market experiences. This tradition of 
research includes the work of Hollingshead and Redlich, 11 
the classic study of New Haven in which the concepts of 
psychiatry and sociology are joined to produce a convincing 
argument that the incidence of mental illness is significantly 
related to social class and that treatment modalities are also 
related to socioeconomic status and class, so that longer and 
more frequent hospitalizations are inflicted on persons of
10. Al Slote, Termination: The Closing at Baker Plants, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
1969).
11. August B. Hollingshead and Frederick C. Redlich, Social Class and Mental Illness: A
Community Study (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958).
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lower status. The Midtown Manhattan study presents over 
whelming evidence of the relationship between mental 
disturbance and social class and it implicates childhood 
poverty as well. 12 Other major studies, such as those of 
Gurin, Veroff and Feld, 13 emphasize the connection from 
another perspective. Even more recently, Turner and Gar 
trell 14 developed from their investigation a construct of 
social competence that encompasses measures of occupa 
tional status, marital status, educational level, and work per 
formance. Low social competence is considered interactive 
with psychopathology and accepts the association of low 
economic status and mental disturbance without assigning a 
causative role to unemployment.
No conclusive argument can yet be made as to whether an 
unfortunate labor market experience triggers individual 
disturbance or vice versa. Well-designed studies are needed 
that will incorporate (1) the cross-sectional approach that 
connects mental illness to low socioeconomic status, and 
(2) longitudinal studies that often associate job separation 
with mental disorder. The two approaches will have to be 
mounted together and include a series of case studies that 
take other significant variables into account.
Plant Closings and Mental 
Health Outcomes
Yet, even without such conclusive studies, it must be ad 
mitted that sufficient study of the mental health outcomes of 
unemployment has been conducted for discussion to proceed
12. Leo Srole and Thomas Langner, Mental Health in the Metropolis: The Midtown 
Manhattan Study (New York: Harper and Row, 1975).
13. Gerald Gurin, Joseph Veroff, and S.C. Feld, Americans View Their Mental Health 
(New York: Basic Books, 1960).
14. R.J. Turner and J.W. Gartrell, "Social Factors in Psychiatric Outcome: Toward the 
Resolution of Interpretive Controversies," American Sociological Review, June 1978, pp. 
383-404.
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on a relatively sophisticated level. Recent developments 
stand in marked contrast to the scholarly consideration given 
to the problems of the displaced worker only 15 years ago. 
At that time, studies associating social class with mental ill 
ness had been made, but virtually no large-scale studies were 
in print; only a few on the mental health effects of job loss 
were even in preparation. At that time, the only available 
data dealing with the mental health status of workers af 
fected by plant closings as distinct from unemployment 
resulting from other causes were found in the study by 
Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard of former employees of the 
Packard Motor Car Company. 15
A morale scale was used there to measure mental 
health or more properly, well-being or its absence. The 
five-item morale score was based on situational variables, 
but it was chiefly an attitudinal determination. The 
measurements made a clear distinction between displaced 
workers who had economic security (savings, other sources 
of income, a readily marketable skill, or some combination 
of these resources) and those who did not. The former group 
had higher scores on the morale scale than workers who lack 
ed such resources. Whether this measurement did in fact 
show something about the response to unemployment of 
those faced with little or no economic deprivation compared 
with those less fortunate was not then clear. It was possible 
that workers with outside resources were so endowed 
because of certain personal characteristics that enabled them 
to cope with life and its difficulties more successfully than 
their coworkers.
These points remain unsettled still, although the ways in 
which the questions are asked have changed. Furthermore, 
the fact that there are plausible alternative explanations sug-
15. Michael Aiken, Louis A. Ferman, and Harold L. Sheppard, Economic Failure, Aliena 
tion, and Extremism (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1968).
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gests an important issue in plant-closing research that of 
the methodological dilemma. Much is lost to plant-closing 
research because the sample of unemployed workers studied 
is not necessarily a random sample, and may not contain 
those persons whose unfortunate labor market experiences 
can be regarded as related solely to their own physical and 
psychological predispositions. While there is no doubt that 
such samples have their own biases workers are probably 
older and working in a declining industry and/or declining 
geographical area, for example the workers have, on the 
other hand, usually been long term employees with stable 
work histories. The difference in samples will prove crucial 
to a balanced understanding of the research findings.
Moreover, any study which focuses on the impact of plant 
closings on individuals will uncover many of them whose ex 
periences escape the path described by the schema. It is ob 
viously inappropriate in those cases where reemployment is 
immediate and satisfactory or even where reemployment is 
delayed but occurs before difficulties have been en 
countered. Basically, the schema is concerned with those 
cases in which difficulties do arise for individuals, particular 
ly difficulties associated with prolonged or recurrent 
unemployment. While this path from unemployment to ill 
ness has been described in many studies of unemployed per 
sons, it has not been a major focus of plant-closing studies. 
However, in this specific respect the two genres of research, 
unemployment and individual reactions to plant closings, 
come together in the Cobb and Kasl study, Termination: The 
Consequences of Job Loss. 16
The fact that the Cobb and Kasl work is comprehensive, 
well designed, and significant would set it above many other 
studies of the unemployment experience. Its scope and focus
16. Sidney Cobb and Stanislav V. Kasl, Termination: The Consequences of Job Loss, 
DREW (NIOSH) Publication No. 77-24 (Cincinnati, OH: U.S. DHEW, Division of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Sciences, 1977).
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are unique, as other work on individual responses to plant 
closings make clear. Mick, 17 in his 1975 assessment of the 
social and personal costs of plant shutdowns, devotes only 
two sentences to noneconomic personal outcomes and refers 
to Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard for the first and to Cobb 
and Kasl for the second. More recently, Holen18 focuses her 
review on those studies concerning adjustment and 
reemployment, no doubt in part because so little is available 
in other areas. While several studies of the correlates of the 
negative outcomes of unemployment are in progress, they 
are devoted either to unemployment not specifically at 
tributable to plant closings or to correlates less psychological 
of physiological.
The Cobb and Kasl study was undertaken in 1969 and field 
studies continued for several years. Two plants about to shut 
down permanently and lay off all employees were identified 
by the research team. Among the workers at these facilities, 
the target group for study was comprised of married blue- 
collar workers, aged 35 to 60, who had worked at the plants 
for more than three years. Close to 80 percent of those 
selected for study agreed to participate.
Displaced workers for the study were drawn from both 
plants. One was an urban establishment, a paint manufac 
turing facility, where work was relatively light for all 
classifications of employees. The second plant, located in a 
rural community, employed operatives who ranged from 
skilled and semi-skilled to unskilled, in a somewhat more 
heavily industrial enterprise. A major strength of this study 
was the use of a control group, a methodological necessity 
often omitted from plant-closing studies. Workers in the 
control group came from four establishments, chosen not
17. Stephen S. Mick, "Social and Personal Costs of Plant Shutdowns," Industrial Rela 
tions, May 1975, p. 207ff.
18. Arlene Holen, Losses to Workers Displaced by Plant Closure or Layoff: A Survey of 
the Literature, Public Research Institute, November 1976.
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only because they were comparable to the two target plants, 
but also because they preserved the rural-urban spectrum.
In the study of ex-Packard workers by Aiken, Ferman and 
Sheppard, 19 the importance of situational pressures as an in 
fluence on mental health was established. Using an index of 
economic deprivation as an indicator of situational 
pressures, a close association between the existence of such 
pressures and mental health was indicated. Respondents with 
high scores had a greater indication of poor mental health 
than respondents with low scores. It was interesting that 
predisplacement statuses (e.g., age, skill status) and labor 
market experiences (number of months of unemployment 
and downward mobility) had little or no predictive value in 
relationship to mental health, but the index of economic 
deprivation was the most powerful variable as a predictor of 
mental health. The authors suggest the following linkage:
- Predisplacement statuses predict labor market outcomes 
(e.g., the older worker is more likely than others to ex 
perience a long period of unemployment)
- Labor market outcomes are related to the occurrence of 
economic deprivation (e.g., workers with long periods 
of unemployment are more likely than others to ex 
perience a loss of savings, an increase in debt and a cut 
back in major expenditures)
- Economic deprivation is a predictor of attitudinal and 
behavioral indicators of poor mental health (e.g., 
workers with high economic deprivation are more likely 
than others to develop dissatisfaction with life and 
reduce contact with kin and neighbors)
19. Aiken, Ferman and Sheppard, op. cit.
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The linkage pattern may be diagrammed as follows: 
The Determinants of Anomia
Old age
Low skill
level
Low
educational
attainment
Difficulty in
finding and
keeping a job
Many
months of
unemploy 
ment
Downward
job mobility
High High
economic feelings
deprivation of anomia
Young age
High skill 
level
High educa 
tional 
attainment
Finding and 
keeping 
another job
Few months 
of unemploy 
ment
Upward job 
mobility
Low
economic
deprivation
Low
feelings of 
anomia
The authors conclude that situational pressures in the 
form of economic deprivation are the link between labor 
market outcomes and behavioral and attitudinal states. 
Predisplacement status and labor market outcomes are 
necessary but not sufficient conditions to influence mental 
health. The necessary ingredient is economic deprivation 
(i.e., the extent of resource depletion). The older worker ex 
periences longer periods of unemployment, and this in turn 
reduces his available resources, which results in negative 
psychological and behavioral states. The authors conclude 
that the availability of resources is the most important single 
factor affecting the morale and mental health of the worker.
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Why is money so important? Resource availability makes 
continued social reciprocity possible, permits continued 
membership in associations and makes possible an element 
of control over the environment. These findings argue 
strongly for the central importance of income maintenance 
programs in the post-shutdown period.
The Cobb and Kasl20 study, which examined worker men 
tal states at a number of points in time, confirms this rela 
tionship between economic deprivation and social and 
psychological indicators of pathology. They conclude that 
the relationship is strongest at the anticipation period before 
the plant shuts down and weaker at succeeding periods. This 
may suggest that, as time passes, resources are brought into 
line with demands a situation that does not occur prior to 
the shutdown.
Data collected in interviews were subjected to a number of 
sophisticated types of analysis, and numerous scales were us 
ed to assess variables. Such measures as the Crowne- 
Marlowe measure of the need for social approval, the Block 
Scale, the CPI Scale and several others indicated not only the 
crucial variables (such as general psychological adjustment) 
but provided validity checks for certain kinds of response in 
the self-reporting areas of the instrument. Such extensive in 
terweaving of different measures of many variables points 
up how far the apparatus of social-psychological study of 
unemployment-related outcomes has come since the workers 
terminated at Packard were studied. Still, it is significant 
that major emphasis in analysis and interpretation was plac 
ed upon two indices, Relative Economic Deprivation and 
Relative Economic Change, both of which were adopted 
from the Packard study.
20. Sidney Cobb and Stanislav V. Kasl, "Some Mental Health Consequences of Plant 
Closing and Job Loss," in Ferman and Gordus, op. cit., p. 293.
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In the Cobb and Kasl study, unemployment experiences of 
the terminated workers differed between the rural and urban 
workers. On average, the men were unemployed for about 15 
weeks during the two years of the study, and for most of the 
workers these 15 weeks were concentrated in the period 
directly after-the plant closing. In the urban situation, 25 
percent of the workers experienced no unemployment during 
the first year, since they were immediately reemployed, and 
50 percent had less than two months of unemployment. It 
was more difficult for workers in the rural setting to find a 
job in the first year, and it was reported that one-third of 
them were still unemployed after three or more months. Dur 
ing the first year, the rural workers had an average twelve 
weeks of unemployment, while urban workers had about 
seven weeks. In the second year, the pattern was reversed, 
and at the end of the study the jobless period over the two 
years was about the same for both groups. Numerous 
workers found themselves without a job more than once. 
However, despite the early difficulties encountered by the 
rural workers, their lives were less disrupted than those of 
their urban counterparts. This may be explained by the fact 
that the plant in the urban setting had been a kind of com 
munity in itself, fulfilling many associative needs that rural 
workers continued to derive from dependable community 
associations.
While it was important that this study identified apprehen 
sion before the fact as one stage of distress in the experience 
of unemployment associated with plant closings, the general 
findings did not confirm any consistent, ongoing, high level 
of distress among all displaced workers from the time they 
knew that unemployment was approaching until they were 
reemployed. Indeed, a particularly valuable finding was the 
presence after an early period of stress of adaptation to 
prolonged unemployment. Those who underwent more than 
one period of unemployment in the course of the study ap 
peared to fare the worst.
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Thus, there is the anomaly that periods of employment in 
the work history of a displaced worker may be more destruc 
tive than prolonged joblessness. Prolonged unemployment 
can be a more stable and predictable existence than the wild 
fluctuations of periodic employment. We have been led to 
believe, particularly in the literature of the 1930s, that pro 
longed joblessness was the most destructive social ex 
perience. The data both from the work of Aiken, Ferman 
and Sheppard and Cobb and Kasl dispute this image.
The Cobb and Kasl data have been used by numerous 
writers to support policy development regarding the social, 
physical and psychological impact of plant closings. Their 
quotations have been carefully chosen because the Cobb and 
Kasl study does not blame job loss for all cases of distress or 
deviant behavior that may follow unemployment. Cobb and 
Kasl state explicitly:
". . .the mental health impact of job loss and 
unemployment appears to be a limited one, both in 
terms of its magnitude as well as in terms of its duration." 21
Such findings differ somewhat from the earlier Packard 
study, although the differences are more marked between the 
Cobb and Kasl findings and the recent work of Brenner. But 
again, Brenner (as well as those who revise Brenner, notably 
Catalano and Dooley22) is studying unemployment in a 
broader sense. The schema presented at the beginning of this 
discussion indicates the underlying rationale of the Durkhei- 
mian approach used by Brenner and others. In the Cobb and 
Kasl instance, individuals would experience job separation 
resulting from macroeconomic change, and might (although 
always depending upon reemployment and adjustment to
21. Cobb and Kasl, Termination, op. cit., p. 175.
22. Catalano and Dooley, op. cit.
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prolonged unemployment) proceed to a position of depriva 
tion brought about by the economic consequences of job 
loss. Cobb and Kasl attempted in at least four ways to relate 
the two scales relative economic deprivation and relative 
economic change to indicators of negative physical and 
mental health outcomes with virtually no success. In fact, 
they questioned whether physical and mental health pro 
blems, when they appeared in their study group, were related 
to the experience of job loss at all.
Despite the fact that this study was exemplary among 
those of plant closings generally and unique in the extent of 
its assessment of physical and mental health outcomes, pro 
blems appear that may contribute to the variance between its 
findings and the close correlations found by Brenner and 
others between unemployment and other social and 
psychological problems. It is likely that the psychic invest 
ment of unskilled blue-collar workers in their jobs, quite 
apart from the financial aspect, is smaller than the invest 
ment of other groups of more skilled and more profes 
sionalized workers. Cobb and Kasl themselves speculate that 
low-skilled, blue-collar workers may have weak attachments 
to the work role. Kanter23 and others have demonstrated that 
weak attachment may result from blocked opportunity and 
similar structural features of the workplace that are par 
ticularly common in large manufacturing enterprises. Conse 
quently, the argument goes, the trauma accompanying 
detachment from a valued social role may very well have 
taken place many years before the plants closed in the 
worklives of the participants of these studies. The hope of a 
valued work role was relinquished at that time, and the 
primary attachment to the job then became economic and, in 
the case of the urban workers, affiliative. At best, therefore, 
the conclusions reached in this study are only suggestive and
23. Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 
1977).
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suggestive only for other workers with a similarly weak at 
tachment to the work role.
There is another factor peculiar to plant-closing studies 
but not to unemployment studies. Unemployment resulting 
from plant closings carries with it less self-condemnation 
than more generalized unemployment does. Whether or not 
an individual was in any way responsible for the loss of a job 
in any particular case, it is highly probable that the worker 
who is laid off while others remain on the job suffers a loss 
of self-esteem. Although there may be no rational reason for 
self-blame, the unemployed individual sees himself or herself 
as somehow inferior. Clearly, as noted above, a general 
plant shutdown offers much less opportunity for blaming 
one's own shortcomings. The very nature of a mass layoff 
provides the newly unemployed with an opportunity to join 
with others similarly afflicted, even for a short time, for 
discussion, mutual support, and solidarity.
The data in the Packard study clearly indicates that skid 
ding in the labor market (in the form of reduced status and 
hourly wage on succeeding jobs) was related to poor mental 
health (high anomie scores, low satisfaction with life and 
reduced contact with kin and neighbors). Ex-Packard 
workers who returned to jobs with status and wages equal to 
or higher than the old Packard job had the highest mental 
health scores while those who had reduced status and wages 
had the lowest scores. What is suggested here is that work in 
and of itself is no cure-all for job displacement. Work that is 
downwardly mobile can be more destructive than no work at 
all. As a matter of fact, the ex-Packard workers who remain 
ed totally unemployed for the 27-month period had mental 
health scores subjectively higher than the workers with 
downwardly mobile jobs.
Moreover, even if the major problem identified in the 
plant-closing studies by Cobb and Kasl was the impact of
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economic deprivation on jobless workers, the negative aspect 
would be moderated somewhat by severance pay. The 
periods of unemployment experienced by these workers were 
not excessively long. It is suggested that there may well be a 
certain period of joblessness required before negative effects 
begin to appear. Only studies that follow workers over a 
period considerably more than two years can begin to assess 
the long term effects.
This necessity is dramatically highlighted by the work 
histories derived from the data provided by the plant-closing 
studies analyzed in this review. In general, the average 
seniority is considerably more than a decade, often fifteen 
years. The plant closing means, for these individuals, the 
possibility of a downward journey through the labor market, 
a long process which Cobb and Kasl assert may change an 
unemployed person into an unemployable one. 24 Such 
"bumping and skidding" is associated with economic 
deprivation, and both these factors are associated with 
negative mental health outcomes for displaced workers. In 
deed, the cross-sectional studies, as well as the genre of 
research focusing upon class, the Midtown Manhattan 
study25 and Hollingshead and Redlich, 26 with their emphasis 
on the close relationship between mental illness and 
socioeconomic status, all document the possible end of a 
work history first disturbed by a plant closing, followed by 
economic deprivation and recurrent bouts of unemploy 
ment, broken only by reemployment at lower and lower 
levels.
The emphasis in this section has been upon mental health 
and mental illness, although Cobb and Kasl consider 
physical health outcomes as well. Brenner, who began his
24. Cobb and Kasl, op. cit., 1979, p. 289.
25. Srole and Langner, op. cit.
26. Hollingshead and Redlich, op. cit.
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research in this area with mental hospital admissions as the 
indicator, has recently worked on morbidity and mortality 
and, indeed, made projections on a national scale. The 
research done on the connections between unemployment 
and physical disability are traditionally an outgrowth of con 
cerns about the relationship between physical well-being and 
environmental factors in the workplace, and about the ef 
fects of occupational stress upon physical health. The com 
plexities of measuring physical health outcomes attributable 
to plant-closing unemployment are illuminated by the com 
ments of James House:
"On the whole, there is already considerable 
evidence that occupational stress is a factor which 
increases morbidity and mortality from physical 
disease, especially heart disease. The complexity of 
this evidence suggests that different forms of oc 
cupational stress may have differential effects on 
varius subgroups of the total population defined in 
terms of standard characteristics (such as age, oc 
cupation, and sex), personality (such as "Type A") 
or social situation (such as social support.)27
Given the problems of measuring work-related physical ill 
ness and of confusing work-related with unemployment- 
related illness, and given the fact that plant-closing research, 
however carefully designed, often lacks adequate baseline 
data for comparative purposes, it is not surprising that the 
area of occupational disability remains largely unexplored. 
While Cobb and Kasl did not find a significant increase in ill 
ness in their sample, it must be emphasized that the same dif 
ficulties limited follow-up period (24 months) and the 
possibility that unemployment in the present may have an 
impact on an individual's well being that will not be evident
27. James S. House, "Effects of Occupational Stress on Physical Health," in Work and 
the Quality of Life (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974), p. 161.
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from some years found in unemployment-related mental 
illness research are exacerbated in unemployment-related 
physical illness research.
Job Loss and Family Changes
Attention has also been focused upon the psychosocial ef 
fects of unemployment upon families. From the earliest 
studies of unemployment during the Depression, 28 emphasis 
has been placed on the disorganizing effect that such a major 
event can have upon family structure and roles, and this 
theme has surfaced again and again with variations. A par 
ticularly important analysis was made by Elder29 in a massive 
longitudinal archival study of families whose functioning 
had changed during the Depression. While Elder makes a 
convincing argument for locating the major impact of 
unemployment crises at the point where the individual, the 
family, and the social environment meet, his analysis is not 
based upon plant-closing unemployment nor does its 
longitudinal emphasis relate the family's experience of 
joblessness either to the work history of the principal worker 
or to the family's own stage in the life cycle.
It might be expected that some of these difficulties would 
be rectified in recent research by Walter G. Strange based 
upon case studies of thirty workers who lost their jobs after a 
plant closed in Saltville, Virginia. 30 While Strange em 
phasizes that his study concentrates upon the individual 
rather than the community, it is clear that he adopts a 
perspective rather like Elder's, since marriage and family
28. Bakke, op. cit.; Angell, op. cit.; Komarovsky, op. cit.
29. G.H. Elder, Children of the Great Depression: Social Change in Life Experience 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).
30. Walter G. Strange, Job Loss: A Psychosocial Study of Worker Reactions to a Plant- 
Closing in a Company Town in Southern Appalachia (Blacksburg, VA: Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute, 1977).
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loom large in the adjustment of these Appalachian workers 
to the closing of their plant. While acknowledging the impor 
tance of the work done by Cobb and Kasl and the associated 
analysis of that data by Susan Gore, 31 Strange places his 
stress upon a model of job loss that perceives that loss as 
analogous to the grief over the death of a loved one or to 
other major losses in adult life.
Following the conceptualization by Robert Weiss32 of 
emotional and social isolation as loneliness, Strange 
hypothesized that mechanisms rather like those suggested by 
Weiss and others in his tradition could probably be expected 
to become manifest in Saltville. 33 As its underlying rationale, 
the study asserted that the closing of the plant at Saltville had 
"stripped that community of what had been its principal 
mechanism of social integration." 34 It is here that the major 
problem with this approach appears, for in assigning to the 
plant the foundation for the sets of relationships that define 
community and community function, Strange set the stage 
for a social cataclysm. Such an exaggerated view of the 
plant's symbolic and actual importance in a rural setting pro 
vides a framework in which anything short of catastrophe 
would be anticlimactic. Moreover, considering the compell 
ing arguments given by Cobb and Kasl and by Gore's 
analysis of the importance of social support in rural en 
vironments in that larger study, such a conceptualization ap 
pears unnecessarily simplistic. And, as one might expect, the 
findings of the study indicate that the family, in particular 
the wife, is both vulnerable to the adverse changes in family
31. Susan Gore, The Influence of Social Support and Related Variables in A meliorating the 
Consequences of Job Loss, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1973.
32. R.S. Weiss, Loneliness: The Experience of Emotional and Social Isolation (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1973).
33. Strange, op. cit.
34. Strange, op. cit., p. 31.
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resources and roles brought about by the closing, and in 
strumental in bringing some new order to at least a portion 
of the ensuing chaos.
In effect, Strange is viewing the family as a social support 
mechanism, particularly strong in this traditional communi 
ty, but one that demands much at the same time that it pro 
vides much. There is sufficient resemblance between the 
responses of individuals in this study and the general phases 
of grieving to permit the identification of part of the in 
dividual and family adjustment to plant closing as a kind of 
grief. The fact that this plant shutdown took place in a set 
ting in which attachment to the land, springing from long 
standing family residence in the area, is particularly strong 
gives rise to another pair of contradictory impulses. Rational 
economic decisions might well dictate that these workers 
move elsewhere to seek jobs, but most of them chose to ac 
cept the loss of a job and its attendant distress and to reject a 
move that would have entailed, in Strange's terms, another 
loss, conceivably much more traumatic. This study provides 
indirect and inadvertent support for a hypothesis that places 
the family in a critical position during catastrophic 
unemployment, but it does not analyze the processes at work 
here because they are not central to the conceptual 
framework. Grieving places the individual in the center, 
although there is reason to suppose (and studies already cited 
indicate) that much of what occurs after a plant closing is a 
social and family process.
It seems fortuitous then, given the fact that most studies 
are suggestive yet inconclusive about the family and the 
psychosocial response to plant shutdowns, that when Ken 
neth Root undertook research on the 1975 Mason City, Iowa 
closing of the Armour plant, he placed a specific focus on 
family. 35 The closing provided a substantial unemployed
35. Kenneth Root, "Workers and Their Families: Some Attitudinal and Behavioral 
Responses to a Plant Closing," National Institute of Mental Health research prospectus.
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population, although the list from which the sample was 
chosen was not ideal. In total, a sample of 103 individuals 
with families were chosen for study, and subsequent 
followup dealt with a reduced sample of 77 persons. Con 
sidering the emphasis on age-related reemployment dif 
ficulties encountered by workers in other plant-closing 
research, as well as the differing needs and perceptions of in 
dividuals and families according to their places in the life- 
cycle, it is particularly unfortunate that this study was 
hampered at the outset by the refusal of both management 
and union to provide the researchers with lists of essential 
demographic information. Still, as the sample was finally 
drawn, it would have been possible to emphasize age and 
age-related phenomena.
Another problem with this set of studies is its orientation 
toward a strongly positive view of plant closings. It is more 
than likely that this emphasis accounts for the style of inter 
viewing evident in some lengthy quotations, 36 a style design 
ed to elicit positive rather than negative responses. On the 
basis of these interviews, Root constructs a typology from 
the study sample, identifying three types of plant-closing 
participants: "winners," "losers," and "marginals." About 
40 percent of the sample indicated that they felt the closing 
had been good for them and their families, thus qualifying 
them as "winners." Another 30 percent indicated that the 
closing had been bad overall, making them "losers," while 
about 27 percent were "marginal," with another 2 percent 
indicating that they were not yet certain what they felt their 
personal outcomes were. A critical variable in this study was 
the announcement by Armour that another plant would be 
opened in Mason City, although it would employ only about 
one-fourth as many workers as the old plant. However, at 
that time the Mason City area generally was not a seriously
36. Kenneth Root, Perspectives for Community and Organizations: On Plant Closings and 
Job Dislocations (Ames, I A: Iowa State University Press, 1979).
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jeopardized labor market, and aggressive efforts by local 
economic development agencies and business groups 
ameliorated the employment situation in objective terms.
To some extent, the Root findings and the interpretation 
of them are a logical extension of the work of Cobb and Kasl 
and of Strange as well. Root emphasizes discontinuity with 
earlier studies, but does not account for it sufficiently. 
Earlier plant-closing studies had concluded that almost 
everyone was a victim, that nearly all workers were 
casualties. Some recent studies present a more positive view, 
finding that support in family and community buffers the 
costs to individuals and indeed provides an environment in 
which positive changes can take place. While Cobb and Kasl 
find stress and clear evidence of adverse reaction in the early 
post-announcement, pre-closing period, Root finds, in some 
cases, a sense of relief and a positive attitude toward the 
change. But, it must be noted that the ease with which many 
workers were reemployed and the accompanying perception 
that jobs could be found are correlates of age, skill, and a 
total resource package, factors insufficiently investigated in 
this study. Only a major longitudinal study, carefully design 
ed, controlling for job histories and labor market conditions, 
can answer the questions these discontinuities raise.
To return once again to the schema set forth at the begin 
ning of this section, it is clear that the points noted are not 
only discrete events in themselves but that they can also be 
construed as junctures at which intervention can take place. 
Much research, from Durkheim through Brenner and the 
new generation of epidemiological researchers, has focused 
in its quest for indicators, on the last point, evidence of in 
dividual pathology. At this stage, intervention is often forc 
ed or inevitable, and the quality of services provided for the 
troubled and ill and the costs of such services become a ma 
jor concern. More recently, emphasis has been placed upon 
the processes alleged to take place between job loss and ill-
148 Effects on Mental Health
ness, so that intervention can take place earlier at mental 
health centers, counseling centers or health maintenance 
organizations, or through the "natural" systems offered 
through networks of lay helpers or an individual's social sup 
port system. 37 Depending upon who is describing social sup 
port, this often intangible good can turn up with very tangi 
ble accouterments like training or various subsidized pro 
grams and the concept can even include transfer payments 
or other forms or sources of income maintenance. 38 These 
intervention points can be geared, again depending on 
definition, to the economic or noneconomic consequences of 
job loss, or even both. Moving back another step ensures the 
appearance of organized labor as well as various policy and 
planning groups with proposals for the delay and indefinite 
postponement of job loss or the creation of new jobs. 39 In 
terventionists of this type point to arrangements in other 
countries that ensure more job security and cushion workers 
from the impact of economic dislocation. Finally, other 
planners and economists would seize the chance to intervene 
at a still earlier stage, to guide and channel macroeconomic 
change so as to cause the least possible perturbation in local 
labor markets.
The available studies of the physical and mental health 
outcomes of plant closings, few as they are, offer a rather 
skimpy needs assessment for one or another of these in 
tervention strategies. However, unemployment studies 
generally, whether case studies or large-scale sociological 
enterprises, provide strong incentives and arguments for 
developing powerful public policies to cope with negative ef 
fects, while neglecting those areas where relevant processes
37. Elizabeth Bott, Family and Social Network, 2nd Ed (New York: The Free Press, 1971).
38. G. Ramsay Liem and Joan Huser Liem, "Social Support and Stress: Some General 
Issues and Their Application to the Problem of Unemployment," in Ferman and Gordus, 
op. cit.
39. S.M. Miller, "Unemployment and Mental Health: An Interpretive Summary," and 
Gar Alperovitz, "Strategy and Policy," both in Ferman and Gordus, op. cit.
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might be seen and specific intervention tactics suggested. In 
other words, unemployment studies in general demonstrate 
that there is a need for intervention to alleviate social costs 
but do not provide much information about where such ac 
tion had best be taken. Plant-closing studies concentrate on 
likely intervention points but do not make a convincing case 
for massive intervention.
Clearly, both the research efforts, as well as the policy and 
programs designed to alleviate problems associated with 
plant closings in the area of mental health, have proceeded 
without certain crucial items of information. Some of the 
missing information depends upon circumstance. For exam 
ple, the mental health effects of plant closings may very well 
resemble the mental health effects of large-scale counter 
cyclical unemployment in situations where these two occur 
simultaneously. To date, no plant-closing study has taken 
place in an area where the unemployment rate is over 10 per 
cent, although the increasing incidence of plant closings in 
the rapidly changing northeastern quadrant of the country 
will provide ample opportunity for such research. Because a 
plant closing may be the point at which individuals enter 
upon downward job mobility and prolonged and/or recur 
rent bouts of unemployment, always coupled with relative 
and sometimes actual economic deprivation, it is obviously 
necessary that plant-closing studies be designed to follow in 
dividuals for a much longer period than a year or two. 
Perhaps a more productive research strategy for the future 
would focus less on an individual plant closing and em 
phasize more those several instances in which the experience 
and success of various intervention strategies might be 
documented and evaluated.

Chapter 7
New Directions for Research, 
Policy, and Program Development
The purpose of this review of selected plant-closing studies 
was to summarize and synthesize the results of research 
undertaken over the past 20 years. Interest in plant closings 
and industrial relocation increases and decreases in direct 
relation to the prevailing economic situation. Such research 
depends, in part, upon the availability of plants in the pro 
cess of shutdown, a phenomenon more common in bad 
economic times than in good, in declining industries, and in 
declining geographical areas. Moreover, the problems are 
most obvious at such times, and since steps are often con 
templated to relieve the consequences of closures, studies are 
often performed in association with such programs. To some 
degree, then, this review reflects yet another economic 
downturn, another set of opportunities for study and action. 
The further purpose of this review was to provide a compen 
dium of information useful to those studying closures at this 
time and helpful to policy makers and planners who might 
wish to review past efforts in order to find directions which 
might profitably be taken in the present and future. 
However, this review can, at best, be only as useful as the 
research which it summarizes. Plant-closing research has 
been so limited in scope and conceptualization that the pre 
sent review is limited as well. Moreover, partly because of 
the narrow conceptualization and total lack of an overall
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research framework, research in this area has also been 
characterized by methodological inadequacy. In these con 
cluding pages, emphasis is placed on this set of conceptual 
and methodological problems for two reasons. First, this 
focus highlights the need for a new research agenda and 
clarifies the problems which need to be addressed. Second, 
the utility of this review as basis for policy recommendations 
is directly related to the degree of confidence which can be 
placed in the synthesis and summary of the research conclu 
sions. Therefore, only an evaluation which is critical of the 
research reviewed will be useful for further research, policy 
recommendations and program planning. Four major points 
will be stressed in these pages: the problems of past research, 
a new research agenda, conclusions about the impact of 
plant closings, and some suggested policy developments. The 
first two points are closely associated with a major theme of 
this report the assertion that, despite the continuing 
research in this area, we are still missing critical information. 
They deal with what specific types of information are lack 
ing, and what barriers conceptual, methodological, and 
practical have prevented gathering such data. What steps 
can be taken to rectify the situation is the topic of the follow 
ing two sections.
Conceptual and Methodological Problems 
of Plant-Closing Research
Plant-closing studies, including the present review of those 
studies, are captives of their own tradition. From the earliest 
studies through several of the more recent analyses, the in 
dividual and community consequences of industrial reloca 
tion have been clearly and compellingly revealed through the 
preferred method of investigation case studies.
These case studies have been conducted when oppor 
tunities for research were presented and their appearance in 
the literature is sporadic. There is no reason to suppose that
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the plant closings studied are typical cases; for example, 
closures which are studied are usually unionized 
establishments. There are additional conceptual difficulties 
associated with plant-closing research. There is no 
framework for such study that permits an estimate of exten- 
siveness of the problem; there is no adequate longitudinal 
base from which studies are made; and usually only a single 
phase of the shutdown process is scrutinized. All of these 
problems are intertwined with program and policy issues 
which have served to limit the general field of plant-closing 
studies to the point where reality may very well be severely 
distorted.
First, while few will quarrel with the assertion that plant 
closings cause severe problems for individuals and com 
munities, particularly for those with fewest resources and ad 
vantages, legitimate questions can be raised about the exten- 
siveness of these problems. While the national interest is 
perceived to be served by the accumulation of information 
crucial to policy formation in the area of employment, 
underemployment, and unemployment, these categories 
have only recently been subdivided. The subdivisions of cur 
rent interest, the employment problems of youth, minorities, 
women, and disadvantaged persons, have been 
demonstrated to be extensive.. In the absence of evidence to 
the contrary, plant closings can be considered unfortunate 
but isolated events whose seriousness is reduced because they 
are not perceived to be common, recurrent, and significant 
on the national level. The results of this isolation have been 
to minimize policy and program initiatives designed to assist 
older industrial areas and to minimize transitional program 
ming for older workers whose educational levels and skills 
added to their high wage aspirations inhibit their reemploy- 
ment. No national policy concerning plant closings has 
developed because extensiveness of the problem has not been 
demonstrated, yet it is unlikely that research of a type ap-
154 New Directions
propriate for measuring extensiveness will be designed, sup 
ported, and utilized until at least some steps toward a na 
tional policy have been taken. Possible methods for approx 
imating extensiveness are discussed below.
A second circularity which has developed through the 
isolation of plant-closing research is related to the failure to 
establish an appropriate longitudinal dimension. 
Throughout the literature we find needs assessments of a 
sort; the studies clearly indicate that some actions designed 
to promote rapid reemployment and community economic 
development should have been taken. Other studies describe 
the implementation of one or another intervention, retrain 
ing or relocation, and document the relative success or 
failure. Since no systematic implementation takes place, no 
systematic evaluation takes place and the results of each in 
dividual program do not provide any guidelines, based on 
rigorous study, for future interventions. The displaced 
workers are seldom followed, with or without intervention, 
for more than a couple of years. Without a good 
longitudinal assessment of lost income and revenue, such 
losses might seem relatively limited. The costs of developing 
programs or doing evaluative research might appear high 
when data are not available about the costs of failing to 
choose these alternatives.
A third research problem with significant policy and pro 
gram ramifications focuses upon the point at which study 
begins. Throughout this volume, specific difficulties 
associated with the starting point are discussed. For instance, 
we know little about those individuals whose jobs were lost 
in the waves of contraction common before a major closing. 
Even more critical issues are obscure because research begins 
too late. A plant closing is an economic and social process 
with many actors and many dimensions, yet very little is ac 
tually known about the process. More important still, little is 
known about how the process of a closing affects the out-
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come. Only in the studies we have which do not begin to 
represent the types of closings which have occurred are at 
tempts made to ascertain whether, in fact, early notification 
conduces to early reemployment when certain programs are 
implemented. While this research problem does not have as 
costly a solution as the problems of extensiveness and dura 
tion, it is fraught with equal difficulty. Only in cases where 
management has pledged cooperation can such studies be 
mounted early; there are only a few cases in the literature 
and a few situations of this type currently in progress. The 
utility of even these few cases can be doubted because the 
type of labor-management climate which permits such incur 
sions is unfortunately not common.
Several of the more serious methodological problems of 
plant-closing research are directly related to the conceptual 
and practical problems of undertaking this research. For ex 
ample, it is not possible to extrapolate the findings from one 
plant closing to another because plants studied are not 
selected from a national sample of manufacturing facilities. 
At best, the research from one case can provide some indica 
tion of what can be expected in similar industries, similar 
communities, and in similar groups of workers. Those plant- 
closing studies which are evaluations are, in general, un 
satisfactory. In some respects, their limitations reflect the 
general difficulties of performing such research on a case by 
case basis. Evaluations of training programs can only pro 
vide convincing results when random samples of other 
unemployed workers from plant closings are taken and the 
outcomes for both groups those for whom training was 
provided and those who did not have such training are 
measured. The methodological problems of plant-closing 
research also reflect the fact that in this area, research, policy 
and programming are closely interwoven. While the impres 
sion prevails that plant closings are among the less critical 
employment-related problems and this impression will no
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doubt continue to prevail unless research on extensiveness is 
begun other efforts to bring plant-closing research up to 
the conceptual and methodological standards appropriate 
for social science research will be unsuccessful.
A New Framework for 
Plant-Closing Research
A proposed research agenda for the study of industrial 
relocations and plant closings would focus on these problem 
areas; extensiveness, duration, scope of the study, and plan 
ning and coherence of research efforts.
Determining the extensiveness of the plant-closing 
phenomenon is a major priority. We do not know the 
prevalence of plant closings, the regional patterns in which 
closings occur, nor the comparative effects of closings on 
different communities. Currently, any estimate of the 
number of plant closings must depend upon Dun and 
Bradstreet data, which are not always the appropriate type 
of data to be used. It is possible that linkages can be 
established between different types of administrative data 
bases to provide at least numbers of closings and numbers of 
affected workers. Clearly, this type of data collection and 
reduction done on a regular basis would be an improvement 
over the current situation. However, administrative data 
provide only beginnings. A national survey, either a free 
standing study, or a substudy linked to a major data base in 
some way, would have the advantage of capturing much 
more information than even the most creative exploitation of 
current administrative data bases. Suggestions have been 
made, usually in the context of the discussion of legislation 
for full employment or job security, that managements of 
facilities planning major changes, especially closures, be re 
quired to inform some agency of government and in the 
course of that notification to present an economic impact 
statement similar to those required when federal defense
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establishments are to be closed. Such reports would obvious 
ly have the advantage of continual open access for re 
searchers and could form a rich administrative data base 
about plants, industries, regions, workers, and other sub 
jects crucial to the understanding of the plant-closing pro 
cess.
An ideal arrangement would feature the following studies:
(1) required economic impact studies;
(2) the inclusion of plant-closing questions in national 
studies, e.g., the Parnes data base, the Current Pop 
ulation Survey, even the Census; and
(3) at least one major national detailed study extending 
over at least four years.
This arrangement would reduce but not eliminate the prob 
lems induced by the isolation of plant-closing research.
Not only does no truly coherent conceptual framework or 
estimate of prevalence exist, but no data are available to 
measure that entire preclosing phenomenon which may be 
characterized by continual contraction. Therefore, any clos 
ing studied may always be a study of a residual worker 
population older, less educated, less mobile, subject to 
some costs but not others, appropriate for some programs 
and not others, and whose experience prior to study has been 
much affected by continuing contractions in the workplace.
An appropriate strategy would be the initiation of a study 
of plants in industries where closings are quite likely. When 
closings occur, the entire process could be studied, not just 
the death rattle. This suggested strategy would remedy 
another major methodological and conceptual problem 
associated with plant-closing research. No other area of 
social science research displays such a lamentable lack of 
that essential ingredient of any respectable research design, a 
control group. Of all the studies reviewed, the vast majority
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stand by themselves. Several studies purport to be com 
parative case studies, yet the rigor introduced is only a 
similar methodology used by the researchers, not a serious 
and sustained attempt at selection of a sample. The position 
of the study by Cobb and Kasl as a landmark in this field is 
related, to a large degree, to the fact that both Baker and 
Dawson plants are matched with other similar plants. 
Despite the fact that this is, for plant-closing research, a ma 
jor step forward, a matching exercise is a relatively simplistic 
and unsatisfactory method of sampling.
Within the genre of plant-closing studies, the attempts at 
study vary widely. To a large extent, a review such as we pre 
sent here confers a unity upon a series of studies which differ 
widely in quality, approach, and focus. There is a danger 
that such studies might be considered appropriate for a type 
of cross-study generalization. These studies were not design 
ed in concert with one another; they capture the plant- 
closing process at different points; they emphasize different 
measures and different variables. Their one point of unity is 
the phenomenon they study, an occurrence which can differ 
dramatically, depending upon the concerns, priorities, 
resources, responses and interactions of the impacted 
groups.
Several other important questions have been raised in the 
course of this review and these issues merit study. The em 
phasis in this review, and in the studies generally, has been 
upon the workers and communities. Little research has been 
done to validate the general assumption that plant closings 
do promote economic efficiency. No follow-up studies have 
been done of facilities that moved; it is not known whether 
such moves always do increase profits. More important, no 
evidence has been adduced to show whether, in fact, some 
closings, characterized perhaps by acrimony, are more costly 
than others. Emphasis has been placed, for example, on the 
use of transfer rights by workers, but no comparative studies
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have been done to indicate whether facilities with additional 
workers who have transferred from a closing plant encounter 
any special problems as a result of the tranfers.
Yet other economic studies remain to be done. Opposition 
to plant closings centers on costs incurred by individuals and 
communities. A modest beginning has been made in the area 
of assessing such costs, yet the level of sophistication does 
not yet approach the level required for economic impact 
statements for defense establishments. The whole differen 
tiation between private profit versus individual and public 
costs should be set aside so that models can be developed to 
assess the total cost-benefit package, public and private, of a 
plant closing.
Still other research questions surface as the responses to 
plant closings change. The development of new, private sec 
tor firms, specializing in employability development pro 
gramming, demands that evaluation of such efforts be 
undertaken evaluations designed to measure outcomes 
over at least one year, and measure them against outcomes 
of public-sector programs. Community responses, par 
ticularly those which develop from the grassroots and which 
involve numerous groups in the community, should be 
analyzed and assessed with respect to the functional social 
support they offer displaced workers and the possible func 
tion they may have with respect to community economic 
development. Such unofficial programming appears to be 
relatively common in communities, but the effectiveness of 
such programming is seldom monitored. Another area which 
requires investigation is the process and outcome of plant- 
closing bargaining in different industries. Experience with 
closings and with union representatives reveals that this in 
dividual bears heavy responsibilities; yet the role of the 
union representative, and indeed the area of union support 
services, has been neglected. Further, nonunionized closures 
must be studied closely because they have been completely
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ignored in the past and because, even in the current state of 
research, some comparisons and contrasts between facilities 
with unions and without bargaining units can be made. 
Finally, the problem of closures no longer affects manufac 
turing plants only. While some studies have been done of 
professional and technical workers whose jobs have been 
abolished, the wholesale closing of service facilities in the 
public sector mental health institutions, agencies of local, 
state and federal departments, as well as employment and 
training agencies will provide an opportunity for careful 
study of major shifts in employment. This is a new and im 
portant phenomenon.
Consequences of Plant Shutdowns
If one conclusion of this review was that much critical in 
formation is lacking, another or at least part of it is more 
reassuring. We do know a great deal about some of the con 
sequences of plant closings and we understand the impact of 
such events much better than we did two decades ago. We 
know, for example, that the decision to close a manufactur 
ing facility is a process which is still concealed from the view 
of researchers and others, although the causes of such in 
dustrial relocation are becoming more obvious and more 
complex. Not only are shifts from north to south in search of 
cheaper land and labor continuing, but those shifts are often 
further afield, to less developed nations where labor costs are 
cheaper still. Such shifts are made possible, in part, by 
technological changes. Those technological threats, the vi 
sions of automata replacing workers, which prompted pro 
gram development and research twenty years ago, appear to 
have been premature then. Now, however, the completion of 
that technological revolution is underway, in concert with 
demographic, geographic, and economic change, a set of 
developments which promises to change the American in 
dustrial scene.
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We also know that while management may, in response to 
market changes, decide to close or relocate, other groups are 
affected and respond to this action. Research indicates that 
labor unions have not succeeded at insuring employment 
continuity for members. In many cases, such employment 
protection has not been featured as a prominent bargaining 
demand, partly because threats to employment seemed dis 
tant, and pressures for other concessions in wages and 
benefits were intense and proximate. Unions with a history 
of continuing job loss due to technological change continued 
to bargain for security while other unions found that benefits 
designed for short-term layoffs, supplemental unemploy 
ment benefits, could be utilized in plant-closing situations.
Unions attempt to secure favorable closing bargains when 
all else fails. And relatively recently, unions have begun to 
assume some role in other broader coalitions whose efforts 
are aimed at other points in the closing process. Coalition 
formation for the achievement of common goals has long 
been a strategy employed by organized labor, and some 
beginnings of coalition formation for the purposes of serving 
displaced workers, assisting such workers with plans to 
relocate, and even in a few cases of developing employee 
stock ownership plans (ESOP) can be seen. Most strategies 
used by unions are still relatively traditional and it is too ear 
ly to assess the success of the newer approaches.
Communities also experience the consequences of plant 
shutdowns. Within the past 10 years, the image of the 
passive town has gradually changed. Whether this image was 
ever accurate is unknown. Recently, communities have acted 
and the research evidence indicates that communities are 
well-advised to take action, for the economic costs to local 
areas are substantial. The research also indicates that it is no 
easy task to mobilize a community to do anything in a coor 
dinated fashion, although a community, such as 
Horseheads, New York, can learn to mobilize effectively and
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that learning remains and enables the community to respond 
rapidly and effectively at a later time.
While we still lack the base of information needed to in 
dicate how serious and widespread plant closings have 
become in the past five years, it is surely clear that communi 
ty and political activists, as well as legislators from impacted 
areas, believe that impressionistic evidence is sufficiently 
compelling to indicate that there is a major problem and that 
the problem requires legislative remedies. The flood of plant- 
closing legislation across the northeast and midwest states is, 
in itself, evidence of concern at levels higher than the af 
fected workers and their local communities.
But the primary focus of plant-closing research remains 
where it has been for the past 50 years, squarely on the 
displaced worker. In the most general terms, we do not know 
who that displaced worker is; once again the limitations of 
plant-closing research restrict our conclusions to those few 
instances among numerous closings the few cases which 
have been studied. However, we do know quite a good deal 
about workers in plants which have been studied.
The job search behavior of blue-collar workers displaced 
by plant closings tends to be late, geographically limited, and 
carried on through informal channels. Such behavior is in 
sharp contrast to the more effective job search behaviors of 
white-collar workers. More highly educated, presumably 
better informed about the labor market, younger and more 
mobile, white-collar workers also tend to look for jobs 
earlier than blue-collar workers do. Various reasons can be 
advanced for this behavior, including the desire of blue- 
collar workers to secure severance pay which is often tied to 
remaining on the job until closure.
The reemployment experience of blue-collar workers is 
usually accompanied by declines in income, in status, and 
almost invariably in seniority, which usually cannot be
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transferred. This experience is in contrast to white-collar 
workers, who fare rather better. However, those same fac 
tors age, lower levels of skills and education, less will 
ingness to consider geographic or occupational 
mobility which affect the reemployment experience also af 
fect the job search pattern. So far, no opportunity has arisen 
for research which permits the separation of job search pat 
tern from reemployment experience for similar types of blue- 
collar workers. So whether it is job search, or other im 
mutable characteristics such as age, race and sex, the result is 
that blue-collar workers displaced by plant closings ex 
perience substantial periods of unemployment followed by 
lower paying, less stable employment.
A number of alternatives, besides local job search and 
reemployment, can be available to displaced workers. The 
transfer alternative is available most often because transfer 
rights have been collectively bargained. While management 
can either impede or facilitate participation in transfer pro 
grams, some characteristics of workers appear to become in 
superable barriers to transfer. Workers who are older, with 
lower occupational status, little education, and presumably 
fewer personal resources are less likely to take advantage of a 
transfer policy. For somewhat similar reasons, women often 
cannot and most often do not use a transfer right. Those, 
therefore, most negatively affected by the closing are those 
least likely to reduce the impact of the closing upon 
themselves and their families by transferring. Those who, all 
other things being equal, might seem more likely to become 
reemployed relatively easily, those with better skills, better 
education, and more youthful, take advantage of transfer 
policies.
When geographic mobility is rejected as an alternative, oc 
cupational mobility is another attractive course. Retraining 
programs aim to enhance the employment potential of 
displaced workers. Once again, those who seem to need such
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interventions least, those who are younger, slightly better 
educated, and possessed of slightly more resources than their 
coworkers, seem to participate the most. Still, participation 
in retraining continues to be very limited, about 15 percent, 
and it is not clear how effective retraining programs have 
been.
Retirement, either early or regular withdrawal from the 
labor force on a pension, appears at first glance to be a 
relatively positive outcome for the older displaced worker. 
Still, unplanned retirement, even when resources are ade 
quate, is closely associated with negative mental and physical 
health outcomes, and resources which depend upon fixed 
pension payments often are far from adequate shortly after 
retirement in a time of inflation.
Generally, the results of plant-closing research indicate 
that these particular displaced workers have age, low skills 
and little education as strikes against them. It also shows that 
neither geographic nor occupational mobility is attractive to 
such workers, and in many cases, may actually be or be 
perceived to be impossible alternatives. The most powerful 
influence upon the outcome of a plant closing is the local 
unemployment rate. Yet even when the unemployment rate 
is relatively low, displaced workers do not become 
reemployed rapidly (perhaps by intention) and do not regain 
their old status, seniority, and wage rate after reemploy- 
ment.
Unemployment is generally conceded to be a significant 
stressor capable of producing negative mental and physical 
health outcomes for individuals so affected. The case studies 
reviewed illustrate human costs in rather general and 
unspecified terms. In general, the negative physical and men 
tal health outcomes to be expected from plant closings are 
not quite so severe as we might have expected. Still, since the 
two major mediating factors between the unemployed in-
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dividual and illness are financial resources and social sup 
port, the lack of overwhelming evidence of such bad health 
outcomes is not surprising. It takes time, longer than the 
study period, to exhaust benefits plus severance pay. When 
resources are exhausted, problems do arise. Particularly 
significant is the fact that rural workers, who maintained the 
same networks after the closing as before, suffered least. The 
irony which emerges from the study of the mental health of 
displaced workers is that, for a time at least, their former 
stable work histories, their community attachment, and their 
family stability, provide some safeguard against the early 
onset of serious difficulties. Yet these very same factors are 
those which often impede their successful search for new 
employment which, ultimately, will provide the only secure 
safeguard against the negative outcomes which have been 
demonstrated to be consequent upon unemployment.
Some Policy Recommendations
We do know more about plant closings than we did 20 
years ago, but we are, in general, doing about the same 
things in response to plant closings that were done then. It is 
clear from our analysis of relocation, retraining, and local 
job search and reemployment that these strategies have been 
generally unsuccessful. Moreover, we know now, in some 
detail, that such industrial shifts are costly in economic and 
social terms.
Prescriptions which lean heavily upon ideology provide 
policies which are unlikely to be adopted. Legislative at 
tempts to restrict plant closings or to delay them will prob 
ably continue to fail, not only because they are designed to 
impose controls which will be resisted, but also because no 
mechanism has yet been suggested to cope with the ultimate 
results of the inevitable, albeit delayed and penalized, plant 
closing. Attempts to cope with results of present and conti 
nuing shifts in capital, production, and technology must pro-
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ceed on different levels with different programs which are 
subject to some type of coordination.
Just as priorities have been acknowledged in the area of 
youth unemployment, a major national employment and 
training priority should be developed, preferably during the 
reauthorization process for the Comprehensive Employment 
and Training Act, for older workers displaced by plant clos 
ings. Such a priority is particularly crucial as the drains on 
the national and state unemployment funds continue and as 
the only alternative for many older workers is retirement, 
itself a major drain on the nation's retirement resources. 
However, when a major program direction is developed for 
displaced workers, attention must be directed toward 
analysis of earlier failure and the reasons for them. 
Therefore, national policy development must begin with a 
set of research tasks. To mount effective retraining and 
relocation efforts, several continuing studies are required. 
Regional labor forecasts, particularly those which assess 
labor shortages, should be supported fully and results 
disseminated rapidly to planners and program developers. 
Studies should be developed which assess the feasibility of 
some types of relocation programs; it may be that supported 
relocation, together with retraining, is not prohibitively ex 
pensive if the program is well-designed and closely targeted. 
When retraining programs are offered, they should be 
designed to provide skills which will be in demand. A major 
problem encountered by displaced workers is a lack of 
knowledge of the local labor markets, other labor markets, 
and the job search process. The employability development 
programs which have been signed for the hard-to-employ 
can be adapted and used for displaced workers with con 
siderable success. Moreover, in a time of tight resources, in 
come maintenance programs beyond unemployment in 
surance and severance payments, such as Trade Adjustment 
Assistance, should have such carefully developed training
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programs funded, available, and then required for par 
ticipants in order to maximize the utility of the transfer 
payments. Programs once set into operation should be 
evaluated rigorously and the results of these evaluations con 
tinuously fed into the program planning and development 
process.
While the research and some of the planning function of a 
new national priority for displaced workers should be 
located on the federal level, service delivery should take 
place on several levels. Again, in a time of institutional con 
traction, there are several important yields on the local level 
to be realized from the utilization and attendant upgrading 
of vocational education programs in local educational agen 
cies, particularly community colleges. Moreover, community 
colleges, with their traditional tripartite structure around 
general education, vocational education, and community 
service, have the capacity to respond quickly to local needs 
while having the assets of linkages in the local community, 
throughout the state, and through their associations, 
throughout the nation. Close coordination with other local 
agencies and providers of services should be a major objec 
tive of any local program.
If the information and goal-setting function lies with the 
federal government and service delivery depends upon local 
and state efforts, a major role for the local community is the 
development of an effective community response to any type 
of large-scale dislocation. The formation of coordinating 
groups which minimize duplication of services and activities 
while insuring the allocation of resources for neglected ser 
vices such a short term health care is essential. From such 
a coordinating group, allied perhaps with other local 
economic development agencies and groups of concerned 
community members and businessmen, can develop the local 
planning and implementation capacity for economic 
redevelopment.
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The research results give us some idea of how such a pro 
gram might be designed. Let us suppose that a market shift, 
obsolescence, and the demand for technological innovation 
indicates that the best course for a specific company is a 
move from a community which was, for jobs and for tax 
support and indirect economic activity, highly dependent 
upon that facility. An ideal strategy for management to 
adopt in such a case would be early notification of workers 
and local leaders, accompanied by an indication of will 
ingness to help support some minimal fact-finding activities 
to aid the community and some additional assistance to 
workers. If possible, transfer rights could be offered. Super 
visors and other managers could permit some time off for in 
terviewing and some assistance with job search. Recently, 
companies have been retaining the services of plant-closing 
teams which offer employability development programs for 
displaced workers before the closure. Such services can be 
costly, but similar activities could be provided by local 
employment and training agencies if sufficient latitude in 
submission of plans to regional and federal offices were 
allowed and if offering services to displaced workers became 
a priority nationally and for such agencies. The lead time 
would also be helpful for local groups, including community 
agencies and service providers, to begin planning and coor 
dination activities to provide transition assistance for those 
who will be jobless for a period of time. Labor would ob 
viously have considerable interest in exploring options for 
possible transfer and might also assume responsibility of 
seeking information from outside groups, if necessary, 
about the current condition of the labor market locally and 
elsewhere. Labor would also continue to bargain for the best 
possible termination settlement, and might consider working 
with other groups in the community should employee owner 
ship appear a feasible option or should there be some 
possibility of attracting other industry using similar types of 
skilled workers to the area and perhaps even to the facility
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itself. Such union activities would, of course, reduce 
management's apprehension about possible damage to the 
physical plant and equipment. Community groups, par 
ticularly local educational agencies, could facilitate job 
placement and provide training opportunities; in-fact, ap 
propriate new training could actually be developed for the 
local labor market. Such training, which must be designed 
with knowledge of present labor needs and some sense from 
forecasts of future labor market trends, could become one 
basis for continuing economic development. A pool of train 
ed workers is obviously one important selling point in a cam 
paign to attract new industry to an area.
A program such as this differs from those described in the 
literature in several important respects. First, it offers more 
than one activity designed to facilitate reemployment for 
displaced workers; it provides, when possible, transfer, 
employability development assistance, and retraining. It also 
serves to coordinate services for personal, family, and health 
problems during the transition period. Third, it relies upon 
local agencies to develop retraining, while it also emphasizes 
the necessity for good information about labor market 
trends. Finally, these initiatives have long term potential 
beyond the important first task of facilitating reemployment 
for displaced workers; it begins to provide trained workers, 
and community coordination and development efforts, all 
important factors in attracting new business. Obviously such 
a coherent program is an improvement over those which of 
fer only one or two program elements. Still, the success of 
such a program depends in large part upon the local 
unemployment rate, and to a lesser degree on the economic 
condition of the region and the country.
It is to be hoped that the "new industrial relations," the 
reduction of areas of conflict between labor and manage 
ment and the concomitant enlargement of areas of coopera 
tion, will set a pattern for such collaborative action in plant
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closings to come. Despite the lack of precise quantative data, 
few will deny that plant closings are unfortunate and costly. 
Many, however, will point to current economic conditions of 
slow growth as reasons to refrain from intervention. Yet in 
terventions need not be particularly costly, nor should all 
costs and activities be associated with federal programs. 
Resources are available in local agencies and educational in 
stitutions, as well as in management, labor unions, and the 
local community. In fact, unfavorable economic conditions 
dictate a cautious, careful, and informed use of all resources. 
Given the national priorities which have emerged recently, 
what has traditionally happened to displaced workers cannot 
be permitted to continue. Long term survival on income 
maintenance programs is destructive for individuals and 
does not provide needed contributions to the economic 
growth of the nation.
The literature reviewed here, despite the shortcomings 
described, remains an important resource for future policy 
development and program design. It is not so much what we 
have learned to do that is critical for the future. It is more 
what we have seen does not work and what the reasons for 
failure have been. But most important of all, the research 
reviewed bears eloquent witness to that often quoted remark 
of the theologian Paul Tillich: "Not to decide is to decide." 
Indeed, we have not yet decided what to do about plant clos 
ings and industrial relocation in America and until an in 
formed decision is made, we will continue to live with the 
economic stagnation and human misfortune that our failure 
to decide has permitted.
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